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Abstract:
This thesis  argues that the Hungarian collective identity is  severely damaged being reflected in
victimhood, low self-esteem, fear, alcoholism,  individualism, among others. It explores how the
historical memories of the Hungarian people are still relevant today and how they manifest in the
Hungarian collective identity and the socio-psychological environment. The focus of this research is
interdisciplinary, in the areas of history, sociology and psychology. Such a study is important to
understand the relevance of historical memories. The main conclusions drawn from this study are
that  the  chain  of  historical  events  of  the  20th century,  especially  the  Trianon  Trauma  and
communism  have  caused  great  traumas  to  the  people  of  Hungary.  The  collective  identity  of
Hungarians  has  been  negatively  affected  that  manifest  in  the  present  political  culture  and  the
negative socio-psychological reality of Hungary. The Dissertation recommends that peaceful means
have to be found to readdress historical memories and the conflict so that positive transformation
may take place.
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From the  beginning  of  the  20th century  there  have  been  historical  events  occurred  that
brought great injustices and trauma, problems to the people of Hungary in the  Carpathian Basin
where Hungary is located. The end of the First World War had a terribly wrongful ending for the
Hungarians due to the treaty of Trianon in 1920, which was an unjust, dictated peace treaty  by
mainly Great Britain and France. Consequently, Hungary lost its about two-thirds population and
territory  with  large  majority  Hungarian  areas  carved  out  by  the  winner  neighboring  states  of
Czechoslovakia,  Romania and Yugoslavia at  that time, but  also by the defeated Austria. It was
extremely unjust compared to the facts that the Hungarians had a subordinated position within the
Austria-Hungary  Monarchy,  self-determination  was  not  taken  into  account  and  the  Hungarian
delegation did not have a say in the matter. This fueled irredentist politics until the Trianon Trauma
was reasserted as a result of the Second World War. Then, from the end of the Second World War,
Hungary had been under Soviet occupation that also left its trace on Hungarian collective identity,
such  as  the  brutal aftermath  of  the  1956  Hungarian  Revolution.  After  freeing  the  chains  of
communism in 1989, it seems like the past issues have not been addressed, reconciled  but rather
deformed and worsened. The new democratic system and joining the European Union in 2004 have
not improved the well-being of the Hungarian people. The collective identity of Hungarian people
and people who live in Hungary have been affected negatively and the traumas are still present in
the historical memories of the people. The historical memories, the unaddressed issues still manifest
in  the  current  political  authority,  political  culture  and  socio-psychological  environment.  The
historical  events  have  led  to  a  sense  of  victimhood,  a  sense  of  a  disrupted  nation,  negative
worldview,  feeling  of  trauma,  low  self-esteem,  large  dissatisfaction,  complaining,  not  trusting
authorities,  not  daring to  resist  authority,   alcoholism,  high suicide rate,  holding on strongly to
properties, etc. Some of the underlying issues, problems manifest in the subconscious minds of the
people that are reflected in the present government of Orbán. The corruption, unfairness, keeping
the  institutions  and people  in  control,  utilizing  fear,  serving foreign  interests,  not  caring  about
people, destroying school system, not taking into account the constitution, having a lack of support
for healthcare system, etc. have to be resolved. There is a need to reconcile with historical memories
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in a peaceful way, to readdress these issues in a just way, to heal the society and to positively
reconstruct the collective identity of the Hungarian people.
1.2. Personal motivation
This research was inspired by many personal experiences, personal convictions, what I have
seen and heard, daily interactions, family stories, historical facts and it could not have materialized
without my emotional susceptibility.
This topic motivated me, because unaddressed historical memories still shape the current
Hungarian reality and  these have created, manifested in societal issues such as low self-esteem,
negative worldview, problem of  alcoholism, high suicide rate  and several mental, psychological
issues. The sole issue of mental health, besides physical, is of utmost importance and great concern
for me as in this regard the reality is tragic in Hungary. There is a need to address, to heal the
underlying issues concerning the Hungarian people and to improve their general well-being, thus
this dissertation is a good way to start.
Then,  the  Hungarian  case  is  one  of  the  most  unjust  historical  issues  in  Europe,
contextualizing  Trianon  and  the  consequences,  following  periods  and  it  is  not  widely  known,
however, still highly relevant as it adversely shapes Central-, East European human and political
relations, such as between the governments of Hungary and some of its neighbors due to the areas
of Hungarian minorities.
The strongest force for my motivation that I have chosen this topic arises from the fact that I
feel the motivation to contribute to the solution, reconciliation of these difficult Hungarian issues by
making people aware of the current  Hungarian reality  as  I  feel  partly  responsible  for Hungary
thinking of myself as a Hungarian.
I also believe in the principle of responsibility and that each person shall be responsible first
and foremost for his or her own space. This can be interpreted that one should create order in his or
her  room before he or  she takes  on global  challenges to  tackle in their  career  such as climate
change. But going deeper, I believe one first and foremost should be responsible for creating inner
peace within oneself or at least learn to tame the evil side of oneself, making peace and justice
locally in their narrow and broader communities. By this, I am stating one should take the first step
first and foremost to contribute to peace in his or her own country if that is possible.
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1.3. Thesis statement and research questions
The chain of historical events of the 20th century,  especially the Treaty of Trianon have
caused great traumas to the people of Hungary and negatively affected the collective identity of
Hungarians. The unaddressed traumas, issues still manifest in the present political culture and the
negative  socio-psychological  environment  of  Hungary  due  to  the  historical  memories.  The
collective identity of Hungarians require just and peaceful solutions for positive reconstruction.
Primary research question:
How  can the negative collective identity,  the negative socio-psychological  environment and the
historical traumas of the Hungarians be addressed, reconciled and transformed by peaceful means?
Secondary questions:
1. What is collective identity? 
2. How have historical events affected the collective identity of Hungarians since the 20th century
until recently?
3. Why have the historical traumas been left unaddressed?
4. What are the characteristics that describe the present collective identity of Hungarians?
1.4. Research aim and objectives
A positive  reconstruction  of  the  present  negative  state  of  the  collective  identity  of  the
Hungarian people through a peaceful reconciliation with their historical memories, all by peaceful
means.
1. Identify the main historical events that negatively affected the socio-psychological environment
of the Hungarian people.
2. Evaluate the consequences of the unjust, traumatic historical events.
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3. Assess critically the present collective identity of Hungarians.
4. Investigate the link between the historical memories of Hungarians and the recent political, socio-
psychological culture.
5. Formulate a direction towards peaceful reconciliation and positive transformation.
1.5. Methodology
First of all,  ontologically realism will  provide the base of  this study how historical events
unfolded in Hungary  during the 20th century  based on the facts,  which are external to the human
mind.  This  realist  lens  implies  an  objective view how different  historical  events  happened,  for
example taking a look at the map of Greater Hungary and acknowledging that by the 20th century
the different nationalities constituted about half of the population, not viewing it subjectively from a
far-right perspective that all the folks were Hungarians, when it is not true.  Then, idealism will be
used as it defines that reality may be understood through socially constructed meanings.  Certain
events, such as the Peace Treaty of Trianon or the Hungarian Holocaust are interpreted in different
ways by different societal groups and one event of the two may have a deeper meaning to them. In
this  study  it  will  be  proven  that  the  collective  identity  is  constructed  by  humans  through
socialization and in other ways and historical traumas may be given more than one meaning. It is
useful  to  combine  realism with  idealism,  because  oftentimes  in  today’s  world  ideas,  concepts,
emotions  define  human behavior,  while  facts  and rationality  are  neglected,  creating a  distorted
worldview, but realism also needs idealism to break the chains, the limits of what is possible, such
as heading towards a direction of peace.
Regarding  the  epistemology  of  my  research,  I  will  apply  constructionism,  because  it
examines the development of jointly-constructed understandings of the world that form the basis for
shared assumptions about reality, which is crucial for my research as the chain of past historical
events construct the Hungarian collective identity to a large extent and historical memories shape
the “Hungarian reality”, the socio-psychological environment.
Regarding the theoretical framework, I will use the approach of historical inquiry as I will
review Hungarian historical events that shaped the characteristics, environment of the society, the
ethnic identity in Hungary and the meanings Hungarians give to historical memories. Thus, the
attributes and meanings of the Hungarian collective identity are analyzed.
Regarding the methods, It is a case study because it specifically analyzes the history of the
Hungarian people and their collective identity, how it has changed over time.
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This  study  will  be  mainly  qualitative  research  (English  and  Hungarian  books,  articles,
Internet sources), because most of my research, such as the interpretation of historical events, the
feelings, thoughts of Hungarians and what the collective identity and historical memories imply
cannot be analyzed by numerical data.
Finally, considering the limitations of the research, firstly due to the fact that I am Hungarian
and it is a sensitive topic, I may not be able to be fully impartial like if someone else would write
about the topic such as from Spain, for example. Secondly, if I encounter that the English sources
are limited, I may need to translate many sources from Hungarian to English and it is sometimes
hard to provide the same meaning as the original text. Third, in case if I only include personal and
family stories, experiences, there may not be enough subjective experiences shared that would give
a clearer, whole picture.  Moreover, some literature on the topic may be biased, and thus it could
divert my research to some extent.
1.6. Literature review
Stephen Béla Várdy (1997) wrote about the Trianon Syndrome in Hungary that left a deep
scar on the Hungarian people within Hungary, the Hungarian people outside the frontiers within the
Carpathian  Basin and the  Hungarian  diasporas in  the  world.  He acknowledged the  nation  was
dismembered into five unequal parts, in a very unjust way not taking into  account national self-
determination.  No event in modern times could be compared to this  event,  while in Hungarian
history the author compared it to the Battle of Mohács in 1526, when the Ottoman empire defeated
the Hungarians in this crucial battle and it paved the way for Hungary’s trisection and became the
battleground  of  two  empires.  The  Trianon  syndrome  appeared  in  the  interwar  period  when
politicians devoted their time to revisionism. Between 1938 and 1941, Hungary achieved ethnically-
linguistically justifiable territorial revisions, however, this came with a high price of being involved
in World War II that undid all achievements.  Trianon shook the life-foundation of Hungarians for
many decades not to be able to objectively assess the situation.  It has become a lasting national
malady that is felt by the Hungarians since then.  During communism, it was not possible to talk
about Trianon as it was a taboo. The end of communism resulted in the reappearance of debates and
frustration about Trianon. In the 1990s border revision seemed to be transformed into worry about
Hungarian minorities in neighboring states who were being subjected to denationalization. Trianon
also prevented Hungary from having good relations with their Danubian neighbors. The Hungarian
minorities  certainly  faced  difficulties  but  the  post-communist  Hungarian  governments  only
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emphasized the importance of human rights of the minorities, not revisions to comply with the EEC
and the NATO in order to join them. Hungarian civic organizations, such as the Hungarian World
Federation also asserted their positions to claim revision or called for improved human rights.
Orsolya Putz (2019) acknowledges the Treaty of Trianon still plays a great role constructing
the  national  identity  and  how it  is  conceptualized  and how contemporary  citizens  of  Hungary
interpret  Trianon.  The  author  thinks  of  Trianon  as  a  metaphor  in  the  Hungarian  collective
consciousness. Putz views Trianon and the Peace Treaty as agents, as persons who cause harm, and
as means of disintegrating an object. Trianon is also viewed as a substance in the Hungarian mind
and  soul,  moreover  perceived  as  mental  and  emotional  illness.  Putz  further  analyzes  the
consequences of the conceptualization of Trianon, ranging from territorial and population changes
to  how  it  changed  the  emotional,  mental  state  of  the  nation.  She  comes  up  with  interesting
interpretations such as how she views the detached Hungarian populations as the child who needs to
be  looked  after,  while  the  post-1920  Hungarian  nation  as  the  nurturing  mother  and  probably
neighbouring states or actors who played a role in the treaty as agents who cause harm. Putz ends
her work with stating the role of Trianon in the construction of Hungarian national identity and in
the conclusions states how this conceptual system about Trianon survives and its recent evolution
from 1990 to 2015.
Gábor Egry (2020) acknowledges that the effects of Trianon are still lasting today and that
there has been divisions about understanding Trianon between right- and left-wing political parties.
The current Orbán regime, furthermore, turned the meaning, commemoration of Trianon upside
down and manipulated it for political purposes. The author highlights how the Trianon trauma was
reframed  as  a  common  issue  of  Central  Europe  combined  with  traditional,  anti-liberal  and
revisionist  Trianon discourse.  It  clearly  serves  the  political  agenda of  the  Visegrád  Group and
Central  European Cooperation.  Egry examined the memory politics about Trianon and political
divisions in Hungary since 2010. As the Fidesz with Orbán gained power in Hungary, some of the
first legislative acts, simplified naturalization process for Hungarians and a new memorial day for
Trianon, the Day of National Cohesion. After the fall of communism, even the centre- and radical-
right  called  for  revisionism,  while  the  liberals  and  socialists  aimed  to  overcome  Trianon  by
accepting the past and with practical solutions such as cultural  autonomy.  The “new Hungary”
during  the  Orbán  regime  was  to  remedy  both  the  failed  regime  change  and  the  ills  of  post-
communism, moreover Trianon. Hungarianness, Hungarian nationhood became the cornerstone of
state-building and the re-establishment of the Carpathian Basin as a Hungarian space. With the fall
of  communism,  many  asserted  that  Hungarian  victimhood  became the  whole  20th century  and
suffering as  the major  thread being perceived in a  broader  Eastern European concept  too.  The
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common  Hungarian  discourse  on  Trianon  mentions  some  form  of  injustice,  while  Orbán’s
commemoration goes further to prove that the tragedy of Hungary is the tragedy of Central Europe.
The new commemoration is devoid of history, tradition and serves ideological, political purposes.
Ionel N. Sava (2020), a Romanian scholar wrote about Trianon that Hungary shall reconcile
with the past and that nostalgia is present in Hungarians that leads to cultural trauma. Moreover,
among  the  20th century painful historical events, Trianon has been the dominant for Hungarians.
The author  begins  by first  comparing the German-French reconciliation since the 1940s to  the
Hungarian-Romanian  reconciliation  after  the  fall  of  communism.  Yet  he  argues  that  in  2018
Hungary stated there was nothing to be celebrated and in 2020 Hungary commemorated Trianon.
He argues historical nostalgia of the interwar period and the Trianon trauma have resurfaced. Sava
states  neighbouring  states  could  find  a  convenient  solution  to  this  historical  problem and  that
Romania only asks for reconciliation and European integration. The past has not been forgotten as
the  nostalgia  about  the  event  of  Trianon  is  unveiled  in  East-Central  Europe.  Sava  defines  the
concepts  of  nostalgia,  tragedy  and collective  trauma.  Trauma theory  is  especially  important  as
trauma is not an institution, neither an experience but memory of something unexpected happening
and suffering could lead to trauma. Sava mentions the latter sufferings of Hungarians after Trianon,
such as the Jewish Holocaust, the Soviet occupation and the military intervention in 1956 that make
the  Trianon  Trauma  into  a  causa  prima.  Sava  further  emphasized  that  for  the  Hungarians  the
multinational Mitteleuropa was replaced by the 1920s as the years of Hungarian suffering and the
grandiose  concept  of  Visegrád.  Finally,  for  Hungary  there  is  a  European  dilemma  whether  to
reconcile with what had happened and focus on integration or postpone integration and focus on the
Trianon trauma. Sava concludes by stating whether there indeed exists a Trianon trauma, it should
be healed within an integrated Europe.
The first  part  of  my study, which is  about  the recurring Trianon trauma throughout  my
Thesis will be based on Stephen Béla Várdy’s (1997) work, because he approaches the topic from a
perspective  of  memory  and  some  objectivity,  that  it  left  a  scar  on  all  Hungarians  and  was
suppressed under communism. While many authors, such as Ionel N. Sava (2020) politicizes the
issue,  among others  pointing to neonationalism and politics of Orbán, I  aim to view it  from a
pragmatic,  sociological,  psychological  view.  In  this  aspect,  Orsolya  Putz’s  (2019)  book  offers
another base that Trianon may be embedded in Hungarian collective identity.
It is important to write about the process of Trianon, its antecedents since when changes
were occurring that led to this event and as Várdy (1997) wrote the period of irredentism and how it
was forbidden to talk about it  during communism. Putz’s (2019) ideas about Trianon that its  a
substance in the Hungarian mind and that Hungary may be considered the mother who has to care
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about the Hungarians detached from Hungary are important, but this work further aims to speculate
about the real effects of Trianon on the exact characteristics of Hungarian collective identity.
As  Sava  (2020)  points  out  the  Trianon  Trauma is  some kind of  causa  prima  that  may
influence the Hungarian collective identity the greatest and it belittles other events. I acknowledge
this as Trianon is not an unfinished event, as Egry (2020) stated too, because there are still many
Hungarians living in neighboring states that affect the Hungarian people and the relations between
Hungary and other states. However, he only views Trianon as a Hungarian issue from a Romanian
perspective, though it is as much a Romanian issue as it is Hungarian. Whereas if one looks at what
the successor states provided to the Hungarian minorities, one may find even the basic cultural
rights of those Hungarians living there are violated and not taken into account creating tensions
between states in the region,  while for moving forward towards a more cooperative region the
successor  states  would  have  to  let  these  peoples  practice  their  rights  and not  act  indifferently
towards them.
On the contrary, as Egry (2020) mentioned, the Orbán government politicizes the issue of
Trianon, which I consider to be an ill-natured political tool, thus it cannot be stated that recently
Hungary is not distorting anything either. Nobody is a Saint. Even if the past is gone, the future is
still unwritten, what this Thesis recognizes.
As  Sava (2020)  put  it,  for  a  similar  French-German cooperation  between Hungary  and
Romania, both parties would have to make an effort and take into account the needs of the other for
a peaceful coexistence. This Thesis will analyze shortly the situation of these Hungarian minorities,
but it will not go into details, politicize this issue, however, there may be a recommendation at the
end how a more peaceful, cooperative coexistence might be achieved.
Mária Schmidt (2005) wrote about the way until the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, such as the
issue of mass rape in 1945 that also led to the Revolution that was brutally repressed. She begins the
introduction by stating the importance of the Hungarian Revolution as having a great role in world
history and the vulnerability communism suffered as a consequence. Tibor Déry defined in his work
that  to  live together  with Bolshevik dictatorship for a longer  time period was impossible for a
nation. The fall of the communist system ended symbolically by the reburial of Nagy Imre Prime
Minister and his fellow martyrs on 16th June, 1989. The roots of the free and democratic Hungary
after the collapse of the Soviet Union has its roots in the struggle of 1956. As the siege of Budapest
in 1945 ended the Second World War in Hungary, the worse catastrophe just occurred the day after
making reference to the weaking of women’s body, the abortion operation was made free that in
reality meant the occurring mass rape of Hungarian women by the victorious Red Army along with
taking prisoners of war ranging from civilian men to women and children to the Gulag, with half of
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them had not seen again any more from the about 700000 people. The resistance to the Soviets
originated  in  the  hopeless  battle  of  fathers  and  monks  who  tried  to  defend  their  children,  the
women. But this was not all, as the terror of the violent forces of the organizations created by the
Communist Party took away 45000 people between 1945 and 1946. People were also executed.
These were some of the antecedents of 1956.
Tibor Valuch (2008) wrote about the societal characteristics and consequences of the 1956
Hungarian Revolution, moreover the retaliation after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which aim
was to instal fear in people or make them incapacitated by executions and incarceration. The author
begins by stating the antecedents what had led to the Revolution both internally in Hungary and
more broadly within the communist bloc. He analyzed also the societal aspects of that time and
highlighted there was increasing tensions between most societal classes and the communists within
Hungary for years, such as an existential uncertainty, the loss of property, the implementation of
violence  in  everyday  life,  systematic  persecution  of  certain  groups  and  harming  the  national
traditions, symbols and so on. He further writes about the organizations that were formed to start the
uprising, political parties and their directions. Valuch continued with assessing the retaliation and
the deaths. 229 people were executed, around 20000 people were incarcerated to shorter or longer
periods, and about 200000 Hungarian people went into exile in 1956, according to the Yugoslavian
and Austrian authorities, from which more than 11000 people returned until the summer of 1957.
However, the communist authorities even after the retaliation aimed to deter, terrorize the people
who wanted to take actions and make them leave the country. After all, due to the failure of the
Revolution  and the  period  of  retaliation,  people  felt  helpless,  subjugated  and weak that  led  to
keeping distance from politics for some time among the average people.
Mária Schmidt’s (2005) and Tibor Valuch’s (2008) works point to two major events during
communism, the mass rape in 1945 and the retaliation of the 1956 Revolution that give part of my
base on communism. This period of terror from 1945 to 1956-57 is the first part of communism that
this study will take into account how it could have affected collective identity but the other part is
the era of the Kádár regime from 1957 till the end of the 1980s that is probably the more prevalent,
which may have a stronger effect on the collective identity, because many people who grew up
during this period are still alive today.
Katarina Gombocz (2016) concluded in her thesis that the high suicide rate and depression
are embedded in the cultural context of Hungarians living in the US as immigrants in this study. It is
concluded that there is a Hungarian Traumatic Cultural Identity linked to a disruption of a sense of
belonging and negative worldview. The author introduces the topic with the tragic fact that Hungary
was one of the leading countries where the suicide rate was so high, such as 44.9 per 100000 in
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1980. This reduced after the period of communism but it is still the highest in the European Union.
She identifies depression as a leading cause of suicide which can also be shown in the case of
Hungary. High rates of drugs and alcohol use are also identified that leads to depression, while
Schultz (1995) argues Hungarians are in an identity crisis between their Asiatic origins and the
current European place. Gombocz then links Hungarian depression and suicide to a broader cultural
context and historical circumstances. There are also studies mentioned that prove that in certain
cases ethnic self-identification of a person may help lessen their depression, anxiety and improve
their self-confidence. Some studies noted that among Hungarians, the Hungarian people who live in
the  US  as  immigrants  have  the  worst  suicide  rates,  thus  four  Hungarian  females  living  as
immigrants were being interviewed about family stories on depression among Hungarian women.
Gombocz argues in her work that family stories are situated within a Hungarian cultural context and
participants make use of cultural resources, such as negative 20th-century events to shed light on
depression  within  their  families.  The reproduction  of  narratives  reinforces  the  identity  through
which Hungarians relate to their depression. The author identifies their Traumatic Cultural Identity.
Gombocz analyzed the definitions of ethnic identification and what it means to be Hungarian. There
are an essentialist and primordial understandings. According to the former, ethnicity is fixed being
based  on  common  language,  ancestry,  territory,  while  the  primordial  one  suggests  a  fluid
explanation shaped by socio-cultural factors such as discourse or group psychology. Then the author
briefly goes through Hungarian history and highlights some important events especially of the 20 th
century,  the  Trianon  Trauma,  the  Trauma  of  the  1956  Hungarian  Revolution,  the  Trauma  of
communism and the erasure of the Trauma of the Hungarian Holocaust. Then she talks about illness
beliefs and making sense of illness. After discussing the participants experiences, a disruption of a
sense of belonging, collective and generational negativity in the Hungarian worldview were brought
up the most, while collective traumas acted as triggers for depression.
The issues being mentioned in the work of Gombocz (2016), such as the disruption of a
sense of belonging, the negative worldview, depression, the high Hungarian suicide rate and the
identity  crisis  of  Hungarians  between  a  European  and  Asian  identity  will  be  considered  as
symptoms of a negative, traumatic historical development.
Miklós  Hadas  (2017)  wrote  about  how  the  characteristics  of  the  Hungarian  society
developed through the ages and identified negative present characteristics, moreover different types
of Hungarian people, the protesters, the withdrawing, the conformists and the passive protesters.
The author introduces his text by stating that many of his sociologist colleagues ask about why is
there  no  resistance  against  the  current  political  elite  in  Hungary.  As  there  is  a  scientific  book
characterizing the German people, Hadas argues nations have certain returning thinking, emotional
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and action patterns that are the results of long-term structures created over time. In the beginning of
his work, Hadas compares the lives, characteristics of Hungarian people to the Dutch. As opposed
to the Dutch people, there is a great chance that the Hungarians feel an inclination not to pay for the
ticket on a tram, regardless who he or she is, which can also be said about hiding the taxation duty
of their income. This has a lesser chance in the Netherlands as according to societal norms, paying
for tickets serve their own interests and safety. This may be linked to the fact that Flanders was one
of the main centers of medieval trade, which resulted in free citizens already in the 12-13th centuries
creating  their  own  structures  and  throughout  the  centuries  common  trust  and  fair  play  have
developed between the people and with the institutions. By this stereotyping, the author focuses on
typical and likely national behavior patterns. While the Western European city went against the
aristocracy creating its own economy and making their societal breakthrough, the prevalence of
cities and the citizenry in the Hungarian history is very low. Even if there are cities, the citizens are
mostly not Hungarians and in the market towns there were rather peasant rights. The Hungarian
citizenry only became a prevalent force in the latter half of the 19 th century and those were mainly
Germans and Jews. Thus, the roots of the Hungarian national habitat primarily originate from the
structural situations and behavioral patterns of the aristocracy and the peasantry. There is a very
important  aspect  of  societal  development  in  a  European  context,  regarding  the  geopolitical
positioning, as while Western European states were able to sail and colonize lands, Russia expanded
to Siberia,  Central-Eastern Europe did not  have such opportunities and on the Danube river in
Hungary  was  also  not  possible  to  sail  upwards,  thus  Hungary,  among  others  was  left  in  the
periphery of larger empires. Another important aspect of that region is that the power was usually
concentrated within the state, which governed the economy and the society in a top-down manner.
In the 20th century,  Hungary had to  go through three  regime changes  (1919,  1945,  1990) as  a
member of a failed world order capitulating to enemies and restart with conforming to the will of
the winner  powers  suffering huge losses each time.  The regime changes  are  forced by outside
powers, the Entente after World War I, the Soviets after the Second World War and “the West” after
the fall  of communism. There are no revolutions,  rights achieved from inside struggles,  so the
people who aim to implement changes, strive to do it under the shortest time period, because the
new powers, new Lords are coming and only that is achievable, which is attainable in a short time.
There is great uncertainty and narrow visions, so if someone reaches a power position, he or she
should  utilize  it  to  make  better  prospects  for  their  families  for  an  unpredictable  future.  As  a
consequence of the capitulations, the consistency, the development that started in earlier periods
were  interrupted.  After  each  regime  change,  an  overly  bureaucratized,  authoritarian  state  was
created under the control of the dominant parties. The elites aim to transform the society from top-
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down and not the expertise, but instead the loyalty and reliability are the decisive factors who are
the members of that period.  A state  elite is  being created that obliges,  calls  on the people,  are
unreliable and punish, change the legal system to their  preferences.  The state is an enemy and
exploitative in each three periods. On top of this, there is a masculine political culture in Hungary
even until today. Most of the Hungarian politicians fought both real and symbolic wars against
internal and external enemies. In each of the three periods of the 20 th century, there was a central
hatred ideology revolved around enemies, which provided the legitimacy of the system. There was
no vision for a positive utopia, but instead a revenge-motivated negativity based on the past, be it
either the Horthy regime, the Kádár regime or Orbán regime. After the fall of communism, the
common enemies became the Jews, then the migrants but in all periods the gypsies, of course. The
Hungarian nation in this sense has become a community of hatred. The construction of an enemy in
the 21st century is new in a sense that there is no outside force or pressure, but the Orbán regime
creates  its  own enemies  and generates  kind of  a  war  of  independence.  The target  enemies  are
basically fictions in this rhetoric war, like Brussels. Then the author analyzes collective strategies of
Hungarians, common behavioral patterns such as the protesters, the withdrawing, the conformists
and the passive protesters. The protesters ultimately always fail in Hungarian history as there are no
bottom-up successful revolutions. The withdrawing group is a much more populous group that has
four types: migration, emigration, self-destruction, submission. In the third category there are the
people who believe in passive resistance, while the fourth group are the conformists.
From  Hadas’  (2017)  work,  the  four  types  of  Hungarian  people,  the  protesters,  the
withdrawing, the conformists and the passive protesters will provide an anchor for this Thesis to
identify the present distribution of the different types of people. Besides comparing Hungary to
Western  Europe,  a  “Middle-European”  category  will  be  highlighted  further  and  more  will  be
mentioned about the regime changes and political culture throughout the last hundred years or so.
Noémi Zsuzsanna and others (2017) gave an overview on the phenomenon of collective
victim  consciousness  and  that  the  so-called  Hungarian  victim  identity  resulted  from  the
characteristics of Hungarian historical trajectory is discussed in the light of social scientific theories
and researches of the last years and decades. The authors state that a collective victim identity exists
if the members of a certain group share the beliefs that they were subjected to aggression, violence
once or multiple times by other groups. They think these acts were undeserved, unjust and consider
them intentional  wrongdoings,  the  group was  not  able  to  prevent,  not  taking the  principles  of
morality into account. Thus they feel vulnerable and the construction of this identity does not only
affect their own group but also it influences the relations with other groups. A group can also feel
themselves  to  be  victims  in  case  of  natural  catastrophes,  while  instead  of  actual  violence,
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segregation or discrimination may lead to collective victimization. After the actual happenings, a
group may subjectively sense and socially construct the accepted representation of the event. The
national memory is functional and selective, the representation of the past occurs according to the
present cognitive and mental needs, while the next generation may reconstruct these ideas in similar
or less similar ways. Radical traumatic events easily form as a good base for collective memories
and these  traumas are  “chosen”  in  a  sense that  the predecessors  were  not  able  to  process,  the
wounds are not healed. Thus, these grievances may be inherited through generations and may form
a central  theme  within  the  collective.  These  “chosen”  traumas,  according  to  Volkan,  mean  an
unconscious decision of a group about events that are deemed to be prevalent and are chosen to be
preserved as  a  part  of  the  group’s  history.  The historical  memories  and the  collective  identity
mutually affect one another. The study conducted by Mészáros, Szabó and László (2013) showed
that identifying with a nation affects the evaluation of historical events. People who identify in a
glorifying way with the nation perceive the traumatic events more negatively and glorious events
more positively. Hammack (2009) describes the discourse that was created about the past conflict
and  is  commonly  shared  in  the  society  through  educational,  cultural,  political  and  social
mechanisms rooted deeply in their identity as “master narratives”. Transmission from generation to
generation  occurs  on  the  levels  of  societal-institutional  and  personal  communication.  The
representation of radical, traumatic events have advantages too as they may embrace heroes and
heroic  acts  that  could have positive influence on their  group. Moreover,  there are  functions  of
remembering these certain traumatic events. There are multiple functions of the collective victim
identity of a group, which are explanation, giving sense, creating a shared reality, decreasing stress
and anxiety,  preparing for future aggression and poor living conditions,  moral  justification and
exemption from the aggressive acts of the group, solidarity and increasing cohesion, mobilization,
political  propaganda,  gaining  international  support.  Then  the  authors  assess  the  destructive
characteristics of such a collective identity, the negative cognitive, mental and behavioral patterns,
then the positive aspects of such an identity. Furthermore Zsuzsanna and others mention the ways,
different experiences how a group may develop collective victimhood, then examine the collective
victimhood in the context of the Hungarians. From many socio-psychological studies, it is described
that  the  Hungarian  nation is  so unique  in  the  sense that  they  have  no racial,  neither  language
relatives in Europe that is why they have that feeling of being alone, which provides a base for self-
piety and operates as a self-fulfilling prophecy. While in the case of Germans ethno-centralism leads
to a feeling of superiority and pride, as a consequence of the negativism found in Hungarian identity
leads to a sense of abandonment and collective anxiety. According to Pataki (2011), Hungarians feel
insulted and let down that Europe is ungrateful for the sacrifices of Hungarians, while at the same
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time there is a sense of yearning towards Europe. According to Csepeli, in the collective memory of
Hungarians, two traumas, the Treaty of Trianon and the Holocaust have central positions, then the
1956 Hungarian Revolution and the aftermath, as in 2012 about 68 percent of Hungarians named
Trianon as the worst tragedy of Hungary.
Noémi Zsuzsanna and others  (2017) discuss  how traumatic  events  can be inherited  and
transmitted, the members of the collective influenced by master narratives. It is relevant to note that
how political  elites  and  the  political  culture  may  shape  the  events  to  their  worldview can  be
differentiated from what a certain event meant and means for the people and how it affected them.
Also, the events which are not “chosen”, so finished or processed may not be that strong in the
collective memory of the people.
György Csepeli  (2018) in Hungarian negativity wrote about the Central-,  East European
misery and the Hungarians, space and time, denial of the collective other, feeling of aloneness,
denial of one’s own body, suicide and alcoholism, distrust towards people and institutions, denial of
the community, empty individualism, a deformed collective space and so on. The author based his
work on “Mi a magyar?” written by Gyula Szekfű in 1939 for political purposes and in Szekfű’s
work the characterization of the Hungarian nation stretches back to the 19th century when Széchenyi
laid down the cognitive area for Hungarians.  Csepeli’s  work is  purely empirical  and pragmatic
without any agendas. Previous studies on the socio-psychological characteristics of the Hungarian
people are revealed in Csepeli’s work. First of all, the study of Hunyadi highlights that Hungarians
like to glorify themselves, but after the tragic events of the nation they do not like the people of
their own group. The Hungarostudy what was taken between 1988 and 2006 assessing the mental
and health state of Hungarians found that despite the bloodline, within their family Hungarians are
individualists and outside of family they hardly trust anyone. They value safety above all, because
inside they are troubled, uneasy.  Another study found that the Hungarians have a habit  of self-
destruction, be it alcohol, drugs or suicide. Csepeli first analyzed whether there are commonalities
with other  states  in  the Eastern-Central  European region.  This  region is  linked to  the  Eastern-
Central  European misery as for centuries these peoples were under imperial  subjugation by the
Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian empires. As a consequence these peoples could not identify with
these powers, were alienated. Although they achieved independence but not by themselves and the
safety  of  life,  properties  and  convincing  remained  doubted.  A European  study  showed  that  in
contrast to Western Europe, trust, autonomy and risk taking are lacking in Central-Eastern European
societies, while the centrality of the state and a sense of seeking safety are characterizing them.
Within this Central-Eastern European misery, according to István Széchenyi who wrote the Hitel in
1830, the Hungarian proprietor  is  poorer  than as  he should be looking at  their  properties.  The
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Hungarian proprietor does not bear himself or herself as the circumstances would allow. Széchenyi
mentions often the word “no”, which is not solely a negation but the lack multiple characteristics
within  Hungarians.  He  stated  that  the  lack  of  credit  or  credence  is  the  cause  of  all  moral
deterioration. Negativity characterizes Hungarians as an added value to the regional misery. There
are more unique characteristics such as can be seen in time and space. As the Great Hungarian
Plains after the Ottoman destruction symbolizes, physical desolation equals to mental desolation, in
which everything loses its sense and the purpose of life. There is no rush for the Hungarians in the
desolation and they have time. Then, the denial of the collective other means a feeling of being
aliens and not being understood, the feeling of being alone in this hostile world. This may derive
from the fact that Hungarian language stands as an island in on the sea of Indo-European languages,
which  is  distinct  from other  languages.  Thus,  the  attributes  of  collective  victimhood,  such  as
complaining, touchiness, not being understood, blaming can be seen. Another one is the denial of
one’s own body, deriving from the denial of the collective other, which points to the only solution as
an early death and the self-destructive practices  it  is  linked to.  Hungarians  generally  die  early,
which can be seen primarily in the rate of suicide especially among men, and in indirect forms such
as alcoholism, smoking and other substances. Moreover, further problems are the issue of obese
people, a decreased fertility rate, all that constitute “a dying nation”. Then, there is the mentality
based  on  a  negative  self-representation,  a  self-defensive  strategy  instead  of  the  mentality  of
credence that suggests the likeliness of success. This negative self-representation implies failure and
is the root of distrust and suspicion as the people who are successful are linked to theft or cheating.
The denial of the community implies that the power of the regulatory norms of the community are
weakened,  the  values  of  the  community  life  fade  away.  The  Hungarian  negative  self-
representation’s most harsh embodiment is the National Anthem, in which, for foreigners especially,
the  aggressive  and  self-destructive  words  can  be  noticed.  The  key  motives  of  the  Hungarian
National Anthem are the sins, the defeat, the loss, anxiety, feeling uneasy even when Hungarians
win. A study found there is also a link between the attitude of a nation’s national anthem and the
suicide  rate  in  that  nation,  which  is  very  true  for  Hungary.  Empty  individualism  is  a  further
characteristic  that  implies  ambivalent  behavior  towards  fellow  citizens,  which  is  neither
competitive, nor cooperative. It assumes one can only count on themselves. Despite acknowledging
the existence of other persons, one only care about themselves not taking into account the interests
of  others.  This  is  like a  trap  in  which  everyone aims to  succeed,  however,  at  the end nobody
benefits. The major goal is survival at all costs and the citizens only want to receive, not give as
opposed to Western European societies where they first give so they can receive something. The
collective cognitive space becomes distorted and narrow is another issue. It suggests a passivity of
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Hungarian people, suggesting from their viewpoint that either they are helped, but mostly harmed
by outside  forces,  but  they  do not  affect  others.  There  is  a  lack  of  sovereignty  that  makes  it
impossible that the individuals or the community take responsibility for themselves and to be active
actors, not passive. The collective defeats always reappear and there is no learning of them, while
always the other is responsible for the causes. Last but not least, not taking into account an outside
point of view of the collective like anything that does not fit into the self-validating sample and self-
criticism, irony and humor are not acceptable. The exclusiveness of the nation’s aspects does not
make living with other nations together possible.
Csepeli’s (2018) work greatly points to the fact that there is a difference between regional
and national characteristics. While there is “the Eastern-Central European misery”, there are further
added Hungarian unique characteristics.
Gombocz’s  (2016),  Hadas’ (2017),  Zsuzsanna  and  others’ (2017)  and  Csepeli’s  (2018)
researches highlight the major issues and socio-psychological environment of Hungarians but how
these  issues  are  manifested  are  not  that  extensively  mentioned.  I  perceive  the  policies,
characteristics of the Orbán regime to be consequences of the unfolding past history of the nation
and its socio-psychological consequences. 
Overall,  in this research I aim to expand on the understanding of the collective identity of
Hungarians, ranging from the time of the Middle Ages (though briefly) until the 20 th century and till
the most recent challenges, then link all the historical events and processes to the current state of the
Hungarian socio-psychological environment and set up a diagnosis and a positive direction that
should be followed.
Moreover, some other gaps  to be filled are why the political culture is deformed, why is
there a need for positive transformation, why do some of the historical traumas unaddressed or feel
to be unaddressed and lastly, would a positive transformation of the Hungarian living space alone
create a more peaceful, cooperative Central-East European environment.
Although  Trianon  and  communism  provide  the  base  for  present  Hungarian  issues  of
collective identity, negativity, there are still other events that will be considered such as the multiple
defeats of Hungarian independence and freedom fight movements, Red Terror-White Terror, the
Holocaust, leaning from the far-left to the far-right and then back again to the far-left, mass rape of
the Red Army, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and some of the recent events after 1989.
Although I acknowledge that the subjective historical memories of the Hungarian people
may intensify the negative aspects of the Hungarian collective identity, an objective view of the
Hungarian history can also substantially explain the current state of the collective identity. In the
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paper the focus is on the objective history, but also to some lesser extent the subjective historical
memories.
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2. Collective identity and historical memories
2.1. The meaning of collective identity
Before diving into the meaning of collective identity, first social identity is to be examined
as a base for collective identity. Social identity theory differentiates social identity of a person from
personal  identity.  While  personal  identity  defines  the  uniqueness,  personal  characteristics  of  a
person, social identity forms the other part of the self based on his or her belonging to a social
group(s).  This  is  created  through  two  processes:  cognitively  that  means  the  categorization  of
individuals  into  groups  including  the  person  themselves,  having  attributions  of  meaning  and
characterizing external groups. The other is motivational,  seeking to differentiate between one’s
own  and  other  social  groups.  This  implies  a  systematic  preference  for  the  norms,  values  and
common behaviors of an individual’s own group. Social identity stands as a foundation to explain
various social effects, such as how humans act, feel or think and patterns of inter-group behavior
like discrimination or cooperation. This is the reason how large numbers of people can be mobilized
and act in coherent ways as they share a social reality being reflected in their norms, values and
understandings (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 355).
As the micro-individual level of identity has been defined, it is time to focus on the macro-
level, socio-psychological concept of collective identity. The concept of collective identity describes
the  identity  of  the  group  as  a  whole  similarly  to  the  concept  of  collective  consciousness  by
Durkheim or class consciousness by Marx. These theories highlighted the notion of we-ness that
inspires collective action and that society is more than just the sum of individuals. Collectives are
formed and through social interactions individuals acknowledge being part of the collective and
accept having shared values and norms. Thus, in essence collective identity means a joint awareness
and  recognition  that  members  of  a  group,  such  as  being  Hungarians,  partake  the  same  social
identity. This can be thought of having a “cloud of collective” that the members share. This shared
collective may influence the group’s social reality being constructed by the members, the degree of
solidarity and unity they experience, the degree to which group members become involved, the
extent of their mobilization, the expected degree of conformity, the pressure they put on leaders and
hold them accountable and the direction the group is taking, among others (David and Bar-Tal
2009: 355-356).
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There are multiple ways to define what are collective identities. In other words, it may be
thought of as an area of culture with unique elements, such as symbols, meanings and so on. These
elements form an understanding about the collective, its attributes, its characterization, its issues,
the present state of its environment and future. It is further stated that not all the attributes of the
collective should be present at all times. Such collective may have a “thin” or “thick” character
depending on the simplicity or complexity of the collective, the small range of shared interests or a
rich, deep historical background, a sense of common purpose. Thus any social unit that has a certain
boundary and internal communication, the smallest being for example a family or a friends circle up
to a civilization or transnational  movements  can be considered a  collective,  also state-bounded
societies,  such as  in  this  case  Hungary  may be  (but  with  loosely  understood state  boundaries)
(Peters 2002: 10-11.).
Several social entities have collective identities, for example social movements but also the
examples of national identity and ethnic-national identity on which the focus will be put in this
paper. Thus in the following analysis, the elements of collective identity will be explained through
the example of the national collective identity.
“The national-ethnic group is defined as “a named human population occupying a historic territory or homeland
and sharing common myths and memories; a mass, public culture; a single economy” and having “common
rights and duties for all members”.” (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 356).
In  other  words,  generally,  the  attributes,  characteristics  of  collective  identity  present,
inherited, shared, circulated by the members of the state-bounded social unit constitute the national
identity,  which has a ruling,  governing political authority.  They have a public culture, a certain
political order and a social order too (Peters 2002: 12.).
From a constructivist  perspective,  ethnic identity  is  the result  of continual  shared social
construction. Nations are modern collectives and the result of imagination and cultural invention
that the elites aimed to create by forming national awareness among the people.  However, solely
this constructivist approach is not enough to understand national identities such as the Hungarian
one (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 356-357).
National identity is defined in many ways from different perspectives by researchers. Some
emphasize national identity is imagined and constructed, some think of the national culture as the
base of  the  national  identity  that  is  obtained by social  interactions,  some correlate  a  state  and
national  identity  and  perceive  national  identity  to  be  the  result  of  nation-building,  some  state
national identity is primordial and backward looking, while others that it is forward-looking, in a
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politicized context the ethnic group is creating their future destiny. Thus it has many aspects and
perspectives how to look at it (Inac and Ünal 2013: 229-230.).
Just like the Hungarian national identity, the origins of many national identities come from
pre-modern ethnic identities. These are defined by their common name, ancestry myths, historical
memories that gives an answer to the group’s origin, uniqueness and the territory they inhabit, their
common language, elements of their culture and a measurable solidarity. Over hundreds of years the
primary social, cultural and symbolic components of identity make up the national consciousness
and deeds that are inherited from generation to generation with possible changes over time. Some
parts of the identity may be forgotten or changed drastically, however, the significance and meaning
the members give them characterize their social identities rooted in the ethnic past. Despite the fast
pace of globalization of the last 30 years, nationality still accounts as a relevant and powerful part of
identity that gives a base how a collective can have sovereignty. National collective identity is a
powerful concept with emotional, perceptual and behavioral aspects  (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 356-
357).
There are two major foundations how collective identity is constructed. The generic features
that  characterize  each  collective  and  also  specific  contents  that  provide  unique  and  particular
characteristics. There are six fundamental generic features that are a sense of a common fate, the
perception of the uniqueness of the collective and its distinction from other collectives, coordinated
activity of the collective’s members, commonality of beliefs, attitudes, norms and values, concern
for the welfare of the collective and mobilization and sacrifice for its sake and finally continuity and
consecutiveness in the dimension of time (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 361-369).
The sense of a common fate implies a sense of unity and feelings of mutual dependence
shared by the members of the collective. It is defined that what connects them, what they share
outweighs their differences of the members. This is what connects the individuals to a nation. It is
also stated that  the fate  of  each individual  of the collective depends on the whole community.
Common fate  is  a  cornerstone of  national  identity,  such as  through the  example  of  a  myth of
common origins as a nation may be thought of an extended family that has been grown from one
seed. In times of crisis emphasizing the unity of a nation can be useful, moreover some states, such
as Germany or Hungary aim to state in their legislation that the diasporas outside their national
borders, also constitute their national community (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 361-369).
Then, the perception of uniqueness and the fact that a collective is different from others can
be seen in the case of collective national identities. First there is the positive definition about their
national identity and second an outer boundary between the inside and outside of the collective that
results in saying “we” and “others” in their social realities. Without this, social entities would be the
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same and it is important to mention that the extent to which one nation differentiates itself from
others can be very harmful  and negative such as in  the case of Nazi Germany.  It  is  crucial  to
distinguish between a positive and negative way of defining national identity, the former as “we-
hood”, while the latter one as “us-hood versus them” (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 361-369).
Coordinated activity of the collective’s members highlights the importance of the different
groups’,  sectors’ ability  to  work  together,  towards  national  goals.  One  aspect  of  that  is  to  set
superordinate goals for the common good and another to act according to them and achieve them
(David and Bar-Tal 2009: 361-369).
The commonality of beliefs, attitudes, norms and values do characterize nations too and
members  are  aware  of  these.  The  adoption  of  these  is  through  depersonalization,  when  the
individual’s  parts  of  self-definition  includes  the  beliefs,  norms  and  values  that  make  up  the
collective prototype (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 361-369).
Concern for the welfare of the collective, mobilization and acting for its sake mean that
members of the collective feel concern and are motivated to take on missions, contribute to the
group with their resources, help fellow members in times of crisis and even sacrifice themselves for
the community (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 361-369).
Finally,  the  last  generic  feature  is  the  continuity  and consecutiveness  in  time,  the  past,
present and future. Considering an existentialist approach, it is said that members of the national
collective construct their present identities as they interact with the past and the future. The past is
from where their culture is inherited, an anchor for the existence of that collective, while the future
implies the horizon of aspirations and possibilities, for the society to set goals and change some of
their ingrained parts of their identity. Between the past and the future, there is the context of the
present providing challenges the members of the nation should take into account  and focus on
mentally.  Some parts  of the collective identity remain the same for longer period,  while others
change through dynamic processes. If members of a collective focus on only the past, it may divert
their  attention  from the  current  social,  political  conditions  and  forms  a  barrier  in  tackling  the
challenges of the present. On the contrary, by rejecting the past, the society’s ability to define and
value  their  contemporary  existence is  damaged,  the  collective fails  to  find  its  place  within  the
broader context. Thus, when a nation forgets its past, it fails to remember its own identity in the
present, while if a nation relies solely on its past, it is not able to construct a competent direction for
the future (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 361-369).
Regarding the particular features, contents of collective identity are territory, culture and
language,  collective  memory  and  additional  shared  societal  beliefs.  The  second  pillar  of  the
collective is the unique features, the contents. The content is like the semantic space the identity
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inhabits. Regarding national collective identities, there are three major tributaries they draw from:
the  first  one  is  being  tradition  including  beliefs,  memories,  cultural  products,  symbols  and
institutions, the second being national ideology that highlights national self-definition, defines the
members and goals of the collective, and the third being crucial experiences from past events, lived,
experienced, heard, taught by the members of the collective. These major events are significant to
the collective as these have an impact on the welfare of the members and on the entire collective, as
it will be seen how major events shaped the Hungarian collective consciousness (David and Bar-Tal
2009: 361-369).
First, territory is one unique feature of the collective. Humans have associated themselves
with particular territories for hundreds of years and this peaked in modern times as members of
national collectives formed deep connections between particular territories and their identities. It is
the place where important historical events have taken place and their identity has been built (David
and Bar-Tal 2009: 361-369).
Secondly, culture and language make up the national identity’s content. Through a socio-
psychological lense, culture is created as a product of human history, it is not created from out of
nothing  as  transmission,  construction  and  socialization  influence  the  national  culture.  Culture
provides  the  concrete  elements  of  national  identity  that  can  be  seen,  heard,  smelled  and  felt.
Through culture one can learn both about the depth of a collective identity and how it is reflected
and expressed. One of the most important elements of culture has always been the language spoken
by a collective that distinguished them from other collectives (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 361-369).
Third, collective memory is what explains a collective’s, in this case a nation’s origins and
evolution  over  time.  This  does  not  mean  scholarly  history,  but  rather  how  the  individuals
experienced, remember events, processes, persons or in other words the sum of social memory of
the group members. This collective memory is passed on from generation to generation through
social communication and is key in understanding national identity. Collective memory does not
guarantee that the history of the past is objectively view, rather a story, which is functional and
relevant to the present and future goals. It can even be a distorted, biased narrative that is used for
certain purposes, however, it  always has some basis in true events. The beliefs presented in the
collective  memory  help  to  understand the  past,  influence  the  present  and serve  future  visions,
aspirations  (David  and  Bar-Tal  2009:  361-369).  But  more  about  this  will  be  examined  under
historical memory.
Last but not least, additional shared societal beliefs besides territory and collective memory
are deemed to be important for the society’s existence. These are based on collective experiences
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and create a perception of reality, furthermore form shared behaviors (David and Bar-Tal 2009: 361-
369).
The concept  of  a  Hungarian  national  or  ethnic-national  identity  or  Hungarian  collective
identity  may  raise  up  the  following  questions:  Would  minorities,  foreigners  living  in  Hungary
belong to this collective? What about ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring states that used to be
part of Hungary or as part of the Hungarian diaspora in the world? After more than a decade of
Hungary’s accession to the EU or simply based on a pro-EU political  orientation,  would not a
European identity conflict with the Hungarian collective identity? 
First  of  all,  for  the  first  question,  presuming these  peoples  were  born  or  have  lived  in
Hungary  for  a  longer  period,  they  naturally  become  part  of  the  collective  through  the  use  of
Hungarian  and  even  through  experiencing,  adapting,  becoming  part  of  the  socio-psychological
environment, even if Hungarian culture is only secondary to them. Whether these persons became
Hungarians by birth, obtained Hungarian nationality through marriage or over a longer period (such
as 10 years) have lived in Hungary, even if they have a non-Hungarian primary national, cultural or
ethnic  identity,  to  a  certain  degree  they  also  constitute  the  Hungarian  socio-psychological
environment even if they have multiple identities, hybrid identities. The hybrid identity of people is
recognized by the study, but it is outside of the focus of this study. If these persons do not feel to be
a part of Hungary or do not want to integrate into the culture or are not aware of the historical and
cultural past of Hungary and so on, they may not be bound to this collective strongly, thus the
influence, the effects, consequences of the past and present are not felt by them that much as they
identify mostly with their primary collective other than Hungarian. Still, as long as they are living in
Hungary for a longer period, they may sense the state of the socio-psychological environment.  
Secondly, Hungarians living in neighboring states, in the “detached territories” or abroad
being  part  of  the  Hungarian  diaspora,  especially  in  the  US,  who  had  either  preserved  their
Hungarian identity by learning Hungarian, keeping alive the consciousness of belonging to Hungary
or either had lived for a longer time in Hungary before leaving but later took on the identity of his
or her new home country, each constitute the Hungarian collective identity too, to a variable degree.
One does not have to have a Hungarian nationality to feel, think as a Hungarian but it is true these
persons have a different living space than in Hungary, as their secondary home country has different
laws, norms, a different environment, thus they may be bound to a variable degree to the Hungarian
socio-psychological environment. Despite their possible hybrid identities, they can connect, tune in
to the Hungarian environment through preserving their traditions, reading, listening, watching news,
stories  from Hungary,  voting  on  the  elections  with  a  ballot  letter  or  commuting,  traveling  to
Hungary from time to time.
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Third, although there are some Hungarians who either exclusively identify as Hungarians or
claim exclusively a European identity, these may not conflict with one another. One can have a
Hungarian and a European identity too, though the more than 50 years backwardness between the
development of Western European European identity and the development of European identity in
Hungary in the past 16 years or so with the memories of communism cannot be neglected. Even if a
European identity suits better a Hungarian person or he or she has a pro-EU political orientation,
but  still  grew up and have  socialized  in  Hungary,  were  or  are  part  of  the  socio-psychological
environment, then their Hungarian identity still greatly define their personality and behavior, until
in the long-term they are able to change, shift their personalities, identities. Unless such a change
occurs, they also make up part of the Hungarian collective identity.
As this work will include some sensitive issues of the past, it is important to mention that
this  work  does  not  aim  to  place  the  Hungarian  identity  as  one  that  supersedes  other  national
identities, rather it aims to raise awareness about issues, unjustices and put the Hungarian people
and the Hungarian identity in their rightful, reasonable place. This study is to inspire, empower, put
things into places for a cooperative, peaceful future. Although in the Thesis some people of certain
origin or a collective are called responsible for certain actions, those statements are based on facts
and not on fiction or racism. Their responsibility, either of the Hungarians or other nationalities, for
their  wrongdoings should  be  recognized,  but  this  responsibility  should not  extend to  the  other
members, descendants of that collective.
2.2. The relevance of historical memories
The Chinese people recall the time period from 1849 to 1949 as the century of humiliation.
During this period, first China was defeated by the British in the First Opium War followed by more
defeats  and  subjugation  by  the  Japanese,  French  and  English.  This  ended  when  the  People’s
Republic of China was formed, however, Chinese people still tend to connect modern events with
these earlier times. During the Yugoslavian war, when the NATO was bombing Belgrade, the US hit
the embassy of Beijing, ending the lives of three people. This event made the Chinese leaders angry
and called it a barbaric act. Even through the US apologized, Chinese people went on the streets to
demonstrate against the US. The event reminded some of the Chinese people for the century of
humiliation that was carried forward into the future with them as a traumatic historical memory
(Roediger and DeSoto 2016).
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Each individual has some kind of collective memory in connection with their social groups
they have been part of. These may be facts or interpretations as in the case of the embassy bombing.
If  one  understands  the  memories  of  a  certain  country,  then  their  national  identity  is  better
understood and the perspectives they own. When Russians and Americans are asked to list some
major events of the World War II, their answers differ. The Americans mostly name the attack on
Pearl Harbor, D-Day or the bombing of Hiroshima, while the Russians remember first and foremost
for  the  Battle  of  Stalingrad,  the  Battle  of  Kursk,  moreover,  the  Russians  have  their  way  of
remembering World War II as the Great Patriotic War. Collective memories, however, are not fixed
but can change over time as older generations pass away and newer generations grow up. While
both younger and older Americans thought of the bombings of Japan in World War II as a major
event, older people considered the bombings to be positive, as it ended the war and saved American
soldiers  from  death,  but  younger  generations  perceived  quite  the  opposite.  They  viewed  it
negatively, because the bombs ended innocent lives and it was not necessary to end the war in a
short  time. Memories  may also fade away completely,  certain events become forgotten as time
passes by (Roediger and DeSoto 2016).
It  is  easy to  predict  that  one can use historical  memory to  the advantage of  his  or  her
political party and agenda, as in the politics of public memory. It is argued that collective memory
summons the presence of the past. The more intense the context may be, the more defining the
memories are. Commemoration of historical events is a tool to stabilize the inconstant memories,
but it may also be used to manipulate the masses to comply with a narrative (Hutton 2000: 537-
538).
Until the 1940s there was no definition for the mass killings of an ethnic group. Then, the
term genocide  was  coined  and  it  was  used  for  the  Holocaust  and  other  events  that  could  be
categorized as such, like the mass killings of Armenians during World War I. However, the Turkish
government denied it from ever occurring and that they perpetrated such an act. They remember
1915 in a different way, how it actually happened or how they prefer to view the event. Some argue
that it never occurred, while others may say it was a retribution due to the deaths of Turkish people.
Even if no Turkish person alive was part of it, they are not willing to admit the crime. Even if they
committed such an act, they would defend themselves by stating it was not like that described by
the Armenians and the Armenians also committed violence against them (Steinhauer 2017).
Many citizens situated in the southern part of the United States have heard, learned about the
Civil War within the US and the Confederacy as a story of victimhood. They did not live in those
times when the war happened, but they have heard memories from their families, communities, saw
Confederate flags at many places and memorials to Confederate soldiers as children. These adults
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who grew up under such circumstances have come to associate home with the Confederacy. On the
contrary, other Americans perceive the Confederate iconography as evil, evoking dark times of the
past when slavery was a part of reality. Although segregation is becoming less and less remembered
and these people who negatively view the Confederacy did not grew up at that time, the monuments
still remind of the history. It is a fact that slaves were shipped from Africa to the American continent
as early as 1619 who did not have rights, were not treated as human beings and often brutally died
as a consequence. Still, according to a poll from 2017, 62 percent of US citizens support keeping
the Confederate statues in place. This may be due to the sense of victimhood or based on a fear
what might replace these statues. For other people, the statues signify their political fight between
red and blue states, or even some of them may be called Fascists. The truth is all these people who
accept the presence of these statues today are influenced by culture and there is a myth they cling
to. While myth can be thought of as a story about the past of the people, culture is what are passed
down to the younger generations. Losses were tremendous during the Civil War and the children,
loved ones and relatives of Confederate soldiers erected memories in different places, except for
government  cemeteries  where  it  was  not  allowed.  As  the  veterans  were  aging,  they  called  for
reconciliation coming from both parties. Time passed and by 1914 Confederate headstones were
considered equal to Union headstones. This was the time when most memorials were elected, when
the Supreme Court decided that white and black people could be separated. Southern states revived
their favored hierarchy, not allowing black people to have the same rights. Thus, erecting memorials
was part of holding on to the system that had been changing (Steinhauer 2017).
Historical memories may be very subjective, may not necessarily be ethical, righteous, but
rather distorted and manipulative.
While many people approve of George Santayana’s saying that those who cannot remember
what had happened in the past may be doomed to repeat it, still, too much remembrance may be
counterproductive. Humans have been taught to remember the past and to memorialize collective
historical memories due to their moral importance. But this remembrance may not lead to peace and
reconciliation in most cases, rather it evokes the evil forces of resentment, revenge and war. Healing
the injuries of a community or a nation and the practice of forgiveness are probably more difficult
than giving in to frustration and anger (Rieff 2016).
After such a long time in the aftermath of the US Civil War, a less intense battle is still
occurring  in  the  form  of  commemoration,  the  demonstration  of  Confederate  flags.  Historical
memories have shaped the world in a negative way too, such as in the case of the Yugoslavian War
in the  1990s or  in  the Israeli-Palestinian  conflict.  It  is  crucial  not  to  turn a  blind  eye to  what
communities are capable of doing in troubled times through remembrance. On the contrary, to be
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fully against memories and the determination of a community to commemorate their deaths may be
wrong. It may be said, however, that while forgetting is unjust to the past, remembering may be
unjust to the present. When historical memories resurface in the collective’s mind and the members
feel  the  pain,  the  wounds,  the  bitterness  of  history,  would  it  be  better  to  forget  instead  of
remembering?  If  humanity’s  tendency  to  resolve  issues,  injustices  through  aggressive,  violent
behaviors is analyzed, then it is suggested that forgetting is the safest path a community may take.
To dig deeper in this debate, remembrance can be considered to be an ally of justice, but it is not
necessarily a guarantor of peace like forgetting. A good example to this is the  pacto del olvido
between the left and right political groups in Spain that restored peace and democracy after General
Franco’s dictatorship in the 1970s. Some memories may seem to be too valuable to give up but for a
better future even the act of mourning should eventually end. Still, some collectives who perceive
they are under existential threat or want to spread, impose their beliefs on their neighbors will most
likely not let go of old memories (Rieff 2016). Either forgetting or remembering in itself may not be
enough, may not solve the issues of the past if the past is not addressed. Perhaps a combination of
remembering and forgetting might be the ultimate solution.
Many historical memories are present even today in the form of narratives. Narrative is
being used to construct social reality and to render meaning in the lives of humans. White (1981)
said that narrative is an innate human ability. Bruner (1990) stated that narrative is like a system
how people organize their experiences, transactions in the social world. Narrative does not only
represent, but also constitute it. When humans put their experiences into subjective stories, they
construct memories through narratives. Thus, narrative and identity are inseparable entities from
one another,  they rather complement each other. Narratives being told are less about the actual
events happened, but rather focus on the meanings and interpretations of those events. Narratives
can be thought of as embodiments of certain points of view, instead of an objective standpoint.
Thus,  an objective reality  is  hard to define,  so the truest  story may be a  conventionalized and
culturally accepted variable. After all, narrative is a certain version of reality that renders meaning
and gives sense, constructs who we are (Guerrero 2011: 89-90).
Societies, communities are formed when a group of people have an adequate, convincing
narrative to  unite  under.  Civilization  was built  by strangers  coming together  to  agree on basic
principles, a story, a narrative that they agreed upon. This narrative may play a big role in their lives
and it becomes part of their identity as well. This gives meaning to their lives and the sense that
they are part of this narrative, which is a social construction connecting people to it (Harari 2015).
As any society, the Hungarian society also has its own history and past, while the present is
built from stories that members of the collective, the people tell themselves, what they feel they are
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and which connect separated individuals together. The future is built on the way how members of
the collective behave, think and what they perceive they need to do today to make their vision a
reality. 
The  historical  memories  are  highly  relevant  to  understand  the  collective  identity  of
Hungarians. It is the way how one can unpack very complex situations, behaviors of a collective,
how outsiders, external viewers can understand, interpret the feelings, acts of the collective and
their relations with others. Thus, if one is eager to find directions, solutions how to address, heal
and reconcile a collective’s distorted, negative behaviors and improve their society, it is crucial to
analyze historical events of the collective and how these have affected their collective identity, such
as the collective national identity of Hungarians that I will be analyzing in the following Chapters.
2.3. The forgotten identity of Hungarians
Who are the Hungarians? Who were the Hungarians? Early Hungarian history, speculations
about the origins of Hungarians and early Hungarian identity are to be explored in this part briefly
as  before  examining  the  most  relevant  past  150 years  or  so  it  is  important  to  put  the  current
Hungarian collective identity into centuries-long perspective and context.
There are differing views about the origins of Hungarians. There is the traditional approach
starting from the pre-Christian era that fits  to a great degree the theory of Sumerian-Hungarian
relationship by international orientalist researchers since the 19th century, while there is the Finno-
Ugrian theory that is rather the result of foreign regimes in Hungary: Habsburg influence in the 19th
century and communist in the 20th century. The traditional view suggests the Magyars and the Huns
were alike both tracing back to ancient Mesopotamia. Researches about Sumerian-Hungarian ethno-
linguistic  similarities  have  proven this.  On the  contrary,  the  methodology of  the  Finno-Ugrian
theory is unscientific and the motives of the theory’s supporters have been wrongful to weaken
Hungarian national identity. This is because their theory suggests a collective inferiority complex
(“The Controversy on the Origins and Early History of the Hungarians”, n.d.).
The theory of the Hungarians belonging to the Finno-Ugrian group can be falsified by both
historical and linguistic reasons, but here only the historical ones will be mentioned. First of all, the
theory that among the Ugric peoples from their ancient homeland, which was put in Siberia, the
Hungarians who had a hunter-gatherer civilization at around 1000-500 BC reached the level of the
conquering, structured Hungarian society within a thousand years could only have been explained
by an unnatural phenomena. Then, the Khanty, Mansi and Lapp peoples were anthropologically
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different  than  other  Finno-Ugrian  peoples  and  as  these  three  groups  spoke  a  form of  ancient
Hungarian language, it is not possible that the ancestors of Hungarians were also Finno-Ugrian
peoples.  The ancient homeland of the Finno-Ugrian people is  highly debated as one researcher
highlights nine homelands of them. What is more, according to Soviet researchers the direction of
the migration movement was reversed on the steppes, as it went from the South to the North and
Western  Siberia  was  populated  from the  South.  However,  the  recently  excavated  traces  of  the
relatives of Hungarians near the Bjelaja, Ural rivers, then on the side of the Irtis and an earlier
excavation link these Hungarian relatives to the Huns, not the Finno-Ugrians. Moreover, genetically
the Hungarians contain Baikal and South Chinese elements, which point to the origin of Hungarians
to be found in the Far East. Another archeological-genetical study concluded the members of the
Árpád-family (who conquered the Carpathian Basin) are of Eurasian origin and that the ancient
homeland could have been in a territory, which belonged to the Hun Empire. Most of the Árpáds
were Turkish-like, Asian Hungarians, thus they came from the same place as the Huns. Last but not
least,  the  Hungarians  are  part  of  the outermost  branch of  the wide 1000-year-old  Asian  music
culture and the music of the Hun-descendant Turkic folks show a strong connection with Hungarian
folk music, but not with Finno-Ugrians (Szili 2019: 3-8.).
However, the recent mainstream narrative still promotes the Finno-Ugrian theory, according
to which, Hungarians were “primitive Asiatic intruders” in a more developed, civilized Europe. This
official interpretation dismisses the Turanian origins of the Magyars, the Sumerian-Scythian-Hun-
Avar-Magyar  identity  and  the  early,  pre-1000  AD  Hungarian  achievements.  According  to  the
traditional account, which is based on ancient sources, there is the story of Biblical Nimrod who
was the son of Kush and Eneth, whose descendants Hunor and Magor led the way from a region
near Persia for the Huns and Magyars to Scythia, which was an earlier name of the region ranging
from the Carpathians to Central Asia. Around the 5 th century first the Huns settled down in the
Carpathian Basin followed by Árpád’s Magyars in 895-896. It is also mentioned in these medieval
sources that Árpád was a descendant of Attila, thereby the Hungarians claimed their inheritance by
reconquering the Carpathian Basin. Contemporary Persian, Armenian, Arab, Greek, Russian and
Western sources are in accordance with the Caucasian-Caspian origins of the Hungarians and their
Scythian-Hun  identities.  Byzantine  sources  refer  to  the  Hungarians  also  as  Turks,  moreover  a
previous name Hungarians used themselves, which was “Sabartoi asphaloi” in Greek. This refers to
the Sabir people who were situated in the Transcaucasian-Northern Mesopotamian-Western Iranian
region. The Hun-Magyar connection is further mentioned in the Hungarian translation of a Turkish
source about the history of Hungary based on a Latin text. This text states when the Huns and
Magyars arrived in the Carpathian Basin, there were already people speaking the same language as
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them.  This  means  Hungarians  or  their  Hun  predecessors  established  themselves  in  the  region
already before around 900 AD. It is to be noted that the medieval Hungarian chronicles could be
based on earlier real sources that were destroyed and that these highlight real historical facts (“The
Controversy on the Origins and Early History of the Hungarians”, n.d.).
The Finno-Ugrian theory is based on János Sajnovics’s book from 1770 when he identified
the Hungarian language to the language of the Lapps. This was followed by German linguists,
especially by August von Schlözer developing the Finno-Ugrian linguistic school. This school had a
dominant effect on Hungarian research due to  strong German influence in Hungary and as the
Hungarian War of Independence of 1848-49 failed, the Habsburg regime imposed the Finno-Ugrian
theory exclusively on the Hungarian academics. This weakening of the Hungarian national identity
aimed  to  advocate  foreign  domination,  Germanization  that  distorted,  falsified  information
connected to the origin, history and language of the Hungarians. This was embedded in the context
of rising German nationalism from the 19th century as they ideologically claimed to be the Aryan
race and making the Indo-European group to be superior, having cultural pre-eminence. The Finno-
Ugrian  theory  thus  was  ideologically  promoted  that  suggested  the  Hungarians  were  primitive
Siberian nomads who wandered to Europe and developed a more advanced culture as they came
into contact with Indo-Europeans. However, there is no agreement and significant confusion among
scholars about the branches of the Indo-European ethno-linguistic tree and the chronology of events
happened.  This  theory  is  ultimately  based  on  linguistic  speculation  and  is  not  backed  by
archaeological,  historical  evidence.  After  all,  the  theory  is  arbitrary  and  unscientific  and  the
presence of Hungarians in the Uralic group is artificial (“The Controversy on the Origins and Early
History of the Hungarians”, n.d.).
As British, French and German researchers analyzed the oldest known written records in
Mesopotamia in the 19th century, they identified their ancient language had similarities with the
Turanian  ethno-linguistic  group,  including  Hungarian,  Turkic,  Mongolian  and  Finnic.  This
recognition grew in international orientalist circles until the second half of 19th century, but due to
the  Habsburg  influence  in  Hungary  further  research  on  the  link  was  discouraged,  continuing
through  the  period  of  communism,  and  this  situation  still  exists  until  today.  However,  some
Hungarian expatriates after the Second World War collected significant evidence that the Hungarian
and Sumerian languages are indeed related. Some result of research on the question indicates there
are more than a thousand shared word roots between Sumerian and Hungarian, moreover similar
grammar  rules.  As  Kálmán  Gosztony,  a  Sumerian  philologist  found,  from the  53  attributes  of
Sumerian grammar, 51 of them also characterize the Hungarian language (“The Controversy on the
Origins and Early History of the Hungarians”, n.d.).
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The Hungarian conquest and settlement in the Carpathian Basin (see Appendix A.1 map) is a
debated question as the mainstream narrative is that they were primitive Asiatic barbarians who
were forced to settle in that region and the Western European influence had great benefits for them.
Though it is true that like other nations, the Hungarians also conducted many raids at that time. This
is opposed by the traditionalist  view, which suggests Hungarians had a developed material  and
spiritual culture and a developed society. It is argued the Western political and religious influence
were beneficial to Hungary such as the feudal political system and the adoption of Christianism as
opposed to the “pagan” Magyars. Others believe the forced integration to the West had detrimental
effects  and  served foreign  interests,  not  the  interest  of  Hungary.  It  is  also  claimed  before  the
Hungarians arrived,  Slavic,  Daco-Roman and Germanic peoples were inhabiting the Carpathian
Basin, while according to the opposing view, the region was inhabited by populations related to
Hungarians.  Due to  the  already  mentioned Habsburg,  communist  influence  and  anti-Hungarian
propaganda,  there  exists  a  distorted  image  of  Hungarians  that  concurs  with  the  traditional
Eurocentric bias. These biases were exposed by Viktor Padányi and historical evidence draws a
different picture (“The Controversy on the Origins and Early History of the Hungarians”, n.d.).
First of all, prior to the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin, due to the Hun-Magyar
identity and its continuity, the Magyars were already part of the Hun and Avar Empires politically
and culturally, being established themselves in the 4th-8th centuries in the region, which means the
current Hungarian state is linked back to about 1500 years and a few centuries back before the
Magyar Conquest of 895-896. The archaeological and anthropological evidence highlights that the
Carpathian Basin was previously populated by significant Avar populations, which was identical to
Hungarians, remaining Huns, but not Indo-Europeans. According to Byzantine sources, as the Huns
and Avars spoke the same language, the theory of Hun-Avar-Magyar ethno-linguistic identity is
almost certain (“The Controversy on the Origins and Early History of the Hungarians”, n.d.).
Secondly, the developed culture of Hungarians can be seen in the Covenant of Blood, which
gave the base of their tribal federation under Hungarian leadership. It was like a constitution of the
Hungarians created in Etelköz, in the region where they settled before coming to the Carpathian
Basin.  It  may be considered  a  partly  democratic  order  at  that  time,  as  among the rules  of  the
covenant, it was declared that clan leaders have the right to freely elect the ruler and be part of the
ruler’s  council,  the rulers  of the tribal  federation are chosen from the Magyar tribe,  the goods
achieved by common effort are to be shared and the ruler that breaks the covenant is to be banished
(Dr. Vágó 1976: 31.).
The ancient Hungarians had their own forged writing system, the runic script and their own
monotheistic religion, the Magian religion. In this the forces of nature were worshipped without
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intolerant, exclusive characteristics. There was more tolerance and freedom present in Hungary than
in Christian Europe. Other cultures, religions were tolerated and Hungarian nationality was open to
all peoples regardless of ethnic origin. In Hungary, there were not only equal rights provided, a
more democratic tribal system than the feudal system at that time, but also more developed medical
knowledge, personal hygiene, more improved social behavior and moral standards than in feudal
Europe (“The Controversy on the Origins and Early History of the Hungarians”, n.d.).
The historical self-identification of the Hungarians of the distant past was provided by the
Hungarian language. Since the ancient traditions, the “aul”, the extended family does not limit itself
to a single ethnic group as it accepted, assimilated foreigners too. Hungarianness of a person is
considered not to be defined by their nationality, but instead who learned the Hungarian language
and  could  call  themselves  Hungarians.  Thus,  a  Hungarian  person  is  someone  who  consider
themselves to be Hungarian (Nemeskürty 2003: 129-130.).
Despite  the  general  cultural  state  of  Europe with generally  poor  living standards,  being
referred to as the dark ages, gave the Church of Rome space to gain political and cultural influence
over many nations, the Hungarian leader, Géza, in the late 10th century was influenced by inter-
dynastic marriages that promoted foreign interests and Christianity,  thereby bringing up his son
Vajk  (later  Stephen)  in  Christian  faith.  As István became the  new ruler  in  Hungary  and made
Hungary a Christian Kingdom in 1000, he also let foreign influence, the political instrument of
religion to gain leverage over Hungary and broke up with ancient Hungarian traditions, destroying
many ancient cultural elements and creating a Christian feudal regime subjugating the Hungarian
peoples for centuries to come (Dr. Vágó 1976: 39-83.).
The precept  of the Holy Crown had been a defining law and element in  the Hungarian
Kingdom throughout the centuries. The Hungarian Holy Crown was sent to Stephen I during his
rule in Hungary. The property of the Hungarian Holy Crown is the territory of the whole Carpathian
Basin  and  a  contract  was  made  between  the  sky  (the  Heavens)  and  the  Earth  that  made  the
Carpathian Basin to be Virgin Mary’s country and this legal rule cannot be modified by mortal
beings.  The Hungarian Holy Crown is  the inheritance of Saint Stephen and will  be valid  until
Hungarians live in the Carpathian Basin. The precept of the Holy Crown served as a theory and the
legal  system of  the  state  to  the  center  of  the  legal  and societal  order  as  it  acted  as  a  patient,
inclusive, defending and retaining force. The precept of the Holy Crown stated that God defined the
purpose of the Hungarians as a nation (“A Szent Korona Tan”, n.d.).
There may have been much difference between the ancient Hungarian way of life and the
way  of  life  after  Hungary  was  Christianized.  The  Christianization  of  Hungary  as  a  right  step
towards a better way of life and progress should be questioned. As the Christian way of life led to
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the structure of feudalism that constituted the wealthy land owners, noblemen and the significant
number of the rest of the society as peasants, in which above the King the Catholic Church stood
having the power of manipulation over the people, the ancient Hungarian, pagan, nomadic way of
life and the alliance, togetherness of different ethnic peoples, the tribal acceptance and tolerance
should have stood as significant virtues in that age.
Hungarian ethnic identity is of steppe origin. The heterogeneity of the Hungarians was even
more stronger after settling down in the Carpathian Basin as the Hungarian nation came together by
merging several smaller components into a united tribe. Hungarian identity had a double meaning
as it consisted of the ethnic Hungarians but also included other groups whom may have also spoken
a different language. From the Early Middle Ages until the Turkish threat, the Hungarians had been
stereotyped as Asiatic barbaric peoples in Christian Europe as both the Hungarian Kingdom was
hostile to Christian Europe and the German-Roman Empire thought of the Carpathian Basin as a
German province. This negative stereotype changed to brave and daring warriors when Byzantium
needed the Hungarians’ help against the Turks and later during the struggle against the Turkish
offensives throughout decades when Hungarians were called as the noble defenders of Christianity.
The Hungarians who often served as a bastion for Europe against the intruder Scythians such as the
Tartar attacks from the East was also mentioned by Machiavelli (Jenei 2020).
It is argued there is a traditional, ancient Hungarian nationalism that was brought to the
Carpathian Basin from the  steppes,  inherited  from earlier  Hungarians  that  also prevailed when
Hungarians settled down. This kind of early nationalism and how the society was organized was the
wisdom of the nomad people as language, ethnicity did not matter and they could mobilize the
people towards a common purpose.  The Hungarian kings of the Christian Kingdom could have
inherited  this  multi-ethnic  tolerance  until  modern  nationalism  did  not  divide  and  turn  the
nationalities against each other in the Carpathian Basin from around the end of the 18 th century. The
problem was that due to different reasons Hungary did not follow this unique path and the “old
ways”,  thus  the  Hungarus  consciousness  ceased  to  exist.  Ján  Balthasar  Magin  emphasized  the
predecessors  of  the  Slovakians  accepted  the  Hungarians,  then  the  Slovakians  became  equal
members of natio hungarica and the ethno-social issues were tackled within the shared political
nation.  Mátyás Bél,  an early intellectual  tried to  define this  Hungarus consciousness by stating
„lingua Slavus, natione Hungarus, eruditione Germanus”, which means he was linguistically Slav,
his nationality Hungarian and his literacy as German. The hungarica natio can be considered as the
Hungarian  state  community,  to  which  everyone  in  the  state  belongs,  in  this  sense  Hungarian,
Hungarus regardless of their class, position or nationality ranging from the Slovak peasants to the
Croatian noblemen (Miskolczy 2012, 163-171.).
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As a consequence of the Hungarian defeat at the Battle of Mohács in 1526 against the Turks,
the Hungarian Kingdom gradually collapsed with one part being brought under Habsburg influence,
the other part ruled by the Turkish Sultan and the region of Transylvania left to be autonomous at a
price. These partitions in Hungary had prevailed until the end of the 17 th century. Due to this, the
unified Hungarian identity ceased to exist, however, the Hungarian Reformation was a cohesive
force that sustained the Hungarian identity as the trends of reformation gave the village people
opportunity to read and write in Hungarian. Although the death of the nation at that time was a real
threat, it provided a strong sense of Hungarian identity to struggle for freedom. At the end of the
Turkish opposition, resentment among Hungarians grew towards the West, against the Germans
appeared due to the German violence of the Habsburg armies inflicted upon the Hungarians. In the
late 17th century, Hungarian identity split into two when the Kuruc and Labanc identities were being
formed.  The  Kuruc  identity  rebelled  to  restore  the  sovereign  Hungarian  statehood  against  the
Habsburg  Empire  that  gained  significant  leverage  over  Hungary  as  the  Turkish  armies  were
eliminated, even with the aid of the Turks, while the Labanc gave up Hungarian independence and
the restoration of the former political functioning and were pro-Habsburg. This led to the Rákóczi
War for Independence in 1703-1711 that failed to restore the sovereign Hungarian Kingdom and left
the Hungarians with limited autonomy within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy (Jenei
2020).
The Hungarians failed to defend themselves against the Turks, failed to liberate themselves
from  the  Turks,  failed  to  regain  independence  from  the  Habsburgs  in  the  Rákóczi  War  for
Independence  and  failed  once  again  against  the  Habsburgs  in  the  Hungarian  Revolution  and
Freedom Fight of 1848-1849 that will be discussed in the next Chapter.
After the Rákóczi War for Independence the Hungarian identity was in danger to disappear
under  the  Habsburg  Monarchy,  however,  Maria  Theresa  revoke  some repressive  measures  and
favored Hungarian identity by creating cultural and economic opportunities for Hungarians. Settlers
of other nationalities settled in the Carpathian Basin began to speak Hungarian, but still there was a
duality, to Germanize the Hungarians as a result of Habsburg modernization that some Hungarians
condemned  as  attack  on  Hungarian  identity,  while  others  welcomed  due  to  the  economic
opportunities. The external image about Hungarians in the 18th century was contemptuous in the
German-speaking area. It was thought that Hungarians can only fight, but otherwise they seemed to
be unpretentious. The contempt of Hungarians was common at that time as the general opinion was
that they have no future and they will be absorbed. Perhaps some of the most negative opinion was
expressed  by  Lipót  Alajos  Hoffmann  around  1790  that  Hungarian  land  creates  everything  a
Hungarian needs and foreign science is not needed, moreover ignorance is a national virtue, by
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which people looked down on someone who learned something abroad. From the 18 th century,
negative German opinions coincided with the increasing self-awareness of minorities and the earlier
“Hungarus” consciousness started to disintegrate. Especially Slovak and Roman authors mentioned
a cruel Asian mentality, the tempered Hungarian man and the language was named “the language of
horses” as a copy of the German language. On the contrary, the Polish public opinion strongly
favored the Hungarians with a sense of brotherhood as these nations shared similar characteristics
for centuries (Jenei 2020).
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3. The Trianon Trauma
3.1. The long 19th century and the Austria-Hungary Empire
Due to the warfare and foreign occupation from 1526 until the end of the 17 th century, large
Hungarian populations died or were taken away, while other ethnic groups sought refuge or were
moved to deserted areas of Hungary, thus these facts reduced the Hungarian-speaking population
living in Hungary. The different nationalities lived in the Carpathian Basin peacefully together until
the  time  when  the  Habsburgs  incited  the  different  nationalities  living  in  Hungary  against  the
Hungarians, though it may have happened due to the national awakenings too, sooner or later. The
Imperial  Government  of  Vienna  utilized  these  nationalities  as  weapons  against  the  Hungarian
ambitions  towards  potential  independence.  Vienna pursued a  divide and rule  strategy since the
partition of Hungary in the 16th century and exploited the fact that foreigners had to be settled in
Hungary as the country was depopulated due to the brutal Turkish occupation. Estimates show that
in the 18th century 400,000 Serbs, 1,200,000 Germans and 1,500,000 Romanians were settled in the
territory of the historical Kingdom, decreasing the Hungarian population to less than 40 percent by
1780, compared to about 80 percent before the Turkish invasion. The Habsburg rule supported the
development of the non-Hungarian ethnicities’ self-consciousness and exploited this opportunity
against  the  Hungarians.  For  example  the  fictional  Daco-Roman  continuity  was  one  theory  to
mobilize the Romanians through the support of the Catholic Church by the Austrians. This put the
Romanian people into a struggle to re-establish their position of “pre-eminence” in the Carpathian
Basin.  As  a  result,  during  the  Hungarian  uprisings  against  the  Habsburgs  in  the  18 th and  19th
centuries Romanians demolished entire Hungarian villages and killed the people, increasing the
Romanian population mainly in the part of Transylvania. As a consequence of the deterioration of
relationships  between  Hungarian  and  other  ethnicities  in  the  19 th century,  ethnic  tensions  had
serious, terrible repercussions by the 20th century (“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
It is argued the Hungarians needed the aid of the Habsburg Monarchy against the Turks as
Hungary was in ruins, but the Habsburgs also needed the help of the Hungarian nobility to defend
against the Turks, thus after all they were able to preserve their privileges and the independence of
Hungary against the Habsburg ambitions of centralization and absolutism. However, the Hungarian
self-determination in the reform era was interpreted as the self-determination of all the peoples of
Hungary by liberal thinkers (Bertényi 2017). 
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This  Hungarian  reform  era,  which  began  especially  in  the  1820s,  meant  the  fight  and
aspirations of the Hungarian liberal noblemen towards the civil transformation of Hungary along
with  national  demands  for  the  self-determination  (autonomy)  of  Hungary,  national  union  with
Transylvania, to make the Hungarian the language of the state, to create a Hungarian government
accountable to the National Assembly and so on, which ultimately led to the 1848-1849 Hungarian
Revolution and Freedom Fight (Gergely 1996).
When  in  the  end  of  the  18th century  the  modern  democratic  nationalism  was  gaining
popularity,  in  contrast  to  Western  and Northern  Europe where  the  state,  which  the  people,  the
nations aimed to take as their own could not be different than the existing framework of the state,
such as Spain or France,  and there was no obstacle  in  the way,  in  Central-Eastern Europe the
presence of the Holy Roman Empire and the invading Ottoman Empire crushed the already existing
national  frameworks,  giving  way  to  the  final  factor,  the  Habsburg  Empire  to  prevent  the
development  of  such  nations.  The  linguistic  nationalism  became  prevalent  in  Central-Eastern
Europe  and  the  borders  became  fluid  between  nationalities,  which  caused  a  problem  as  the
historical memories of the people, such as the Hungarians, bound them to Greater Hungary, but the
bond of the southern nationalities, the Romanians and Serbs to historical Hungary weakened due to
fact they were not liberated by the Hungarians, thus the significance of the Hungarian state dropped
and they began to gravitate towards their linguistic relatives to the South. The original frameworks
of  states  disappeared and the culture  provided the  togetherness  the nation,  not  like  in  Western
Europe where the framework of states were not interrupted (Bibó 1990a).
Many politicians at that time did not consider a total separation from the Habsburg Empire
due to the fear against the Holy Alliance in Europe, especially considering the Russian tsarism. Still,
the period of the Revolutions of 1848 that was a series of political upheavals throughout Europe
stood  as  an  opportunity  for  the  Hungarian  opposition.  Through  the  so-called  “laws  of  April”
Hungary became independent. The relationship with the Habsburg ruler was unsettled though and
when power relations shifted in Europe, Vienna aimed to eliminate the Hungarian government that
led to a freedom fight. The Hungarians successfully defended their freedom for months against the
Habsburgs until the Russian intervention defeated the movement in August 1849 (Bertényi 2017). 
Negotiations went successfully between the Hungarians and Vienna until June 1848, after
which the Habsburg Monarchy decided to act against Hungary’s transformation. They encouraged
and supported the Ban of Croatia, Josip Jelačić, who was known for his anti-Hungarian stance, to
take up arms against Hungary in spite of the protest of the Hungarian government. Moreover, the
Habsburgs aided a Serbian uprising in June 1848 to establish a Serbian voivodeship. As a response
the  Hungarian  government  called  on  people  to  arms,  but  until  the  end  of  August  Hungarian
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delegations  tried  to  negotiate  in  Vienna  about  the  new laws  in  Hungary,  however,  these  were
rejected. First Jelačić attacked Hungary in September 1848, but was withdrawn to Austria. Then the
Austrians attacked from December 1848 until the summer of 1849, when about 200,000 Russian
troops arrived to help the Austrians and the Hungarians Revolution and Freedom Fight was defeated
finally in August 1849 (Harmat 2015).
There was a brutal retaliation against the Hungarians initiated by Emperor Franz Joseph and
Hungary  was attached to  the  centralized  monarchy,  however,  the  economic  modernization  was
allowed. Due to the Italian defeat of the Habsburg Empire in 1859, Franz Joseph sought a way to
amend the structure of the monarchy by balancing the interests within the Monarchy and giving
concessions to the Hungarians but keeping the emperor having the crucial powers. Lajos Kossuth,
the most influential leader of the 1848-1849 Hungarian Revolution, at this time in emigration, was
hoping  for  another  opportunity  to  fight  for  absolute  independence  and  would  have  given
concessions to the nationalities in Hungary as he thought in the next period national independence
will  be  the  determining  direction,  thus  such  empires  as  the  Monarchy  are  doomed.  A new
opportunity,  however,  did  not  present  itself  and  negotiations  started  between  the  emperor  and
Ferenc  Deák,  the  most  prestigious  Hungarian  politician  who  subordinated  the  ambition  of
Hungarian independence to the privileged position of Hungary within the Monarchy. They reached
a compromise and the framework of dualism was created, but this left other nationalities, who were
about 50 percent of the population dissatisfied. There were separate compromises made with the
Poles  and  Croatians,  within  Austria  and  Hungary,  respectively,  but  due  to  the  failure  of  the
compromise  with  the  Czechs  in  1871,  the  Czech  national  movement  and  the  nationalities  in
Hungary remained hostile to the Habsburg Empire (Bertényi 2017).
The  Joint  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  since  1867  was  not  allowed  to
intervene in internal matters of Austria or Hungary, but Gyula Andrássy, Hungarian Prime Minister
intervened in the conflict between the Czechs and Austrians, Germans that created a precedent the
Czechs would do the same. Kossuth even considered Andrássy to prevent the autonomy of Czechia
(Somogyi 2010: 537-547.).
The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 did not recognize the political autonomy of the
Czech territories, thus they announced passive resistance in 1867. Emperor Franz Joseph reacted
and aimed to negotiate with them in 1871. Gyula Andrássy brought up two main arguments for the
Czech aspirations.  One was that  due to the Czech demands,  the non-Hungarian nationalities in
Hungary would come up with separatist movements and that in this case he would need to step
down. The finance minister stated in the case of a compromise with Prague, the Austro-Hungarian
compromise would have to be renewed, then the Emperor ended the discussions and refused the
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Czech aspirations (György 2016: 115-124.). Although Andrássy did stand up against the Czech
aspirations, he was not the only factor that led to the refusal of the idea by the Emperor of the Dual
Monarchy.
The Austro-Hungarian compromise brought great political stability and peace to the whole
empire accompanied by unmatched economic and cultural development. Despite these facts, the
compromise was neither popular in its own age, nor considered to be a good decision by many
Hungarians today (Bertényi 2017). 
It is important to note that Lajos Kossuth protested against the compromise with Austria in
his  famous  message  called  Cassandra-letter  written  to  Ferenc  Deák.  Although  the  internal  and
external circumstances at that time did not present any other alternatives to gain independence,
Kossuth encouraged the nation to wait  and refuse the deal  of the Habsburgs that would signal
Hungary is not willing to maintain the empire. The stability only persisted for one generation, while
the  wider  society,  the  peasants  and  the  lower  middle  class  opposed  the  compromise.  The
compromise prolonged the longevity of the empire though, but it buried historical Hungary with
itself (Gergely, n.d.).
This is because the compromise between Austria and Hungary politically led to a dead end,
the self-deception and the deception of the other and the common legal constitution had always
been  interpreted  for  the  advantage  of  their  own  nations  of  the  parties.  Austria  sought  the
compromise with Hungary, because it  believed their empire could not be preserved without the
Hungarians as they lost some important battles, while Hungary, or at least the movement of Deák
and the supporters of compromise, agreed upon the compromise as its capability to maintain the
Hungarian state weakened and believed it  will  be stronger within the Dual Monarchy. It was a
conservative compromise for about 50 years,  because it  meant  the supporters of independence,
societal revolution and development, or the self-determination of nationalities were not allowed to
gain  majority.  As  the  Hungarian  opposition  questioned  the  compromise,  some  election  frauds
occurred to prevent them from gaining power that distorted democracy, then the voting rights of
nationalities was also curtailed (Bibó 1990b).
The Austro-Hungarian  compromise  of  1867 created  Austria-Hungary  (see  Appendix  A.2
map) or in its other name the Dual Monarchy that brought together to a closer cooperation the
Kingdom of Hungary and Austria and its provinces in a personal union lasted from 1867 to 1918.
The  Hungarian  party  was  able  to  achieve  not  to  implement  a  unified  imperial  legislation  in
Hungary, however, there were shared matters, the foreign affairs, military affairs and the finances of
these that were kept in imperial hands in Vienna. Although the monarch of the empire kept the
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executive power to a greater degree in their hands, there was no imperial parliament, but separated
legislative powers for the Habsburgs and the Hungarians (Szabó 2001).
Then in 1868 Croatia was given autonomy through the Croatian-Hungarian compromise.
Croatia achieved full autonomy with their own legislation and government, but still they remained
part of the Hungarian Kingdom. In the same year the new nationality law was accepted, which
provided  cultural  autonomy  to  the  different  nationalities  in  Hungary  cultural  autonomy.  This
allowed them to use their own languages in the school system, in public administration and to create
their own associations. In the areas where non-Hungarian nationalities lived, they were not even
obliged to use the Hungarian language. They could also write their petitions in their own languages,
but  the  law  did  not  recognize  their  national  independence,  as  they  were  part  of  the  “unified
Hungarian political nation” (Keserű 2006).
The crisis of dualism had begun from the 1890s partly due to the loss of political leaders
who greatly benefited the Dual Monarchy through their personalities and politics and other factors.
The characteristics of this crisis within the Hungarian part and partly in the whole Monarchy were
that the conflicts, differing interests were considered to be a problem of dualism. The institutions
were not able to resolve smaller conflicts, which accumulated over time and led the whole dualism
into crisis (Szabó 2001).
The modernization of the 19th century greatly benefited the national societies, for example
the Slovaks, Serbs and Romanians living in Hungary but until the 1890s they were rather passive in
the parliamentary elections as the Hungarian governments restricted their activities. By the turn of
the century they became more active to take part in politics and in 1893 the Romanian, Slovak and
Serb leaders already held a joint conference in Vienna to state that non-Hungarian nationalities
constitute the majority of the population in Hungary and that they reject the Hungarian national
perspectives.  They  demanded  the  reforms  of  the  state  structure  by  providing  more  self-
determination for different nationalities based on the languages spoken in the given areas. These co-
operations did not lead to significant results but provided insight about the internal situation (Szabó
2001).
There was a wide celebration on January 1st of 1896 to commemorate the millennium of the
Hungarian Conquest of the Carpathian Basin that brought great attention to Budapest for months.
The celebration, attractions had to prove that the Hungarians had found themselves and the nation is
united, however, nationalities other than Hungarians often did not show up and took part in these
celebrations, moreover some of their organizations even protested against the events (Szabó 2001).
The Hungarian national consciousness regarded Austria and the non-Hungarian intellectuals
in Hungary as opponents in the era of dualism. They feared that all the non-Hungarian nationalities
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could be politicizing creating a disadvantaged position for them, and this fear deepened when the
self-consciousness of these nationalities had increased. The opposition against the Austrians were
another  factor,  which  could  not  gain  ground though,  as  for  example  the  Magyarization  of  the
Hungarian army was prohibited. However, there were some measures taken against the different
nationalities  such  as  lawsuits  against  certain  political  activities,  but  the  most  significant  was
probably  the  school-legislation  pack  by  Apponyi  Albert,  Minister  of  Culture,  that  made  the
intervention of the state possible to  state and non-state  primary schools by increasing financial
support and made the Hungarian language a compulsory subject from the first grade (Szabó 2001).
It is necessary to analyze the foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary and the changes occurring in
the region to better understand the context, circumstances of Hungary prior to the First World War.
When Agenor Goluchowski became the foreign minister of the Monarchy in the 1890s, he predicted
the power of the Monarchy less than his predecessors and aimed to maintain the status quo in the
Balkans as at the turn of the century nations on the Balkans posed problems for the Monarchy. From
1906 the Monarchy pursued a more active foreign policy and annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina with
German  support  in  spite  of  the  Russian  and  Serbian  resistance.  However,  this  ended  the
compromising politics with Russia and turned most of the Balkan states against Austria-Hungary.
As the First Balkan War and the Second Balkan War occurred, the Monarchy aimed to abstain from
the matters to decrease tensions, however, it still put conditions on Serbia for example to prevent it
from getting a sea port. By the beginning of 1914 it was visible that the Balkan states, except for
Bulgaria were the enemies of the Monarchy and some of them pursued expansionist policies. This
meant  that  Romania  and  Serbia  aimed  to  annex  the  territories  where  Romanian  and  Serbian
populations lived in Hungary (Szabó 2001).
István Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister from 1903 to 1905 and 1913 to 1917, recognized
the power of the increasing separatist nationalities that were opposing the Monarchy prior to the
First World War and aimed to make concessions for them instead of relying on a strong hand. He
negotiated with the Croatians to consolidate their governance and tried to reach a common ground
with the leaders of the Romanian National Party. The main focus was placed on the Romanian issue
as he found it  easier to come to terms with the Romanians instead of establishing a long-term
alliance with the Serbs. There were a number of negotiations, however, he could not guarantee the
demands  of  the  Romanian  leaders  and  by  the  time  Romania  entered  the  First  World  War,
negotiations had stopped (Pölöskei 1998: 454-455.).
As  a  result  of  the  Turkish  invasion  of  Hungary,  the  Hungarians  had  gradually  become
subordinated to the Habsburg rule and could not split from them even by 1848-1849 Hungarian
Revolution and Freedom Fight. After the Turkish invasion and the defeated attempts to gain full
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sovereignty the compromise may have reflected a weaker nation in the promise of working together
with  the  Habsburgs.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  was  indeed  consisting  of  several  different
nationalities  making  up a  multinational  state  with  a  large  territory  that  was  fragile  due  to  the
differing interests within the bloc and the new emerging modern thinking in nation-states. Austria-
Hungary  represented  backwardness,  maintaining  the  status  quo  and  preventing  societal
development, thus it acted as a time bomb until something happened that shook up the empire. The
Hungarian leaders did not recognize the aspirations of the different nationalities and did not make
significant concessions for them, but instead aimed to gradually assimilate them. However, by the
1900s it became clear that sooner or later a war on the Balkans may occur that has most likely
turned the tide on all the promises of the Dual Monarchy.
3.2. The First World War and the chaotic road to Trianon
When the Crown prince, Archduke Franz Ferdinand went on a two-day visit to Sarajevo to
witness a military exercise he was assassinated by a Serb nationalist group, the Black Hand on June
28, 1914, the case triggered an existential crisis of Austria-Hungary. As a response to the event, the
Austrian leadership chose to wage war against Serbia after calculations that the time was right as
Serbia may get stronger over time and the alliance with the Germans was prepared for a larger war
if the conflict spreads in Europe (Szabó 2001).
Tisza found that date to be unfavorable to start a war as he argued that the Dual Monarchy
had already lost Romania and the only state they could count on on the Balkans was Bulgaria,
which was exhausted. Then, Tisza stated that the situation on the Balkans is very hostile and it
would be easy to find a reason to punish Serbia at a different time, but not long after he still agreed
on the war (Pölöskei 1998: 455-456.).
The Great War spread rapidly on the European continent and it was soon to be seen that the
opponents had immersed themselves in a long-term conflict, which would not solve itself overnight.
Due to the defeats of 1916, the thought of ending the war and making peace appeared both in
Vienna and Budapest as there were constantly new demands on the front line, moreover due to the
high  number  of  Romanian  and  Slav  soldiers  within  the  army  of  the  Monarchy  that  began  to
demoralize the army, while the nationalities expressed the aspirations to join their new nation-states.
The worsening economic situation, the disruption of the illusion of a rapid, successful war, the
defeats and the great human losses contributed to the widespread dissatisfaction at home and in the
political  parties.  By 1918 Mihály Károlyi had become the leader of the opposition as with his
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leadership a National Council was formed from three opposition parties, among which the Social
Democratic  Party  had  become  the  most  popular  and  on  31st October  1918  their  democratic
revolution triumphed (Pölöskei 1998: 456-467.).
The Great War had taken its toll on the Hungarian society like probably in other states as
well. Within the joint army of the Dual Monarchy 4 million Hungarian soldiers served during the
war, of whom more than 600,000 soldiers fell victims to the war, while the number of casualties and
prisoners of war reached 1,5 million. By the fall of 1918 chaos had spread within the Monarchy and
in Hungary as the internal situation was so terrible and the people were in misery, were dissatisfied
what  the  returning  soldiers  had  to  face,  who  were  disregarded,  thus  making  a  collapse  and
revolution inevitable (Kollega and others).
Then, in 1916 the Allied powers promised Transylvania, Partium, Máramaros and Banat, the
eastern parts of Hungary to Romania, if Romania had joined on their side in the war which Romania
did.  Then,  the  French  resolution,  along  with  British  and  American  ones,  in  1918  recognized
Czechoslovakia as their allies and promised them the Felvidék (Upper Hungary), the northern part
of Hungary and thus soon all the plans for Hungary’s dismemberment were created (Dr. Dobó 2019:
82-83.).
After  the  Dual  Monarchy  signed  a  ceasefire  with  the  winning  powers  in  Padova  on
November 3rd,  1918, the French-guided military occupation of Hungary began. The neighboring
states of Hungary began to occupy the promised territories with French support,  and the weak
resistance in some areas, the incapabilities of the Károlyi-government were favorable to them. First
the southern demarcation lines were laid out, the new Serbian-Hungarian border, then the northern
ones, the so-called first Vix-list, the new Hungarian-Czechoslovakian borders, moreover the eastern
demarcation lane, the second Vix-list about the new borders between Romania and Hungary (Dr.
Dobó 2019: 91-100.).
At  this  crucial  time when the expansionist  states  prepared to  occupy large territories of
Hungary,  also  areas  with  majority  Hungarians,  the  Minister  of  Defence,  Linder  Béla  is  often
mentioned stating he did not  want to  see any soldiers that  is  considered to be a  high treason,
however, he could not have an outlook on the state and politics of the army in the period of a bit
more than a week but his secretaries called to duty one of the younger generations. The recruitment
to a new army failed due to a lack of leverage, such as lands for the soldiers, while as the returning
army divisions from the Great War were often mixed nationalities, they did not stand for the defense
of Hungary any more. The disorganization was high and it was highly unlikely the Hungarian army
could  not  stand  a  self-defending  war  on  multiple  frontiers,  the  Czechs  from  the  North,  the
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Romanians from the East and the Serbs from the South. Even if they were weak, tired armies, the
Hungarians were far outnumbered (Ablonczy 2020).
As  the  Károlyi-government  failed,  the  Hungarian  Soviet  Republic  was  established  in
Hungary on March 21st, 1919, which was a communist rump state that ruled Hungary for 133 days,
yet this event in Hungarian history is considered by some a “Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy”. This
dictatorship of the proletariat had a Revolutionary Council that governed in Hungary and had many
members of Jewish origin, who did not have a Jewish identity but were thought to be atheists and
internationalists, by which this period was blamed as a “Jewish dictatorship” by the far right at that
time. In contrast to this conspiracy, the Jewish people were emancipated in Hungary and the Jewish
religion  was  accepted  in  1895  by  the  state.  However,  many  Jews  felt  discriminated  and  this
internationalist movement provided them a way to leave behind their drawbacks of having a Jewish
identity. A novel, The descendants of Fischmann S. by András Komor that was written at that time
reflects the hardship of a Jewish boy not being able to fully assimilate into the society and this
guided him to the radical communist ideology that stood as a solution instead of assimilation. Even
Béla Kun, the de facto leader of this government stated that in spite of his dad being a Jew, he could
become a socialist, communist. By the fall of 1919, most political parties in Hungary held the Jews
responsible for the national catastrophe. Soon after this dictatorship, radical papers were publicized
arguing that as in August 1919 the Jewish leaders with stolen treasures emigrated from Hungary, the
Hungarian nation has to deal with “the remaining parasites of the nation” who have to be banned
from Hungarian  politics  as  they  created  “a  national  catastrophe”.  This  paper  also  drew a  dark
picture about this dictatorship by saying: 
“Those, who after the defeat of the Hungarian Bolshevik dictatorship visited the morgue of Budapest, could
believe that the Tartar invasion was a tourist trip compared to the terror of the Jewish Bolshevik government
practiced on the Hungarians” (Csunderlik 2020)
In the operation of the proletarian dictatorship, more than 60 percent of the Revolutionary
Council  were  of  Jewish  origin  based  on  the  above-mentioned  historical-sociological  reasons.
According to Béla Szemere and Károly Lechner, the entire Hungarian political elite from the late
19th century  can  be  considered  “people  with  mental  disabilities”  as  the  rivalizing  Hungarian
politicians allied themselves with anti-Hungarian forces due to their selfish ambitions and left these
to  grow upon  Hungary.  The  author  in  his  work  considered  the  Hungarian  Soviet  Republic  to
embody the racial ruling ambitions of the Jews, who disguised themselves as communists, to gain
hegemony in Hungary (Csunderlik 2020).
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There were about twenty armed groups formed in Budapest and in the rural areas to defend
the communist regime and they were often called the “Lenin-boys”. Their aims were to suppress
any  counter-revolutionary  movement  against  the  regime,  kidnap  people,  inspect  houses,  arrest,
execute, torture and rape people. The number of known victims who died in Hungary was about
600. The regime was opposed by the majority of the population, while due to the nationalization of
the land of medium landowners and above, moreover some of the peasantry, many people became
the enemies of the state. Thus the regime knew that they could maintain their power through terror
and oppression what was called after the “Red Terror” (Anka 2019).
The  rule  of  the  Hungarian  Soviet  Republic  had  serious  consequences.  It  resulted  in  an
increasing wave of antisemitism, which was already present during the years of the First World War,
by the fall of 1919, then the leftist thinking within the Interwar period was discredited and it was
correlated with the Jews. The long-term consequences have been till today the intense opposition
between the urban and rural areas, the contrast between modernization and traditionalism, moreover
from 1947 until  the  1980s  overshadowing the  conservative  thinkers  and people  who proposed
alternatives. This period had serious repercussions that had a negative impact on society overall,
and the lesson would be not to perceive events to be black and white (Ujváry 2019).
The new government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, which was dominated by radical
communists, was formed in March 1919 with many of the leaders being criminals before, with the
most prevalent figure being Béla Kun. The rule of the radical communists was not beneficial in
many aspects to the Hungarian state (Dr. Dobó 2019: 100-106.).
In the meanwhile the Romanian forces already gained hold of the Eastern part of Hungary
until  the  Tisza  river,  while  the  Czechs  occupied  large  territories  in  Northern  Hungary.  The
proletarian  dictatorship  called  the  Hungarians  into  arms  and  succeeded  against  the  Czechs,
however, Clemenceau sent an ultimatum to Béla Kun to withdraw from Felvidék, in exchange he
promised that the Romanians would withdraw behind the set demarcation lines. The Hungarian
army withdrew, but the Romanians did not that led to desperate attack of the Hungarians against the
Romanians, which failed. The Romanians occupied Budapest and major areas of Hungary, while the
Hungarian Soviet Republic stepped down on August 1st, 1919 and the Romanians remained there
until November. The occupying Romanians plundered the country as they had taken away values
worth more than half a billion dollars, which was protested by the French for the fact that the
Hungarians need to pay reparations for the First World War. The Allied powers then sent diplomats
to make the Romanians leave. The Romanian occupation did not alter the conditions of Trianon,
even though they aimed to  keep the  region of  Tiszántúl,  this  did  not  happen after  all.  As the
Romanians began their withdrawal from Hungary, Miklós Horthy gained power on November 16th,
49
1919 and the Peace Conference requested the Hungarian government to send their delegation to
Paris on 1st of December, 1919 (Dr. Dobó 2019: 100-106.).
Even as  some Hungarian territories  were  occupied by Hungary’s  neighbors,  Hungarians
were  chased  away  from  their  homes  and  200,000  Hungarians  from  Transylvania,  120,000
Hungarians from Felvidék and 80,000 Hungarians from Délvidék fled to Hungary (Halassy 2012).
The First World War or at least the local conflict with either Serbia or Romania seemed to be
occurring sooner or later and the conflicts of the Dual Monarchy came to the surface. The will of
the non-Hungarian nationalities of the historical Kingdom was prevailing but it may have buried
with it the future chance for cooperation and peace in the Carpathian Basin, the relatively healthy,
peaceful  co-existence  of  the  nations,  nationalities.  The  Great  War  and  the  events  in  Hungary
between 1918-1919 caused great turmoil in Hungary and after when the war was over in 1918, the
Hungarians had to  face the invasion of its  neighbors,  the realization that  the nationalities were
aiming to separate from Hungary, a communist rule and its Red Terror, the issue of the returning
soldiers from the Great War and the Hungarian refugees from the occupied territories by foreign
troops, among other internal issues.
3.3. The Treaty of Trianon
The leader of the Hungarian delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris was Count Albert
Apponyi who held an important speech on 16th January, 1920 in front of some of the most important
leaders of the Allied powers, such as Clemenceau and Lloyd George. He pointed out that among the
Peace Treaties of the defeated powers, the conditions on Hungary are the harshest with such large
territorial changes, not taking into account the self-determination of nationalities, condemning the
accusations  against  Hungary  to  have  such  a  great  role  in  creating  the  war  within  the  Dual
Monarchy. He stated that among the 11 million people who were to be detached from Hungary, 35
percent of them would be Hungarians as it was presented in the famous Red Map of Pál Teleki (see
Appendix  A.3  map  and  another  map  about  Trianon  see  Appendix  A.4  map),  which  is  unjust,
moreover the new borders would create more heterogeneous states than it was during the period of
the Dual Monarchy. The most important element of his speech was that according to Woodrow
Wilson’s liberal ideas, the populations of a state cannot be placed without their agreement under
foreign rule and based on this, the Hungarian delegation asked for plebiscites in the territories the
Allied  powers  and their  allies  wanted  to  detach from Hungary and that  the  Hungarians  would
subject  themselves  to  the  results  whatever  they  would  be.  However,  he  focused  too  much  on
50
preserving  the  whole  territory  of  Greater  Hungary,  stating  Hungary  acted  as  a  natural  bastion
against foreign invaders from the East, pressed the unique economic integrity of the Hungarian state
and  emphasized  the  Hungarian  state-forming  capacity  and  the  cultural  development  of  the
Hungarian state, in contrast to the new successor states, but could have put more emphasis on the
Hungarians who were to be attached to the new successor states. He further stated that if violence
and materialism would be the maintaining forces of the peace in Europe, then Europe’s future will
be  sad.  His  speech  achieved  a  good  impression  on  some  of  the  important  leaders,  however,
unfortunately for the modification of the earlier permanently defined borders it did not have any
effect (Zeidler 2009).
Out of compulsion, Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon in the Grand Trianon Palace on
June 4th, 1920 and the Hungarians mourned that day, the Hungarians dressed in black, while the
churches rang the bell for two hours (Dr. Dobó 2019: 178-181.).
The most serious Hungarian trauma and the biggest Hungarian issue until today about the
neighboring Hungarian minorities was created on June 4th,  1920 by the Treaty of Trianon.  The
victorious major powers after the First World War, France, Great Britain and their allies created
multiple  minority  issues  through  their  decisions.  The  Western  powers  did  not  implement  the
minority rights protection clauses at the Peace Treaties, thus Hungary lost 72 percent of its territory,
64 percent of population with one-third of all ethnic Hungarians becoming detached from Hungary.
The conditions of Trianon imposed upon Hungarians were more cruel than the terms on any other
defeated nation, because the Hungarian Kingdom was indeed a multinational state, but the loss of
about a third of all Hungarians at that time in the Carpathian Basin made it significantly worse
(“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
By 1918 the non-Hungarian nationalities expressed their aim to separate from Hungary and
this could not be prevented at this time by the Hungarian government, but the principle of self-
determination  was  applied  in  a  way  that  it  was  detrimental  to  the  Hungarian  population.  For
example, the Czechs aimed to acquire even majority Hungarian and Ruthenian areas, to push the
borders  of  Slovakia  to  the  South  as  much  as  possible  to  satisfy  their  economic  and  strategic
interests. Finally in this area of Felvidék, which was detached from Hungary, 1,9 million Slovaks,
460,000 Ruthenians and about 750,000 Hungarians lived in 1921. According to data from 1921,
470,000 Hungarians were attached to Serbia (30 percent of these territories were Hungarians in
1910), while the on the acquired territories of Romania, 32 percent of the population (1910) were
Hungarians with majority Hungarian towns and the Szekler enclave. The Hungarian railway lines in
such territories were also strategically important to be taken from Hungary. The self-determination
of the nationalities occurred in a one-sided, inconsistent way on the detriment to the Hungarian
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people, creating new injustice and tense, non-cooperative relations in “Middle-Europe” (Zahorán
2020: 193-209.).
Within Austria-Hungary the foreign affairs and military matters were defined, decided by the
Austrians.  Although  in  1914  the  Hungarian  government  opposed  to  take  aggressive  measures
against Serbia, the Austrians could force Hungary to accept the Habsburg policies by overruling the
Hungarian objections. As the Crown Council decided to go to war with Serbia, Hungary could only
comply  with  its  obligations  as  an  ally,  but  the  fact  is  that  the  accusation  of  Hungary  to  be
responsible for this war is unjustified, because Hungary had no territorial ambitions, while other
powers such as the Habsburgs, France, Romania or Serbia pursued expansionist policies (“Origins
of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
It is argued the Treaty of Trianon has no legal or moral validity. First of all, Hungarians
could not negotiate the terms of the treaty but it was imposed upon the Hungarians, just like on the
other defeated nations. Trianon endorsed and legalized the occupation of Hungarian territories by
Hungary’s  neighbors,  the  conquest  of  these  states  made after  the  end  of  the  First  World  War,
violating the armistice agreements.  The post-war borders in  the region were determined by the
claims and information of the parties that aimed to dismember Hungary. The objections of Hungary
and the  rightful  demand for  plebiscites  were rejected  by the Peace Conference.  Thus,  the new
frontiers were drawn discriminatorily against Hungary, favoring the Associated powers in all ethnic,
strategic, economic and other aspects (“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
When the Hungarians  were  invited  to  the  Peace  Conference  in  the  end of  1919,  Albert
Apponyi already considered the possibility of not signing the treaty and mentioned it later too that
in the case if no concessions will be given to Hungary about its borders, the delegation should
refuse. In March 1920 the decision was final not to modify the conditions imposed upon Hungary
and the refusal was discussed. A military occupation from the Associated powers was not probably
but rather an economic blockade that could have led to the collapse and misery of Hungary, and
considering the fate of the Hungarian minorities in the new successor states, finally the Hungarian
leaders chose to sign even if no concessions would have been given, arguing “Hungary does not
have an Anatolian desert like Turkey” (Ablonczy 2020).
Finally Hungary signed with the possibility of future revision in mind and that the successor
states  were obliged to  protect  national  minorities,  though later  these were not  guaranteed.  The
Allied powers were supposed to serve justice based on President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points to
provide self-determination for Central-East European nationalities. The principle asserted that each
territorial settlement must be made for the benefit of the given population and on the basis of free
acceptance  of  those  people,  however,  Trianon  completely  contradicted  these  assertions.  As  a
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consequence, about 3.5 million Hungarians were forced to live under the rule of successor states.
There were no plebiscites except for the town of Sopron that favored belonging to Hungary, the
Treaty did not take into account self-determination (“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
The Allied powers claimed that through the partitioning of Hungary the nationality problems
would be solved as Hungary was not unable to do so. If the Treaty of Trianon were to achieve any
peaceful solutions in Central-East Europe, it would not attach minority issues to successor states as
there  were  new  multinational  states  being  created  from  the  old  ones  with  large  Hungarian
minorities. Lloyd George pointed out at that time that there won’t be peace if the new states have “a
large Magyar irredenta within its borders” (“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
"For a thousand years we did not suffer half at the hands of the Hungarians that we have had to suffer in a few
years at the hands of the Czechs." - said Father Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Catholic Party
(“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
"... If we speak without bias, we have to say that the Yugo-Slavs of Austria and Hungary had before the war more
political freedom than they had in Yugo-Slavia even before the dictatorship..." - said Svetozar Pribićević,
former Yugoslavian Interior Minister (“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
"...  More Transylvanian-Rumanians were appointed to the Hungarian High Court in Budapest than are now
appointed  in  Bucarest.  In  Hungary  there  were  eighthigh  financial  officials  who  were  Rumanians  from
Transylvania; to-day in Rumania there are but two." - said Mr. Vaida Voevod, former Romanian Prime
Minister (“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
These statements highlight the significant drawbacks considering not only minority rights,
but also the political and economic consequences, the detrimental nature of the Treaty on economic
development and political  stability in the region that paved the way for the Second World War
(“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
Even  before  the  First  World  War  there  is  evidence  that  states  aimed  to  exploit  the
opportunity  of  partitioning  Hungary  and  annex  territories  through  the  strategy  of  supporting
separatist movements of the Hungarian ethnic minorities. The Czechs, Serbs and Romanians had
such expansionist  aims that  were promoted,  propagated in  the West also by influential  persons
creating anti-Hungarian propaganda. Arbitrary and biased arguments were created to  justify the
maximum territorial objectives of the Slavs and Romanians that contributed to the fermentation
within the Monarchy and the new order in East-Central Europe. Eventually this propaganda resulted
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in the Treaty of Trianon that decided over the Hungarians’ fate in a biased context not relying on
facts, where Hungary’s image became deformed. The biased political atmosphere of the Paris Peace
Conference about Hungary and the malevolence are reflected in the words of the British Diplomat
Harold Nicolson:
"I confess that I regarded, and still regard, that Turanian tribe with acute distaste. Like their cousins the Turks,
they had destroyed much and created nothing." (“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
The  anti-Hungarian  propaganda  was  a  great  tool  to  justify  the  anti-Hungarian  policies
dictated,  but  these  misconceptions  were definitely  not  new as  since  the  19 th century  Germans,
Czechs, Slovaks and Romanians had played a part in this. The distorted views about Hungarians in
the West became generally acceptable. The most prevalent image about Hungarians is that they are
aliens in Europe, Asiatic barbarian intruders who harmed the European people and that they are
culturally inferior to Indo-European peoples. The Romanians also made up their anti-Hungarian
theories, such as that the Hungarians are “despoilers of ancient Romanian soil of many millennia”
and “Hungarians have no right to be in Europe”. Moreover, there is an example of a French school
textbook  from  1971  made  in  Paris,  which  shows  the  ethnographic  map  of  Austria-Hungary,
however, on the Transylvanian Hungarians it  is noted:  "Les Hongrois forment un bloc compact
(l'enclave  des  paysans  de  Transylvanie  ne  compte  guère)."  Or  in  English  that  the  presence  of
Hungarians in that region is recognized, but the Hungarian minority is disregarded of having any
importance. The propagation and teaching of anti-Hungarian information threatens the existence of
Hungarian minorities and may justify Slovakia, Romania and Serbia to implement discriminatory
policies (“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
It has been claimed by some that the Hungarians have treated the ethnic minorities as a
tyrant  would  since  the  19th century  as  a  justification  against  them.  It  is  argued the  Hungarian
statehood had been influenced by nomadic tribal life that provided autonomy and self-government,
lacking discrimination against foreign ethnic or language groups. The most convincing evidence to
that is that in the 16th century, religious freedom was permitted in Transylvania for the first time in
Europe. It is stated the Hungarians not only tolerated other nationalities, but also empowered their
development  before  the  20th century,  and  as  a  consequence,  they  reached  a  higher  cultural
articulation than their kin in Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia, for example. The Hungarian policies
towards the minorities were not as strict and harsh as it had been propagated. The evidence points
out that Magyarization occurred as a natural and moderate integration, assimilation into the society
in Hungary. Then, the Magyarization policies in the late 19 th century were aimed to preserve an
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endangered nation as the survival of Hungarians became doubted due to the increasing number of
surrounding other ethnic groups, threatening the integrity of the state. Thus, these were measures
similar to the French or American policies, in order to re-establish ethnic homogeneity and political
sovereignty,  which  were  disappearing  due  to  centuries  of  foreign  influence  and  colonization
(“Origins of the Hungarian Question”, n.d.).
The First World War interfered in the Hungarian population growth in the short term, but
despite the occupations, all the human losses, the decreasing birthrates and the appearance of the
Spanish flue, the long-term Hungarian tendency of population growth was not interrupted. Despite
the common beliefs and the depressing years after  1920, Trianon did not interrupt the growing
tendency in Hungary as the Hungarian economy was able to successfully adapt to the situation.
Gábor Koloh pointed to the fact that though Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory, and half of its
entire  population  with  3,2  million  Hungarians  detached  from  Hungary,  the  population  of
“truncated” Hungary had grown from 7,6 million in 1910 to 9,3 million in 1941 (Vajna 2019).
Then Béla Tomka analyzed the decline of Hungary’s economic potential due to the Treaty of
Trianon, as Hungary lost 84 percent of its forests, 90 percent of its iron ore, 100 percent of copper
and salt mining (Vajna 2019).
The collapse of the economic integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire led to an economic
disorganization  that  became  more  intense  due  to  the  war  and  the  Revolutions.  However,  the
economic performance of Hungary after Trianon had not been relatively weaker in an international
context compared to the period during Dualism, though in this earlier period understandably the
hardships of Trianon were not present. There is a need to not only take into account the economic
provisions of the treaty but to assess the real economic performance of Hungary by the rate of the
GDP in an international context.  While the period of the Dual Monarchy is considered to be a
prosperous, peaceful time when Hungary is able to catch up with Western European states, the
Horthy-regime of the 1920s is characterized by inflation, economic crisis, being subjected to the
German sphere of influence, thus telling about a period of economic decline. Comparing the period
of the Dual Monarchy and the Interwar period, the growth of the GDP per capita was between 1890
and 1913 1,6 percent on average, while between 1913 and 1939 1,6 percent on average but there are
distortions. At the late 19th century the GDP per capita in Hungary, being based on the territory after
Trianon,  made up more  than  half  of  the  level  of  the  Western-European average.  Although the
aftermath  of  the  First  World  War burdened Hungary  worse than  Western  Europe,  by 1929 the
Hungarian GDP per capita reached 57,1 percent of the Western-European average. Then by 1939 it
reached 58,3 percent of the Western European average, which was the relatively developed level of
pre-war  Hungary.  Although  Hungary  lost  a  tremendous  amount  of  its  natural  resources,  the
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economic development after the Great War were rather dependent on technological advancement,
structural changes and human capital,  and thus Trianon did not seriously impact the Hungarian
economy in the long-term (Tomka 2018).
One has  to  admit  the  fact  that  Greater  Hungary  within  the  Carpathian  Basin  was  once
populated by Hungarian majority a long time ago but this has not been the case in the past centuries.
Although 3 million Hungarians were stuck under foreign rule due to Trianon, Hungarians have to
admit that 8,5 million non-Hungarians could become part of their new homeland. It is also true that
these nationalities helped to build and defend Hungary, this is why Trianon is not only a Hungarian
case (Halassy 2012).
There are often false reasons mentioned in history books about the causes of Trianon. These
are  the  role  of  the  Hungarians  in  the  First  World  War,  the  operation  of  the  Hungarian  Soviet
Republic and the oppression of the non-Hungarian nationalities in Hungary (Halassy 2012).
The real  forces that  led to  Trianon are the following:  Throughout  the ages,  unfavorable
ethnic changes occurred for the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin, Hungary was lost when the
Hungarians were defeated against the Turks in the crucial battle of Mohács in 1526 that paved the
way for a multinational state, the nationalities bound with Hungarians were mingled with elements
from the  Balkans,  who then  wanted  to  secede  from Hungary  from the  19th century,  it  was  in
France’s interest in the beginning of the 20th century to smash the Dual Monarchy and Hungary
within it, after the First World War Hungary was left without strong, moral leaders (Halassy 2012).
Ficeri  (2019)  identified  four  major  failures  or  flaws  that  set  up  the  conditions  in  the
Hungarian  Kingdom  that  led  to  the  event  of  Trianon  due  to  the  omissions,  mistakes  of  the
Hungarians or rather the Hungarian leaders and elites. First of all, though the Hungarian political
elites  had  successfully  founded  a  Christian  Kingdom,  they  failed  to  populate  their  new,  large
territories with the dominant ethnic group, except for Transylvania, even though in Hungary until
1526 it is argued that 60-80 percent of the population were Hungarians. Other kingdoms could
partly  populate  such  areas  or  could  assimilate  the  non-dominant  groups.  The  peripheral,
mountainous regions were left out probably intentionally, thus these areas became the homeland of
the  non-dominant  groups  within  the  Kingdom.  Secondly,  the  Hungarians  were  not  capable  to
preserve the territorial integrity of their land in the beginning of the 16th century, failed to maintain a
competitive  continental  power  strong  enough  against  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  then  were
subjugated  by  the  neighboring  Austrians,  later  the  Habsburg  Monarchy,  which  undermined the
exclusive position of the Hungarian elites in the different areas of the partitioned Kingdom. The
century of decline, the 150-years Ottoman presence in the Carpathian Basin and the partitioning of
Hungary started significantly the process of awakening of the nationalities within Hungary. Thirdly,
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the Hungarian elites failed to assimilate the non-dominant ethnic groups in Hungary. The semi-
colonial  status  of  Hungary  within  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  made  it  possible  for  the  different
nationalities to become modern nations and the attempts of the Hungarian elites to re-establish the
former  status  quo either  in  1848 or  in  1867 were  counter-productive.  The Hungarians  did  not
recognize their  process of becoming a nation and did not provide them sufficient autonomy. If
administrative boundaries based on the ethnic internal borders were drawn before the First World
War, separating righteously the different nationalities within Hungary, then the Great powers may
have also respected those boundaries at a Peace Treaty instead of the excessive demands of the
successor states. Finally, the fourth failure was the omission to make a compromise with the elites
of the non-dominant groups. The Hungarian elites had always favored a culturally homogeneous
state and thus nationalize (“Hungarianization”) the identity of the people living in the Kingdom, but
did not aim to make compromises with their elites, only as a consequence of defeats like in 1849 or
1918. This attitude could not make peace with the elites of the different nationalities and their
opposition led them to pursue their own territorial interests. The discriminatory politics of Hungary
towards the other ethnic groups made the state vulnerable that most of the Hungarian elites could
not recognize (Ficeri 2019: 763-776.).
The fact that these nationalities in the territory of the Hungarian state were becoming more
conscious  of  who they  are  when  the  Hungarian  state  was  weakening  due  to  above-mentioned
circumstances was a natural phenomenon. It  is not clear the Hungarian leadership bore the full
responsibility for the eruption of the war and the expansionist policies, though as the Hungarian
state did not have full sovereignty, and ultimately the Emperor could have made the decision to
attack Serbia. But even if one attacks Serbia, the Dual Monarchy, why would they be responsible
for the eruption of the war between Germans and the French?
Regarding the fact that these non-Hungarian nationalities living in the territory of historical
Hungary,  especially  the  Romanians,  Slovaks  and  Serbs,  could  unite  with  their  kin  who  were
speaking the same language and had about  the same culture due to the Treaty of Trianon was
righteous  and  fair.  As  mentioned  above,  the  Hungarians  did  not  provide  them with  sufficient
autonomy as they would have liked and for example in 1871 the Czechs could not  gain more
autonomy within the Dual Monarchy partially due to the resistance of the Hungarian leaders. It is to
be  acknowledged  the  Hungarians  did  commit  some  wrongdoings  against  these  nationalities,
however, perhaps not major ones, I mean not major hateful, malevolent acts.
However, the new borders by the Treaty of Trianon were not just as majority Hungarian
areas were occupied by the Czechoslovak, Romanian and Serbian forces and seceded from Hungary
by  the  Trianon.  Some  of  the  territories  where  the  3.5  million  Hungarians  lived  should  have
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remained in the territory of Hungary, and in the case of Szeklerland a compromise would had to be
found. The above-mentioned nationalities aggressively and unjustly had taken more territories than
they should have, used propaganda they should not have used, which highlights the omission of the
major Allied powers, especially France, Great Britain and Italy as they were expected to be the most
knowledgeable about these areas and act in the correct way accordingly. Despite this fact,  they
allowed the above-mentioned nationalities to take it to the extreme carelessly, considering the most
possible economic,  strategic opportunities they could exploit  leaving a large visible scar on the
Hungarian nation. Such a behavior, the above-mentioned quotes and not considering the other one
is to be condemned. Last but not least, at least the Allied powers should have given the Hungarians
and the other defeated nations a chance to represent themselves from the beginning and negotiate
the terms fairly.
3.4. Hungarian irredentism and the Second World War
The new or enlarged successor states after Trianon had no better, just ethnic compositions
than Hungary before 1918 as the Czechs and Slovaks cannot be counted as one nation, and they had
34.7 percent minorities, while Romania 25 percent and Yugoslavia had no dominant nationality at
all (Vardy 1983: 21-27.).
The name of Admiral Horthy became almost synonymous of Hungary’s interwar period as
he was a conservative nationalist regent of Hungary between 1920 and 1944 (Vardy 1983: 21-27.).
In interwar Hungary younger generations were educated and taught to believe that the map
of Greater Hungary is the rightful one, and the borders of Trianon are just like a nightmare that will
disappear.  An attitude  of  self-deception  was  also  present  in  the  emerging  Turanian  movement,
supported by many in interwar Hungary, which was kind of an escapism, hostile reaction towards
the treacherous West  that  left  behind,  betrayed Hungary.  The members  of this  movement were
convinced of the important role Hungary played in Christianity, and for that they only received a
lack  of  gratitude  and  appreciation  from  the  West  when  Hungary  was  dismembered.  These
Hungarians aimed to outreach to the East, while turning their back to the West, and even to replace
Christianity with Magyar culture and religion. It was a form of “new paganism” that reflected the
psychological dislocation and emotional misery some of the Hungarians were experiencing, and the
force of  despair  that  pushed Hungarians to  be more susceptible  to  radicalization when rational
thinking had left (Vardy 1983: 38-40.).
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The Turanian movement was, however, not new in the interwar period as it has its roots in
the  end  of  the  18th century  but  by  the  19th century  it  became  more  popular  and  in  1910  the
Hungarian  Turanian  Association  was  founded.  During  the  period  of  the  Monarchy  it  aimed  to
establish closer links with different Asian relatives such as the Turks, cultural diplomacy and even
these new relations would have provided economic opportunities too (Mikos 2017).
Hungary’s main issue during the interwar period was that Hungarians could not come to
terms with the new reality and Hungarians could not free themselves from the “Trianon Syndrome”.
The Hungarian reaction to Trianon was very emotional and often wrong. Then the political leaders
of Hungary sought to undo the injustices of Trianon at the makers of the treaty but also looked for
military alliances. The anti-Trianon propaganda, however, was focusing too much on the historical
arguments, which were not carrying too much weight at that time any more, aiming to regain the
whole historical Hungary, instead of focusing on self-determination and the detached Hungarian
majority areas. The “No! No! Never!” and the “Let’s take everything back!” attitudes were a bit
strong and Hungarians could have been more open to a compromise based on ethnic and linguistic
self-determination (Vardy 1983: 38-40.).
After  the  Hungarian  Soviet  Republic  ended,  a  new  wave  of  terror  spread  against
communists, Jews and people who supported this communist regime, which was called the “White
Terror”.  Some  wings  of  the  Hungarian  military  and  radical  right-wing  groups,  who  were
nationalists,  partly anti-Semitic,  implemented the terror and violence against the communists  to
make justice and act for revenge that lasted from 1919 to 1921. Although Miklós Horthy,  who
gained  power  in  November  1919,  did  not  order  an  organized  violence  against  the  communist
elements, he did not stop them either. As Horthy became the Governor of Hungary and aimed to
consolidate  the  Hungarian  situation,  he  repelled  the  right-wing  violence  and  normalized  the
relations with the Jews, while the official Jewish leaders supported him too. The victims of the
White Terror were often the Jews and overall the victims of this period may be a few to several
hundreds (“Fehérterror Budapesten 1919-1922”, n.d.).
The  foreign  policy  direction  of  István  Bethlen,  Hungarian  Prime  Minister  at  that  time,
helped Hungary to come out of its diplomatic isolation by the end of the 1920s as the difference
could be felt between the winners and losers of the First World War. In 1922 Hungary joined the
League of Nations, which opened doors for them and over time Hungary gained the support for
revision  of  the  Trianon  borders  by  Mussolini  from  Italy  and  others.  The  Hungarian  public
demanded a  full  revision  of  the  former  Greater  Hungary,  however  the  ethnic  revision  was  the
primary goal and was accepted by the left and right political parties (Cservenka 2020).
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Although in the interwar period, the revisionist propaganda was based on the suffering of the
detached  Hungarian  communities,  the  experiences  of  the  minority  Hungarians  showed  a
strangeness, rejection from the part of the Hungarians from Hungary. The local political parties in
the neighboring Hungarian communities were dependent on the financial support of Budapest, but
these communities such as in Transylvania created their own theories and identity, often different
than the mentality was from Budapest. In a paradoxical way, Hungarians and minority Hungarians
felt  close  to  each  other  when  they  were  physically  distant  from  each  other,  while  they  met
physically, they felt the distance created between themselves (Egry 2017: 88-108.).
The revision of Trianon after many years could take place between 1938 and 1941 (see
Appendix A.5 map). First of all, the First Vienna Award in November 1938 granted Hungary the
southern strip of the historical Felvidék that was made by German and Italian judges. This decision
was  valid  according  to  international  law  and  this  was  a  majority  Hungarian  area,  while  the
Slovakian part remained making this an absolutely just correction (Halassy 2012).
Secondly, Kárpátalja was occupied by the Hungarian military in March 1939 but there were
no victims. This was rightful in the sense that this area was historically part of Hungary and the
Slovakians did not improve this area, however in this region only 15 percent of the population were
Hungarians (Halassy 2012).
The Second Vienna Award in August 1940 granted Northern-Transylvania to Hungary. It
was decided by German and Italian judges again, while also the Romanians took part thus it was
legitimate. The ethnicity of the population was mixed as considering the data from 1941, by this
decision  not  only  1,3  million  Hungarians  (54  percent),  but  also  1,1  million  Romanians  were
attached to Hungary, while in Southern-Transylvania among 1,9 million Romanians, little more than
half a million Hungarians remained (Halassy 2012; Tarján, (n.d.), a).
In  1939  when  Nazi  Germany  began  its  offensive  against  Poland  starting  officially  the
Second World War, Pál Teleki became the Prime Minister of Hungary until 1941. During his rule
Hungary achieved two of its revisionist ambitions, to take back Kárpátalja in 1939 and the Second
Vienna Award that gave back Northern Transylvania to Hungary in 1940. Teleki aimed to preserve
Hungary’s neutrality as the hostilities of Second World War began to spread, thus aimed to balance
Hungary’s  foreign  policy  between  Germany  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  powers.  He  did  not  allow
Germany to use Hungary’s railways against Poland and opened the frontier for the Polish refugees,
though in 1940 Hungary joined the Tripartite Pact of the Axis powers to aid each other in case of an
attack. Teleki’s plan to ally Hungary with Yugoslavia supposed to counterbalance this, however an
anti-Nazi coup d’etat succeeded in Yugoslavia. Hitler aimed to eliminate this new government and
wanted to reach a closer cooperation with Hungary, thus persuading Hungarian military leaders in
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exchange to  gain  Délvidék.  Great  Britain warned to  declare war  against  Hungary in  case  they
attacked Yugoslavia, thus Teleki felt the pressure and ultimately committed suicide in 1941 (Tarján,
(n.d.), b).
Hungary began supporting the German expansionism from 1941 and first Hungarian soldiers
fought against  Yugoslavia alongside the Germans for gaining hold on the territory of Délvidék,
which was detached from Hungary by Trianon (Harmat 2019).
Finally the region of Délvidék was taken by Hungarian military effort in April 1941, but the
parts of Délvidék were ethnically heterogeneous, from which some did not even host Hungarian
populations, thus it cannot be considered to be fully justified (Halassy 2012).
Then the war was declared between Hungary and the Soviet Union as a consequence of the
alleged bombing of Kassa by the Soviets, or secretly by the Germans. As Hungarian soldiers were
sent to the front line against the Soviet Union, Miklós Kállay became the new Prime Minister who
was against this strong German orientation and pursued a “shuttlecock policy” which meant that he
pretended to stay loyal to Hitler, while trying to seek connections with the Allied powers, the UK
and the US, ultimately the Soviets, but the Nazis knew about this and ordered to occupy Hungary in
1944 (Harmat 2019).
It is undeniable the Hungarian leadership reflected the mentality of “let’s take everything
back” and they were concerned more about  the gained territories,  not the ethnic circumstances
there. Thus, by the end of this series of revisions out of the new 4,5 million citizens of Hungary,
only about 2,3 million people were Hungarians, so only half of the population. Although the new
borders dictated by Trianon were highly unjust considering the Hungarians, these new revisionist
borders were partly unjust too. During this period of 1938-1941, there were some atrocities both
against  the  new  foreigners  in  Hungary  and  the  outside  remaining  Hungarians.  In  1941  some
Hungarian  militias  killed  2000  Serbians,  while  in  1944  the  Serbians  killed  more  than  40,000
Hungarians (Halassy 2012).
The Hungarian revisionism after 1920 was fully legitimate as even Europe, the English and
the  Italians  recognized  their  mistake  and  the  need  for  revision  of  Trianon.  Many consider  the
Hungarian leadership to be Fascists for pursuing revisionist politics, however in reality Hungary
only became Nazi by the takeover of Szálasi with German support in 1944, while some neighboring
states stepped on the path of Fascism earlier without German compulsion. Between 1920 and 1944
Hungary was not less democratic than some other states, rightfully claimed the revision of Trianon
but  the leadership was not  Fascist  due to  this.  However,  policies  against  the Jews appeared in
Hungary too,  partially due to the German influence that resulted in discrimination,  ghettos and
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internment camps, and when the Nazis took over the deportation of the Jews also began (Halassy
2012).
The Hungarian government was pressured to enter the Second World War on the side of
Hitler’s  Germany and was defeated.  In 1942 there were already plans of the Soviets  to restore
Hungary’s borders as it was in the Treaty of Trianon and negotiations were impossible. The Western
powers also stood by the Soviets to restore the borders and make the former territorial gains of
Hungary to be void. Thus the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties reasserted the unjust Trianon borders upon
Hungary (Halassy 2012).
The German orientation and after joining the Second World War on the Axis’ side may be
explained by the creation of successful diplomatic relations, having revisionism in common with the
Germans and Hitler offering territories to Hungary and the geopolitical proximity of Germany that
can be considered a threat too, expecting German occupation if Hungary and Germany would not
have been allied, that ultimately also dictated that Hungary could not succeed to remain neutral in
the Second World War or side against Hitler openly.
In the Second World War about 350,000 Hungarian soldiers died, while the number of the
civilian casualties without the Jewish ones, exceeded 80,000-100,000 Hungarians. About 600,000
Hungarians were taken away as prisoners by the Soviets, of whom 150,000-200,000 people died in
the Soviet Union. From 1944 about 500,000 Jews were deported to concentration camps, and most
of them had died in the camps. Then due to further atrocities and violence 80,000-100,000 Jews lost
their lives and a significant proportion of gypsies were also killed or taken away. 
Between 1944 and 1947 about 200,000 Hungarians  left  the country and permanently settled in
Western countries (“Magyarország embervesztesége”, (n.d.).
Due to the Second World War significant changes occurred in the Carpathian Basin. The
Jews  were  either  killed  or  deported,  the  Germans  were  expelled  partially  from Romania  and
Hungary, while completely from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The lands of the Hungarians were
seized. 200,000 Hungarians were removed both from Romania and Czechoslovakia, while 50,000
Hungarians fled Yugoslavia after about 40,000 Hungarians were killed by Serbs. Czechoslovakia
wanted  a  total  population  exchange  with  Hungary,  but  this  was  not  possible  due  to  the  low
proportion of Slovaks living in Hungary, thus in the exchange only 60-70 thousand people were
moved.  The  Paris  Peace  Treaties  was  even  more  unjust  than  Trianon  as  Hungary’s  neighbors
implemented harsh means against Hungarians. In this sense, Czechoslovakia led the way with the
“Beneš decrees” that  named  the  Hungarians  collectively  guilty,  while  they  used  terror  against
Hungarians  to  call  themselves  Slovaks.  Some  part  of  the  700,000  Hungarians  living  in
Czechoslovakia were taken to forced labor, while in Serbia concentration camps were created for
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Germans and Hungarians. The administrative boundaries of the successor states were modified in a
way that the Hungarians could not be the majority and achieve a degree of autonomy (Halassy
2012).
Unfortunately  the  interwar  period  began  with  the  White  Terror  and  ended  with  the
discrimination and deportation, killing of the Hungarian Jews. As it is stated above, the German
orientation of Hungary and the promise of its aid in Hungarian irredentism (but also the efforts of
the Italians, especially) may have been inevitable looking at the circumstances what it could provide
to the mind and heart of the Hungarians but the choice also led the Hungarians on a dark path, to
take part in the extermination of the Jews even if as it is stated above, there were considerable
attempts of the Hungarian leaders to try to escape from under the shadow of Nazi Germany. It is
another  terrible  factor  that  after  the Second World War,  besides  the treatment  of  the  Germans,
Hungarians  in  the  neighboring  states  were  discriminated,  killed,  sometimes  treated  as  slaves,
considering less than humans in their homelands.
It  might be strange to state,  but the Hungarian reaction to Trianon may have been both
normal and abnormal in the interwar period. The movement for the full revision of Trianon and
many Hungarians turning their back on Western powers due to the unjust treatment through the
Turanian movement and looking towards the East (from where they have come from a long time
ago) were the partially justifiable coping mechanisms of the Hungarians, the easiest, the least they
could do in the short term to somehow try to get a hold on what had happened to them. This is why
it was normal in this sense, but on the contrary it was also abnormal in the sense that at least in the
longer term they may have lessened their emotional feelings and should have better processed what
had happened to them, moreover should have become more rational over time about the issue and
focused on the right solution (which is another question).
3.5. The effects of the Trianon Trauma on collective identity
The event of Trianon should not be viewed as one single event, when “smaller” Hungary
was created but rather as a process, because it was preceded by the events of the First World War,
the occupation of Budapest by the Romanians, the Red Terror, the White Terror, the political turmoil
at that time, the attitude of the Allied powers and the new successor states, moreover the state of the
Hungarian  governments  and  then  the  difficulties  the  Hungarian  minorities  faced,  the  Turanian
movement and the irredentism in the interwar period. The complex event of Trianon has definitely
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left  a  mark  on  the  Hungarian  collective  identity  and the  effects,  consequences  of  Trianon  are
analyzed below.
Borders  are  indeed  relevant  and  necessary  for  humans  as  it  had  to  be  seen  during  the
pandemic. Although the human spirit is limitless and cannot stand borders, the human body needs
delimitation,  boundaries not to  feel  uncertain and lose their  balance.  Home is  a spiritual  thing,
which is limitless, but it still has a middle, where that landscape, that region, that language in which
the spirit was born and is reproduced (Tőzsér 2020).
Árpád Tőzsér  argued Trianon was  not  perceived  by the  Hungarian  people  as  the  many
individual tragedies or the great national tragedy of the First World War. There were two years
between  the  events  and  everything  seemed  to  be  uncertain,  with  many  things  happening  thus
making  the  ordinary  villagers  unconcerned  towards  high  politics.  Many  people  felt  that  the
demarcation lines of 1918-1920 are not meant to be taken seriously and that it was just a temporary
period. He mentioned that in his village, which was attached to the then Czechoslovakia with 2 km
distance from the Hungarian border,  a few Czech soldiers appeared in the first  few years after
Trianon who were supposed to defend the border, which was impossible. The villagers did not take
seriously  the  new border  and  could  cross  it  with  ease  illegally,  then  running  their  errands  in
Salgótarján.  The smuggling was popular and the loose border remained until  1935, when more
Czechs were patrolling the border (Tőzsér 2020).
Then, there is the perception that during the First World War when the Hungarians were
called to the barracks they found themselves not to be understanding the different nationalities,
while the Slovaks, Croats and Romanians understood each other’s language to some degree. This
highlights the uniqueness of the Hungarian language in Central-East Europe too. Thus, in post-
Trianon Hungary, the people in the barracks could easily understand each other. Another positive
aspect of the Hungarian minorities that instead of being monolingual, they have become over time
multilingual  being  able  to  interact  in  their  mother  tongue  and the  language  of  their  new state
(Tőzsér 2020).
According to Gáspár Miklós Tamás, the collective subconsciousness of today’s Hungary is
of an empire of 35 million people. The Hungarian imagination deriving from it has mountains and
seaside. Today’s Hungarian modernity is solely characterized by the classical liberalism of the 19th
century in the subconscious level.  Hungarians are largely ambivalent towards their traditions as
behind the visible and audible country, there is the invisible, rejected country and the shadow of the
nation in the background. Hungarians are the citizens of both of these, however, the post-Trianon
Hungarians do not have traditions, while the pre-Trianon Hungarians do not have a reality. This
political  schizophrenia  is  serious,  but  this  is  not  all,  as  this  schizophrenia  of  the  Hungarian
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minorities is divided into three: pre-Trianon, post-Trianon and minority consciousness. Moreover,
he states that even if an individual is more susceptible, they also suffer from the schizophrenia of
the majority Hungarians in Hungary (Tőzsér 2020).
During the Great War and even as the Dual Monarchy was collapsing, there was a strong
belief and trust that the territorial integrity of Hungary would remain intact, still what happened
after went completely against this expectation and created the Trianon Trauma. Due to the Treaty
Hungary had become sovereign as the opposition of the Compromise of 1867 longed for, however
this came with the price of lessening the territory, population, economy and its society of Hungary.
However, the economic and societal changes are not supposed to be assessed quantitatively, but
rather qualitatively. Trianon may have had positive aspects too, as smaller Hungary could become a
real  nation-state  due  to  its  ethnic homogeneity  and a  more unified,  integrated  society  in  many
aspects such as the distribution of income, culture and lifestyle (Gyáni 2019).
The peripheral regions that were lost were ethnically and religiously mixed but also less
developed than the central regions of Hungary, considering economic development of the area and
the educational,  social  development  of the inhabitants.  Although important industrial  and urban
centers  in  the  Partium  and  Délvidék,  moreover  important  areas  of  Erdély  and  Felvidék  were
detached, the least developed regions and their societies were left outside smaller Hungary. Some of
these were also the focal points of transatlantic emigration. As a positive reassessment, one can state
that at least the Hungarian governments were spared from making a lot of effort to increase the
development of these regions to the level of the central regions. Despite this, it is also important to
highlight  that  the  Budapest-centered  urban  and civilian  world  shrank  as  Kolozsvár,  Kassa  and
Temesvár were detached delinking the modern civilian middle class and the industrial proletariat
from Hungary outside of Budapest (Gyáni 2019).
Due to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, a nation-state similar to the French one
was being created and this state showed continuity through time as Hungarians traced back the
origins of this state to Saint Stephen I, which was a natural and ideal phenomenon in Europe at that
time.  However,  in  contrast  to  Western  Europe,  due  to  the  heterogeneity  of  nationalities  and
religions, moreover due to the age of empires that disrupted the development of nations in Eastern
Europe, the preservation of the Hungarian state was at stake. Then the fact that the nationalities
within Hungary already wanted greater autonomy in the latter half of the 19th century worsened the
situation. Even if nationalities in Hungary were becoming Hungarians and loyal to the state, these
nationalities did not get enough, even minor autonomy as they would have wanted such as in other
areas of Austria-Hungary. Then the Allied Powers of World War I in the 1910s already decided to
provide  sovereignty  to  the  nationalities  in  Central-East  Europe,  but  many  historians  argue  the
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collapse of the Monarchy and with it the Hungarian Kingdom would not occur inevitably due to the
political and societal structure of the Monarchy, but may have happened at a later time, without the
Great War (Gyáni 2019).
It can be argued that the national identity is the continuity of the strictly territorial entity of
the nation-state. Thus, Trianon for the Hungarians shattered a solid modern national self-identity,
historical self-image and an empirical world. Trianon symbolizes deep and indelible traces in the
psyche, chaining the societal consciousness to itself and enslaves the memory culture. The truth of
those  who  state,  however,  that  Trianon  is  only  an  artificially  incited  mental  state  being
instrumentalized politically is questionable. The sense of irredentism from the period of the Horthy-
regime is known even today, in the form of a top-down practice, but this alone does not stand as an
explanation to the virulence of the Trianon cult. The existence of the Hungarian minorities of the
Carpathian Basin and their fate in the last hundred years remind the Hungarians for Trianon. But in
itself this is not all, as first the then historical empirical space ceased to exist in a moment as this
entirely unexpected future caused a mental shock, which confronted the people of their era with an
absurd,  inexplicable,  unacceptable  reality.  The  new  reality  bred  disappointment,  bitterness  and
nostalgic  memories  when  thinking  about  the  past.  This  remained  and  serves  to  maintain  the
experiences,  consciousness  about  Trianon.  The  sum  of  the  past  within  this  picture  cannot  be
rationally analyzed, as historians would (Gyáni 2019).
It is undeniable the Treaty of Trianon had some minor positive effects on the Hungarians,
like as it is mentioned above that in the Hungarian army after Trianon all the soldiers could speak
Hungarian between themselves and that the Hungarian state could be relieved from developing,
improving some of the detached territories, which were less developed areas. Whether the fact that
Hungary  became  Budapest-centered  is  positive  or  negative  is  arguable.  The  capital  attracts
Hungarians to live in Budapest disproportionately decreasing the population and the competence of
the countryside, while creating problems and making Budapest a crowded city, where if it is not
handled right, will be hard to live for the citizens under worsening circumstances. The fact that in
the  first  years  after  Trianon  an  in  1918-1919  when  the  demarcation  lines  were  drawn  the
Hungarians  in  the  detached  territories  did  not  take  seriously  these  new  borders  may  be  true,
however in the long run they may also realized the disruption of the nation and some negative
feelings, then perhaps some negative treatment too.
The statement that Hungarians in a subconscious level are perceiving to be the citizens of an
empire is wrong, it can only be quite the opposite. Although Trianon set Hungary free from the
other nationalities, made it an independent nation-state as it earlier aimed to be so much since the
Turkish invasion when its  territorial  integrity  was lost  and then controlled,  manipulated by the
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Habsburgs,  so from about  1526 to  1867,  and then  since  its  territory  was  compromised by the
establishment of the Dual Monarchy until 1918. But as a consequence of Trianon Hungary became
small and it led Hungarians to the realization that they are not an empire any more. If a nation was
relatively small and was subjugated, part of an empire, which is not their own empire and then this
nation  gains  independence,  then  they  would  most  likely  be  proud  and  confident  in  their  new
position. However, if a nation had its own empire, in this case the Hungarian Kingdom, then if they
lose more than half of its original territory and become small,  they will not be proud and self-
confident about it, at least for a while. It is different.
The  Hungarian  subconscious  identity  indeed  realized  the  dichotomy of  pre-Trianon and
post-Trianon Hungarian reality. The pre-Trianon Hungarian identity may have been fading away,
the old familiar way, the traditions, while the post-Trianon Hungarian identity may have meant the
disrupted, rejected unity of the state, a sad reality that manifested in the Hungarian communities left
outside Hungary’s borders that could have fueled traumatic feelings of those who were susceptible
to the changes. One cannot deny either that there may have been people who remained unaffected
by the big changes.  The event of Trianon may be compared to an amputation of the limbs of the
body of a human being, in which the body means the center of the nation, “smaller” Hungary and
the limbs the detached Hungarian populations, who would scream, feel the terrible pain and then
could not move, could not take action, become helpless and immovable.
Since the Treaty of Trianon the language of the Hungarian nation has also been defeated as
no new words were created, found for new inventions that appeared in the meanwhile, such as the
radio or the television. Before 1918 cinematography was easily named as “mozi” and electricity
was easily named as “villany”, to mention some examples (Nemeskürty 2003: 134.).
After  Trianon,  the  Hungarians’ lands  were  taken  away,  the  Hungarian  institutions  were
closed and even the use of Hungarian language was constrained. The successor states implemented
several  statistical  tactics  to  decrease the  proportion  of  Hungarians  in  their  new states  (Halassy
2012).
Concerning the self-identity  of Hungarians detached from Hungary as a consequence of
Trianon, one example may be the fate of Hungarians living in Délvidék, which became part of
Serbia. After the wealthier, more intellectual Hungarians were exploited and expelled, the Serbs had
propagated over decades that they constitute the natives of the land since ancient times and the
Hungarians are only newcomers. This have been propagated ever since until today in schools that
lessens the self-consciousness of being Hungarians and make them half-hearted. One who feels to
be a newcomer in a region may be more likely to migrate as they would rather go than to feel
exploited and despised. This is the Serbian strategy in education against the minorities and this
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creates a withdrawing, fugitive Hungarian self-identity in these Hungarian people. „Pognutu glavu
sablja ne seče” – this Serbian proverb asserts that he or she who surrenders will be accepted. Those
who state  that  they  are  not  Hungarians  (or  different  nationalities  than  Serb),  but  Yugoslavians
(earlier) or Serbs, especially in villages, will be approved by the Serbs, however, those will not be
who stick to their communities (Mirnics 2002: 260.).
In the first few decades of the 21st century,  the discussions, communication between the
majority Hungarians in Hungary and the Hungarian minorities seem to be frozen. In earlier decades,
such as during communism, Hungarian minorities did not feel the divisions in Hungary, though in
the latter  decades these oppositions are spilling over into the lives of the Hungarian minorities
creating divisions and having less discussions (Tőzsér 2020).
Even though Hungary is a member of the European Union, the situation of the Hungarian
minorities outside Hungary’s borders has not improved since then. For example Slovakia, in spite of
being an EU member, constrained, discriminated the use of Hungarian language, such as in the case
of a television channel in Hungarian language in Slovakia, but the European Court of Human Rights
after  thinking about  it  for  six  years  rejected the lawsuit  referring  to  formal  issues,  while  such
rejections would have to be stated within maximum one year. A small Hungarian television channel
was  broadcasted,  in  which  a  few sentences  were  told  in  Hungarian  without  any  subtitles  that
violated the Slovak laws, and was punished as only the channels of the public media are allowed to
broadcast in Hungarian. But this is not an isolated issue as there were many examples to constrain
the use of Hungarian language such as that Hungarian nurses were not allowed to talk to Hungarian
patients in Hungarian at the hospital (Magyari 2021).
The legal protection of the native populations within the area of the European Union is not
guaranteed, thus the successor states may arbitrarily regulate the lives of Hungarians. The minority
protection clause signed by Romania in 1921 was supposed to provide local governments the rights
to determine religious and educational direction of the given minorities, yet the Szeklers are still
fighting for their autonomy. In Slovakia the Hungarians are like secondary citizens and their dual
citizenship  is  prohibited,  yet  Slovakia  is  a  member  of  the  European  Union.  In  Ukraine,  dual
citizenship is not allowed either, while they also constrain education of the Hungarians in their
mother tongue. From the 3,3 million Hungarians who were detached from Hungary in 1920, there
are still 2,3 million Hungarians bordering Hungary (Dr. Dobó 2019: 178-181.).
Through the peace  “treaties” (which were in fact dictated), the Great powers achieved to
incite  the nations  against  one other  and the new positions in  Central-East  Europe have caused
further  problems  instead  of  creating  long-term  just  conditions  for  all  nations  that  could  have
consolidated better the situation of this region. If the Peace Treaty had been otherwise, probably
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more  peaceful  relations  could  have  been  created  between  Hungary  and  some  of  its  neighbors
settling  old  wounds,  such  as  with  Slovenia  or  Croatia.  It  is  not  surprising  that  some relations
between states tend to be tense, as there may be unresolved issues. Despite the wrongdoings and
what had happened in the past, the responsibility to address these and come to a common ground
are  shared  between  Hungary  and  its  neighbors  with  Hungarian  minorities,  mainly  Slovakia,
Ukraine, Romania and Serbia (Dr. Dobó 2019: 178-181.).
The wheel of history cannot be reversed and in order to change the current situation it is not
likely the Hungarians will have allies. In the past world orders there were always forces indirectly
on the side of Hungarians that were against Austrian or Soviet rule. There is no international interest
in the revision of Trianon, Hungary and the Hungarians are only an insignificant factor in world
politics. The inertia of the Hungarians  may make them feel either sad or apathetic  if someone is
looking to better the situation. While the attitude of “let’s take everything back” is highly irrational
and a saying of the far-right, the attitude of “the Hungarians will ultimately be assimilated” should
not be the solution either (Halassy 2012).
The best would be to forget about Trianon, but it seems to be impossible. There is a need to
work together, collaborate with the different nationalities of the successor states, to reach a common
ground, to think in a Europe, but even the level of Middle-Europe has not been overcome that need
to be addressed (Tőzsér 2020).
Ondrej Ficeri, a Slovak academic states that by 2018 the master narratives about the end of
the First World War and the collapse of the Dual Monarchy did not change much in the East-Central
European nations. While the Czechs, Romanians and Slovakians grandiosely celebrated this period,
the Hungarians and Austrians dove into some nostalgia. Due to the state of the cultural memories in
these countries, it is easy to see that the “winners versus losers” mentalities remained the same a
hundred years ago and can still be instrumentalized. Ficeri through his work, ultimately calls on
both the winners and losers to take responsibility for Trianon, for what had happened a hundred
years ago (Ficeri 2019: 763-776.).
It is acknowledged that Hungary’s neighbors lack the empathy towards Hungarians and fail
to approach the situation from the other’s point of view. First of all, there is the example of the
LARICS,  which  is  an  anti-Hungarian,  anti-Russian  far  right  organization  connected  to  the
Romanian  Academy,  showed  in  their  Romanian  public  opinion  poll  that  more  than  half  of
Romanians fear that the Hungarians may take over Transylvania, in reality surveys highlight that
the anti-Hungarianness has been reduced to a linguistic question in the sense that the Romanian
language  should  be  exclusively  used  in  Romania.  Studies  highlight  that  discrimination  against
Hungarians, as neighbors, co-workers or family members in Romania is even more acceptable. The
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use of the Hungarian language in Romania disturbs the Romanians and there is a high percentage of
refusal of the already existing linguistic minority rights (Bálint-Pataki 2021).
One  of  the  latest  cases  has  been  against  the  Hungarian  minority  in  Beregszász,  within
Ukraine,  where  posters  were  put  on  the  walls,  which  called  for  the  Hungarians  to  leave  the
Ukrainian soil  and slogens like: “Onto the tip of the knife with the Hungarians! Long live the
nation! Death to the enemies!” It was also stated if the Hungarian Foreign Minister goes to Ukraine,
they will be prepared (Körömi 2021).
Even the Slovak historians and the majority of the Slovak nation reproduce the “majority
Trianon-syndrome”,  meaning the  ethnocentrism that  in  Slovakia  only Slovakians  live,  while  in
Romania there are only Romanians. This can be seen especially in their political culture and that
both  the  Romanian  and  Slovakian  elites  and  the  public  hesitate  to  recognize  Kosovo’s
independence, because they fear the Hungarians living in Southern Slovakia and the Hungarians in
Transylvania would request an autonomy, and then separate from them. The Slovakians also share
the view that Catalonia should give up its separatist movement as it goes against the Spanish law.
On the contrary, it is emphasized that the Hungarians tend to cling too much to the victimhood, to
the syndrome, the trauma of Trianon, not taking responsibility for it, instead of recognizing that it
did not happen out of nothing, there were reasons behind (Ficeri 2019: 763-776.).
Overall,  The Hungarian denial  of  their  responsibility  about  Trianon and maintaining the
victim mentality have been counter-productive and have created barriers between Hungary and its
neighboring countries to reconcile, upholding geopolitical instability in the region. However, the
“winners” of Trianon should also take responsibility and be warned as the Roman and Slovak elites
have not learned much from the example of Hungary’s tragedy. They ignore the danger that is
lurking to their borders of Trianon, as in an ideal situation, the winners should take responsibility
too and provide autonomy to the Hungarian communities within their states. If the Slovaks and
Romanians are not willing to make concessions and are pursuing a narrow-visioned and stubborn
strategy, in the long-term they may lose more than to give autonomy to the Hungarian communities
as history taught the Hungarians through Trianon (Ficeri 2019: 763-776.).
The situation of the Hungarian minorities in Hungary’s neighbors is a tough issue and has a
long history as it was already described above. The successor states who, in a metaphoric way,
taken these Hungarian populations into custody have not been guarding, respecting the interests of
these Hungarians in most cases. The inhuman treatment after the First and Second World Wars, the
fact that after the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty there were no minority protection clauses that would
protect  these  minorities,  among  other  issues  are  signaling  there  are  problems.  However,  it  is
interesting to see that the Slovaks and Romanians, for example,  may not have been considering
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these  areas  where  the  Hungarians  live  to  be  their  own,  because  evidently  they  have  not  been
invested, developed these areas, but rather exploited them economically such as in Transylvania.
As the Serbian case highlighted to be Hungarian, to remain Hungarian may not be easy and
most likely this withdrawing Hungarian identity exists in these regions, which is an issue. It would
be rightful to request more autonomy to regain some of their rights, to make it possible to remain
who  they  are  if  they  want  to.  Some  of  these  Hungarians  may  hold  onto  their  identity  more
stubbornly than  others  such as  the Szeklers  in  Transylvania.  In  the  last  year  there  was an  EU
petition  on  the  civil  level  that  aimed  to  provide  full  autonomy  to  the  Hungarian  Szeklers  in
Transylvania,  but  it  failed  due  to  the  disproportionate  representation  from  the  different  EU
members. The truth is these detached Hungarian peoples may have grown apart from Hungary in
mentality due to their differing situations, regarding at least the fact that they have developed a
minority consciousness. As it is stated above the states of Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine
could take more  responsibility  for  the  peaceful  cooperation of  Central-East  European states  by
providing more rights and autonomy to the Hungarian minorities learning from the mistakes of the
Hungarians in the past. This is not only an issue for Hungarians but it also acts as a barrier for them
too. Until these nations are not willing to acknowledge their wrongdoing and reconcile with the
Hungarians and the past, it will also affect them. Furthermore, it is also true the Hungarians could
get  over  it  and  not  place  themselves  in  victim  mentality,  in  the  position  of  the  loser  as  a
consequence of the First World War, but first be responsible and aim to process the issue, but due to
the circumstances after 1945 new obstacles emerged that prevented a healthy processing, integration
of the issue that will be analyzed in the next Chapter.
The  experience  and  memory  of  Trianon  for  the  Hungarians  either  consciously  or
subconsciously  may  be  linked  to  recent  historical  events  and  the  current  Hungarian  Fidesz
government. The fact is that ultimately the Treaty of Trianon and the trauma it has caused, the loss
of the Hungarian living space and dominance in the Carpathian region are the consequences of the
immigration of foreigners after the Turkish were driven out of the Carpathian Basin. The Hungarian
populations were decreased, while, especially in the 16th to 18th  centuries, perhaps even in the 19th
century,  foreign people with a differing mentality  (such as more Balkan mentality  of  Serbians,
Romanians) than the Hungarians or the friendly,  familiar  nationalities settled in the area of the
Hungarian Kingdom leading to more conflicts, disintegration, “parallel worlds” within the state that
led to the traumatic Trianon. The current migrant crisis into Europe since 2015, from the Muslim
world, Africa and Asia with differing mentalities, may bring up for many Hungarians the fear of
another Trianon, as the scenario is similar as it happened before, consciously or subconsciously,
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even that the Fidesz is strengthening this narrative with its propaganda. This may explain why many
Hungarians would not like to take in immigrants in the country.
In relation  to  the  migrant  crisis,  while  Angela  Merkel  the  German Chancellor  has  been
famous about its welcoming policy regarding the foreign migrants, Viktor Orbán opposed it and is
presenting  to  stand  against  the  “liberal  West”  and  Western  Europe.  This  reflects  the  Turanian
movement of the interwar period of Hungary,  when they rejected the West  and questioned the
Christianity of Hungarians, while searching for connections with the Hungarians’ Eastern ancient
relatives.  The  Fidesz  government’s  questionable  relations  with  some  Western  European  EU
members and its “Eastern opening” policy may be compared to the former Turanian movement.  
This policy is aiming to decrease the economic reliance of Western Europe upon Hungary
and is aiming to increase economic relations with the developing states of Asia, such as states in
Central Asia like Kazakhstan, however, the results are questionable (Mészáros 2021). There will be
more discussed about the Orbán regime and Trianon in Chapter 5.
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4. In the shadow of communism
4.1. The Soviet “liberation” and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution
As Hungary was an ally of the Axis powers in World War II and the war was coming to an
end,  Hungary  became  occupied  by  the  Soviet  forces  in  1945,  then  the  Soviets  established  a
communist regime in Hungary by 1948, like in other East-Central European states (Pastor 2016:
197-200.).
The  root  causes  of  the  Hungarian  Revolution  can  be  traced  back  to  1945  when  the
Hungarian nation was “liberated” and at the same time occupied again by the Red Army. Soon a
totalitarian terror network was created.  After the Soviets took over Budapest in 1945, the most
terrible event happened, which was the mass rape of Hungarian women by the Red Army. The
euphemistic decree on February 14, 1945 abolished the prohibition of abortion and made these
operations free, referring to the serious weakening of women’s bodies due to the war and poor
healthcare.  This  was  a  wave  of  mass  rape  weighing  down  the  whole  country,  which  was
accompanied by capturing many civilians as prisoners of war, the “malenky robot”. Hundreds of
thousands of people, women, children and men were taken to the Gulag for decades. It is estimated
the action affected around 300,000 Hungarians, while another 300,000 soldiers from the Second
World War were taken there too. Half of these 700,000 people could never return to their country.
Fathers, husbands, bishops were killed for protecting their female family members. However, this
was not all, as the liberation meant great threat to the life, wealth, rights of freedom and the basic
civil  values.  The Hungarian Communist  Party was rising with Soviet  backing and special  state
security  organizations  were  created  against  the  remaining  Fascists,  but  also  innocent  civilians.
Between  1945  and  1946,  45,000  Hungarians  were  taken  to  internment  camps  based  on  false
pretenses and without any reasoning. By 1946, the Hungarian law created the legal conditions of
arresting,  murdering anyone who were against  the communist  regime.  Between 1946 and 1956
thousands of Hungarians were incarcerated and 400 Hungarians were executed (Schmidt 2005: 213-
222.).
Despite the fact that the Independent Smallholder Party won the 1945 Hungarian elections
with 57 percent absolute majority, the actual power was in the hand of the communists. This made it
possible that the leaders of the party were arrested due to their own alleged conspiracy and removed
from  power.  The  political  opponents  of  the  communists  were  either  imprisoned  or  forced  to
73
emigrate and by 1949 the communists eliminated the remaining elements of the Hungarian civil
society. Thus, the majority of the Hungarian population, about 83 percent were left without political
representation (Schmidt 2005: 213-222.).
Since Mátyás Rákosi returned from his Soviet emigration to Hungary in 1945, he not long
after  became  the  central  figure  in  Hungarian  politics.  He  was  the  leader  of  the  Hungarian
Communist  Party  and  with  some help  from Moscow,  he  could  subjugate  the  operation  of  the
coalition government at that time. 
The 1947 elections resulted in frauds by the communists.  Besides the cheating with the
“blue-tagged” ballots,  the State  Protection Authority  applied  administrative cheating and half  a
million Hungarians  were not  allowed to vote.  The acceleration  of  the implementation of  plans
towards a one-party system occurred after signing the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty (Gyarmati 2019).
The new constitution named Hungary as the Hungarian People’s Republic that asserted the
dominance of the physical workers, was the state of the workers and peasants, however, in this
totalitarian dictatorship not even the workers had a say regarding the political matters. After the
Rákosi regime neutralized all political opponents from other political parties, they went against the
churches. They nationalized parochial schools supported atheism. The head of the catholic church
was  arrested  for  opposing the  regime  and deported  many  Catholic  priests.  New enemies  were
always found, who were sometimes the “imperialists”, the spies of Tito, then the Social Democrats,
then some Generals, then members of the communist party and so on (Sásdi, n.d.).
The Rákosi regime utilized the Hungarian nation’s wealth, including all the economic tools,
properties knowledge in a contra-productive way and consumed most of it. The living standard in
Hungary in the post-war decade had not been improved, the situation of the Hungarians neither
improved, nor it  could recover after  the Second World War.  The new regime discriminated the
whole society and they caused unnecessary sufferings. Many people were put to work dysfunctional
jobs, which were considered to be “the most valuable to socialism” despite the people’s expertise or
creativity.  The Rákosi  era  was  considered  to  be  unlimited  in  the  way this  regime was  always
seeking and eliminating new enemies. The continuous abuse, terror and oppression extended to all
the corners of Hungarian society. Nobody was in safety against this regime, not even the servants
and own members of the regime (Gyarmati 2019).
The police officers and the leaders of public administration of the Horthy era,  the large
landowners, the gentry and former company owners were evicted from Budapest,  about 12,000
people. The regime aimed to solve the lack of housing situation this way and these people were
often evicted at dawn by the communist authorities and were put on trains guarded by the police,
then sent off to their new locations. These families lost almost everything, barely had any money
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and they could mainly only do hard physical jobs. Moreover, the peasantry was also not spared
from  communist  terror.  The  5-year  communist  plan  aimed  to  collectivize  agriculture,  but  the
peasantry stick to their own lands. They were nevertheless forced to join the common agricultural
groups and their taxes were increased. Then the service system appeared, which aimed to collect
more and more products of the peasants in exchange for some small payment. Those who were not
cooperating with the authorities, the authorities went to their houses and took every product the
family  had  from the  cellar  to  the  attic.  Those  peasants  who  owned  lands  more  than  25 acres
constituted  one  of  the  most  terrible  class  enemies  of  the  system.  They  faced  all  kinds  of
discrimination, were propagated to be criminals and unique police units were created to beat them
up (Sásdi, n.d.).
The Rákosi regime announced for the period of 1950 to 1954 to make Hungary “the country
of iron and steel”. Under the order that they were preparing for the Third World War, all economic
efforts were placed on the military industry, heavy industry and manufacturing industry to develop.
For this, large amounts of workforce was needed that was directed there from agriculture. Already
in 1950 there were serious supply problems as the agriculture sector was not developed and the
produced crops were exported from Hungary. Thus, blaming it on the workers, rationing system was
introduced  in  1951  first  for  sugar,  flour,  then  for  bread,  milk,  meat  and  others.  By  1953  the
Hungarian nation was impoverished and most of the families were starving (Sásdi, n.d.).
One of the results of the Sovietization processes in Central and Eastern Europe was the
appearance of the Stalinist  cult  and its imitation the mini Stalins such as the Rákosi cult.  This
Rákosi cult was partly based on the Soviet example, but it also had some Hungarian national roots.
Rákosi was named “father figure”, “teacher of the nation”, “man of the people” and “caring leader”
for example. Rákosi was traced back to Hungarian revolutionary traditions and was presented as the
successor of Hungarian freedom fighters (Turbucz 2018: 663-665.).
Due to the death of Stalin in 1953, it became apparent that the communist bloc faces a crisis.
As a consequence, Mátyás Rákosi,  the representer of classic Stalinism was dismissed and Imre
Nagy became the new Prime Minister. Imre Nagy opened the door of the internment camps and the
prisons and due to some of his other concessions, he became famous as the grip of the regime was
softened. However, Mátyás Rákosi could return to power in 1955, which caused resistance of the
people  with  the  leaders  being  reformcommunists  grouped  around  Imre  Nagy.  Due  to  the
international context, such as the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party or the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Austria in 1955 favored the coming Hungarian Revolution (Schmidt 2005: 213-
222.).
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Rákosi’s  rule  lasted  until  1956 when he  was  dismissed  from the  leader  position  of  the
Hungarian Workers’ Party, after he once again moved back to the Soviet Union (Gyarmati 2019).
The increase of the societal tensions within the decade prior to 1956 led the Hungarians to
have conflicts with the communist regime ranging from an existential uncertainty through losing
properties, lands, the unlimited terror and violence till the systematic persecution of certain groups
(Valuch 2008: 131-132.).
On October 23, 1956, a revolution and freedom fight broke out that succeeded for ten days
until the Soviets crushed the movement. It may be considered an unexpected revolution that began
with  the  peaceful  demonstration  of  university  students  and their  supporters  in  Budapest.  They
demanded  to  end  the  communist  regime  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  Soviet  army  stationed  in
Hungary. As the authorities shot into the Hungarian crowds, an uprising began on 23rd of October
and the violence was reciprocated with 250 deaths on that day. Although about 15,000 Hungarians
took up arms against the regime, the whole country stood up for Hungarian independence. On 26
October  the  Hungarian  Communist  Party  called  for  the  establishment  of  a  new  coalition
government and on 30 October Prime Minister Imre Nagy declared the end of the one-party regime,
however, the next day, Nikita Khrushchev ordered the Soviet army to crush the revolution. From
November 4 to November 11, 60,000 Soviet troops and 2,000 tanks defeated the freedom fighters.
2,500 Hungarians died and 20,000 were wounded, while due to the retaliations, 22,000 people were
sentenced to prison and 300 were executed. As a consequence of the defeat, 200,000 Hungarians
fled the country mostly through Austria and many of them have never returned. Many of them
successfully reached the US as one of the major destinations. It is estimated that only 5 percent of
the fleeing Hungarians were freedom fighters, while most of them escaped fearing the returning
totalitarian regime (Pastor 2016: 197-200.).
Although in the rural areas the Hungarians did not have weapons during the Revolution,
there was a civil revolution at the same time. The communist councils were abolished and self-
governing local organs were created through bottom-up processes. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution
constituted the freedom fight in Budapest for independence and the creation of civil democracy in
the rural areas (Schmidt 2005: 213-222.).
As a result of the defeat of Nazism in Hungary, the Soviet “liberation” or rather occupation
did not bring any good to Hungary but death and oppression and the freedom was taken away once
again. Hungary slowly but steadily transformed into a far-left Soviet satellite state from the far-right
Nazi satellite. Between 1945 and 1953 the totalitarian system was being built that first involved the
mass rape of Hungarian women, the loss of poverty, the humiliation, the discrimination and the
impoverishment of the Hungarian people, while the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty undid all the revisions
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and  the  issue  of  the  Hungarian  minorities  abroad  was  suppressed  to  be  talked  about,  it  was
associated with the Nazi’s aspirations. The classic Stalinist rule of Rákosi and the terror, then the
saying of “Those who are not with us, are against us.” highlight that this period was one of the most
terrible periods for the Hungarians in the 20th century.
The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, as some earlier Hungarian Revolutions mentioned above,
was defeated, once again by foreign intervention just like in 1849. The brutal retaliation meant for
the Hungarians that they have to be careful, while the emigration of about 200,000 Hungarians
meant the withdrawal of the Hungarian identity to some extent. This Revolution may have further
decreased the self-confidence, the bravery of Hungarians and the rebellious nature, the Hungarians’
love and aspiration towards freedom and independence.
4.2. The Kádár regime and its “Goulash communism”
After the Hungarian Revolution was defeated, János Kádár became the de-facto leader of
Hungary for the next 33 years. From 1956 to 1988 Kádár had remained the first man both in the
Socialist  Party  and  in  the  government  and this  Kádár  era  has  often  been  dubbed as  “Goulash
Communism” that will be explained below (Hungary Today 2016).
The Kádár  regime showed a  kinder  communist  attitude,  called  as  a  soft  dictatorship  or
“Goulash Communism”, however, it was founded on the brutal retaliation of the 1956 Hungarian
Revolution. Hungarians were prohibited to talk about certain topics, creating powerful taboos such
as the Revolution. It had been either named as a counter-revolutionary uprising or not mentioned at
all. Between the Stalinist Rákosi regime and the Kádár regime one significant difference was that in
the former one, Hungarians could talk about 10 topics as Rákosi demanded an active attitude from
the  people  for  the  communist  project  and  ideology,  while  in  the  latter  there  were  10  topics
Hungarians could not talk about.  Kádár shifted Rákosi’s  demand of an active attitude from the
people to demand a passive attitude. Hungarians did not have to glorify communism, but instead by
avoiding key topics they could enjoy their private lives (Hungary Today 2016).
János Kádár was considered to be a political opportunist in the sense that what mattered to
him was solely to gain power. When the Hungarian Revolution was ascending, he supported its
cause, but as the Soviets decided to intervene he changed sides and joined the cause for repression.
He implemented the stick and carrot policy on the Hungarian nation, first subjugating the people by
retaliation and terror, secondly buying them off with higher standard of living. The early years of
Kádárism broke the spirit of the Hungarians, then the people were bribed by economic concessions.
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It is also argued the Kádárist tolerance was a calculated one as the concessions could have been
withdrawn at any time. Kádárism’s social compromise was not what it supposed to be as it did not
provide autonomy to social forces and did not safeguard the rights of the people (Lomax 1985: 102-
110.).
Kádár absolutely bore responsibility for the terror and retaliation from 1957 to 1960. The
new regime executed 300 people, imprisoned about 22,000, moreover interned 13,000 Hungarians
but Kádár stated there would be no return to the Stalinist politics and removed key figures such as
Mátyás Rákosi from political participation (Takács 2010: 113-123.).
Once the acts of retaliaton served their purposes, he aimed to make a compromise with all
corners of the Hungarian society through reconciliation, amnesties and economic reforms. In 1961
he stated: “Whoever is not against us, is with us”, while in 1962 he even acknowledged that most of
the Hungarian people do not favor Marxism, but they should not be regarded as class enemies
(Lomax 1985: 110-111.).
Kádár  announced  political  amnesty  in  1962  to  consolidate  and  legitimize  his  regime,
especially in the eyes of the Hungarians. The detotalitarization of his regime may be considered as a
careful strategy against to decrease political resistance. The regime allowed more cultural freedom
and  provided  an  improved  standard  of  living  to  depoliticize  the  society.  Significant  economic
reforms were introduced in 1968 and Hungarians were allowed to decide where to work more freely
that opened space for the “second economy” (Takács 2010: 113-123.).
It is important to distinguish between the “first economy” and the “second economy” in the
communist  era.  The  “first  economy”  meant  the  socialist  sector,  the  classic  system,  so  the
bureaucratic state and cooperative sector, while the “second economy” meant the sum of the official
small family businesses and the informal private sector (Dupcsik 2016).
Kádár successfully neutralized and depoliticized the Hungarian public, so that people did not
criticize the regime and talk about sensitive issues (Takács 2010: 113-123.).
The social compromise of the Kádár era can be summed up as the following:
“Provided they renounced all claim to participation in decision-making, the life of the population was made
considerably easier. Everyday life became what was commonly perceived as tolerable” (Takács 2010: 113-
123.).
The dependency of the regime on the factors of consumption, second economy and private
property were considerable. The system can only survive if they opened up the private sphere that
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was contradictory to the regime’s ideology. This bred political apathy that led to privatizing state
property, corruption, thus in two words moral distortion (Takács 2010: 113-123.).
As  contradictions  of  the  socialist  society,  the  increasing  consumer  mentality  and  the
decreasing socialist morality appeared in the Hungarian society in the forms of bribery, corruption,
usury or misuse of influence and so on (Takács 2010: 113-123.).
Kádárism was named “atmospheric totalitarianism” as it was a form of socialist dictatorship
with an invisible repression. If someone criticized the fundamentals of the regime, they would face
the consequences, like when one stops breathing. As the Kádár regime tolerated behaviors unknown
to the communist ideology to maintain their rule, it led to a moral distortion among the Hungarians.
Although the direction was towards democratic transition, cynicism, corruption and stealing have
become the norms that were inherited by the post-communist system (Takács 2010: 113-123.).
In the 1970s Western observers regarded Hungary as the most liberal state in the Eastern
Soviet bloc and Hungarians often referred to themselves as “the happiest barracks in the camp”.
Although the Hungarian people may have relatively lived well, the Kádár regime was based on the
collective bribery of the Hungarians.  Its system contained cynical politicians who maintained a
hypocritical and fraudulent compromise with the demoralized and corrupted Hungarian population
(Lomax 1985: 110-111.).
Kádár proclaimed an alliance policy with all the Hungarian people and not returning to an
iron rule.  Loyal  extra-party Hungarians were becoming involved in  the common socialist  goal,
while there was a decentralization of authority and certain groups and institutions were provided
with greater autonomy. Then, amnesty for most political prisoners was announced that ended the
internment for many Hungarians. Some liberalization occurred in the cultural sphere and within
social sciences but there were limits to the freedom and expression that was allowed. The policies
of  Kádár  aimed  to  put  the  legitimacy  of  the  system  on  satisfying  the  material  needs  of  the
Hungarians. It was understood that change may only come through the orders from Moscow, but
still Kádár was able to partially satisfy the interests of the Hungarians within certain limits. The
Kádár regime had achieved a neutral public acceptance but many negative features remained from
the Rákosi regime, such as the pervasive propaganda or the authoritarian and petty bureaucratism.
The standard of living in Hungary was improved along with the welfare functions like pensions and
child care. However, there was a shortage of housing especially in and around Budapest in spite of
construction programmes and measures  to  aid private  constructions.  The housing problem with
other factors contributed to a high abortion rate, many divorces, and increasing rates of alcoholism
and suicide (Kovrig 1978: 720-739.).
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Under the Kádár regime the “eight men watching, one man working” saying was created.
During communism there was officially zero unemployment and hard work was part of the Soviet
ideology, may jobs were only for people to get by and not to achieve anything. The connection
between honest work and societal, economic advancement ceased to exist. This is still prevalent in
Hungary in the form that Hungarians will not necessarily get ahead through hard work (Hungary
Today 2016).
There was a TV show, called “The Window” that best described the Kádár regime as it was
kind of a reality show where people could complain about anything, except for the regime (Hungary
Today 2016).
The term of “the little person” was indicative of this period how the Hungarians acted and
thought.  The  little  man  can  be  considered  as  a  plotter  who  is  always  looking  for  the  next
opportunity, and to get ahead that remained in the Hungarian consciousness (Hungary Today 2016).
The Kádár regime was also characterized by indebtedness. The current national and some of
the  personal  debts  originate  from the  communist  times  as  spending  was  high  to  maintain  the
shortsighted Kádár regime and the lifestyle. All this debt at the end has become the problem of the
next generation (Hungary Today 2016).
The communists in Hungary, just like within the whole Communist bloc, had many spies
and informers spying on their own people. In contrast to other communist states, such as the former
East Germany, the Kádár regime denied the fact they would spy on people, whereas in reality they
did (Hungary Today 2016).
One  of  the  most  problematic  characteristics  of  the  Kádár  regime  was  to  co-opt  the
Hungarian people to comply with the communist regime either in an active or a passive way. After
many traumas and terrible events of the 20th century, Hungarians compromised and participated in
their own oppression. They could live in relative peace, they could live a comfortable life with food,
jobs and vacations if they became collaborators. This, however, came with a price too. It bent the
spine of the Hungarian peoples, shattered their self-confidence and made them feel guilty and self-
loathing. It is argued that the effects of this have not been remedied since the end of the regime
(Hungary Today 2016).
The Kádár regime introduced the cultural policy of the 3 Ts, which stood for támogatás,
tűrés, tiltás (promote, tolerate and ban) different artistic productions after 1956 (Huth 2021).
The communist ideology was from the beginning suspicious towards nationalist sentiments
or aimed to exploit it and like in many Eastern European countries, the Soviet fatherland and a new
kind of patriotism was created that even in the small Hungary the people could live better than in
Western Europe where they are oppressed by the capitalist system. The Treaty of Trianon and the
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pursuit for just revisions after the First World War was no longer considered to be legitimate for the
communists as it allegedly advanced Nazism, socialist fraternity with neighboring countries was
much more important than territories. During communism public opinion surveys highlighted that
about half of those Hungarians asked limited Hungarian nationality only including Hungarians in
Hungary, not considering those from the detached territories. In the 1980s due to the rising Slovak
and  Romanian  anti-Hungarian  nationalism,  such  as  Ceausescu’s  plan  to  make  thousands  of
Hungarians move from the countryside of Transylvania to agricultural centers, the Kádár regime
allowed to publicly defend their ill-treatment in Hungary (Deme 1998: 307-313.).
On June 16, 1989 the fall of communism became apparent in Hungary and for the world
when a  reburial  was  held  for  Imre  Nagy and his  fellow martyrs  who were  executed  after  the
Hungarian Revolution (Schmidt 2005: 213-222.).
The Kádár regime really bribed the nation with a relatively high standard of living at that
time,  but  as  a  consequence  the  Hungarians  became  their  own  worst  enemies  by  becoming
conformists to the regime. On the surface Hungarians had to passively accept the status quo but in
the depth many of them may have developed self-loathing, anger and frustration. It was a form of
self-deception that led to the distortion of the Hungarian collective identity.  Hungarians could not
be independent, they became reliant upon the socialist state and were disciplined not to do certain
things, while also had to be loyal by all means to the regime, accepting the reality, compromising
themselves, becoming a herd of sheep who have to obey to the system. The Hungarians had to be
used to the one-party system, the soft totalitarian, authoritarian regime, which would take care of
many things, the system, the people, treating the people as underage children. It bred a high level of
acceptance to the status quo and political apathy. Often the Hungarians who became members of the
communist party were not experts, competent persons but they were ultra loyal to the system and
could do many harm to the ordinary Hungarians. These persons may have also felt more confident
than  the  rest  of  the  society  as  they  could  get  protection  under  the  shadow  of  communism.
Furthermore, though this is also true to the Rákosi era, the distrust of the Hungarians towards each
other may also be traced back to this period as often people were being observed, there were spied
and sometimes even family members could not have trusted each other, because if they committed
something, they could be punished even severely. The well-being of the Hungarians came at the
price that their collective identity was deconstructed and the Hungarians had to forget about real
freedom. Independence, freedom, and political participation became unknown to them that have its
serious consequences as it will be seen below.
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4.3. The effects of the communist era on collective identity
The  long  decades  of  communism  must  have  been  devastating  to  the  Hungarians  both
physically and mentally. First the behavior of the Soviet troops, the hard totalitarian system and the
terror of Rákosi’s rule broke the Hungarian society, took many innocent lives, impoverished the
people and utilized the weapon of fear to a great extent. Although the days of the 1956 Revolution
signaled some hope, it was brutally repressed then a compromise had to be made with Kádár that let
the Hungarians live in an illusion, but at the same time it completely distorted the society. The rule
of  communism  in  Hungary  has  resulted  in  serious  consequences  affecting  Hungary  and  the
Hungarians till the present day.
The Kádár regime (33 years) may have been more mentally destructive than Rákosi’s rule (9
years, the major period) and may have affected more deeply the Hungarian mentality regarding
politics,  societal  functioning  or  social  interactions.  While  the  Rákosi  era  had  proven  to  instill
immense fear  in  the  Hungarian  people,  the  Kádár  regime aimed to  maliciously  undermine  the
Hungarian collective behavior and create some underlying patterns in the subconsciousness of the
people that would not only let them live a tolerable, perhaps even happy life, but could also cement
the authoritarian Kádár regime in the ground and maintain its rule upon the Hungarian society.
The persecution of Christians, anti-nationalist measures and the prohibition of most of the
pre-existing  values  considered  to  be  important  by  the  Hungarians  had  resulted  in  the  general
rejection of the communist state and a tendency to ignore its norms. The society became atomized
and was set up for wide-range exploitation, moreover it led to an increased alienation of the people
and  the  fragmentation  of  societal  groups.  As  the  old  norms were  abolished,  prohibited  but  as
communism could only create an anti-state or politically passive environment, it only left behind
alienation, estrangement and apathy. Due to the communist narratives, social solidarity, tolerance
and respect for the others largely declined by the 1980s. According to a survey from 1982-1983,
only a third of the interviewed Hungarians considered tolerance as one of their top five values. The
demoralization  and  apathy  of  the  Hungarians  aggravated  societal  disintegration.  Suicide  and
alcoholism has been especially high among Hungarians, especially in communist times between
1960 and 1993 when Hungary was the number one on the top ten list with the worst suicide rates
around the globe (Newberg 2019: 14-17.).
Post-communist Hungarian mentality was largely influenced in the Kádár era and due to the
more than 40 years of communism that provided the Hungarians with distorted behaviors. Kádár
bought  the  Hungarian  people  with  some  delicious  goods,  but  the  “Kádár  pact”  included  two
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destructive mentalities, which were the mentality of dependency and the culture of envy. It is stated
that materialistic concerns of Central-East European societies play a significant role and can be used
against the populations, what Kádár may have done. The Hungarian standard of living was low,
there was not that much to spend on extras and most of the average family income was necessary to
be  spent  on  housing,  utilities  and  food.  For  a  large  part  of  the  Hungarians,  this  mentality  of
dependency has continued, worsened and exploited after the collapse of communism, for example
that Hungarian workers were incapable to think for themselves (Bollobás 1995: 162-165.).
The Kádár pact,  besides that it  made Hungarians to be dependent and treated them like
minors, provided false securities that were deceitful. Until Hungarians were given only the fish,
there  was  no  need,  opportunity  to  fish  by  themselves  with  a  net.  The  Hungarian  society  had
successfully become homogenized, equal at the lowest standard of living, where mediocrity became
the  norm.  The  communists  payed  attention  to  the  social  status  of  the  people  to  be  equal  and
outstanding workers did not earn more, rather poor performance was the norm. Due to the regime
change opportunities have multiplied and a thin layer of people either with skills, talent or a vision
could make it in Hungary, however, only a thin layer. These successful people frustrated the other
fallen behind, bitter and depressed Hungarians, of whom many became envy. Especially those who
were still dependent on the state, do not like to see their fellow citizens succeed and have a zero-
sum game mentality. This atmosphere of envy combined with the mentality of dependency may
have been harsh to cope with for Hungarians. Without believing in self-reliance and autonomous
living, Hungarian businessmen may not take a business venture, an unfamiliar road instead of the
familiar, modest way. While if one is successful, he or she may have witnessed some manifestations
of envy against them that would not take them closer to be beneficial to the society, to help the poor,
instead they would hide their success and leave behind a shallow society (Bollobás 1995: 165-167.).
Despite Hungarians had lived better than others in the region under communism, pessimism
and complaining have become characteristics of them, at least many say, but could have the forty
years of communism been more positively viewed? The communist leadership did everything to
limit the knowledge of Hungarians, such as about the values of democracy. Hungarian adolescents
from the 1990s were foreign to the terms of solidarity, social safety and citizenship, while they
tended to favor the authority of the state and the parents. A public opinion poll from 1995 conducted
by Sonda Ipsos showed only 6 percent of Hungarians favored freedom of expression and a free
press to be important. As Hungarians were accustomed to the rule of one party and there were no
debates, only a theater in the Parliament, many Hungarians considered the debates of the multi-
party system in the 1990s chaotic as if the government was losing control. This is because back in
communist Hungary there was order and no place for confusion. The culture of negotiation is also
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lacking in Hungary, which is normal in Western democracies but rarely characterize the countries to
the East and South from Hungary, where disagreements turn to conflict and violence (Bollobás
1995: 167-170.).
Overall, during the de facto 44-year long communist dictatorship the Hungarian collective
identity  had been severely  affected  that  last  till  the  present  day.  Many positive  aspects  of  the
Hungarian identity were deconstructed, while new deviant patterns were formed and may have also
remained to some extent. 
The  positive  aspects  that  were  deconstructed  to  a  certain  degree  are  the  following:
independent thinking, bravery, love for freedom, trusting each other and the system, entrepreneurial
skill,  societal  cooperation,  political  participation,  tolerance,  solidarity,  freedom  of  expression,
favoring democracy as some of the major ones.
The  negative  aspects,  patterns,  mentality  of  the  Hungarians  that  were  either  created  or
strengthened are the following: dependency upon the state, compromising themselves, fear, getting
used  to  authoritarianism,  self-loathing,  political  apathy,  demoralization,  distrust  towards  other
people and the authorities, envy, self-destructive patterns: alcoholism, suicide, smoking, depression,
alienation, lack of togetherness, lack of self-confidence, self-deception, becoming too acceptable
conformists, getting used to corruption, stealing, political cynicism as some of the major ones.
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5. From the regime change to the 21st century
5.1. The regime change of 1989
On June 16th,  1989 a  ceremony  and  the  reburial  of  the  leaders  of  the  1956  Hungarian
Revolution, Imre Nagy, the martyred Prime Minister and four other important figures was held in
Budapest that meant a point of no return for communism in Hungary. One year earlier, in 1988 a
mass  gathering  was  held  to  commemorate  Nagy’s  execution  that  was  repressed  by the  police,
however, as Kádár was removed from power, the ceremony could be made possible. Then soon
after an agreement was reached with the communist party about the reburial. Variable opposition
forces  were  gaining  influence  in  Hungary,  while  the  new orders  from Moscow stated  that  the
Hungarian communists have to work on preserving their power in a post-communist Hungary. In
1989 on the commemoration of Imre Nagy and the other leaders, the opposition forces held a large
demonstration. There were about 250,000 Hungarians on the reburial ceremony and the speakers on
the demonstration called for a peaceful transition to a democratic system. On the demonstration
Viktor Orbán, a founder of the Fidesz (and Prime Minister from 1998 to 2002 and from 2010 to the
present that will  be discussed further below) also held a speech in which he demanded that all
Soviet troops should withdraw from Hungary. This speech was criticized by left-wingers, such as
Ferenc Gyurcsány, who was at that time an important figure of the Communist youth organization.
Then a political round-table was formed and some of the former communists, reformers and the
opposition parties agreed upon a peaceful democratic transition, a new Hungarian constitution and
multi-party elections (Budapest Business Journal 2020).
As the Hungarian Democratic Forum won the elections in 1990, based on the consensus of
all political parties and the Hungarian public opinion, bilateral negotiations were initiated to protect
the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring states, which signified the revision of the concept of
Hungarian national community (Deme 1998: 307-313.).
The last  Soviet  troops left  Hungary in  1991 and most  Hungarians  favored the peaceful
transition  that  no  purges  against  communists  occurred.  Although  most  of  Hungary’s  1990-94
Parliament were not communists, the 1994 Hungarian elections voted back the “ghost people”, as
the  New  York  Times  called,  following  similar  tendencies  in  Lithuania,  Estonia  and  Poland
(Bollobás 1995: 159-161.).
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It  is  argued the shadow of the communist  system has not left  Hungary and real regime
change  did  not  happen,  because  former  communists  figures,  such  as  the  already  mentioned
Gyurcsány or Gyula Horn and Péter Medgyessy, who became Hungarian Prime Ministers in the
1990s and the 2000s, were the embodiments of the previous system. They may have become the
supporters of constitutional democracy from the 1980s, but they could preserve their powers for the
next period, and who knows what other hidden interests, secrets are still lurking in the background
(Horkay 2003: 62-72.).
For example Gyula Horn, who stood against the 1956 Hungarian Revolution as part of the
Communist  militia  became  the  Prime  Minister  after  “the  regime  change”  as  member  of  the
Hungarian Socialist Party (Budapest Business Journal 2020).
At  that  time  economists  warned  about  the  “Latin  Americanization”  of  Hungary,  which
means that a small percentage of the country become absolutely rich, while the rest falls behind.
From the 1980s through the 1990s this tendency could be seen in East-Central European states such
as  in  Hungary,  where  former  communists  could  put  their  hands  on  economic  reforms.  This  is
referred to as an Italian model, in which there is a corrupt government who lean on a semi-mafia
business class, but in this case former communist members. In this ex-nomenklatura capitalists and
ex-communist politicians share the power and dominate in different fields, leaving little space for
other competitors. Sociologists in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary identified several hundreds of such
business persons and that  transforming political  power into economic power is  common in the
region. Hungarian sociologists have identified the appearance of new ex-nomenklatura oligarchic
families, who saved their power from the 1980s through institutionalization in certain areas of the
economy in Hungary (Bollobás 1995: 162-165.).
Still, to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the regime change, first of all on the
societal level, the advantages were the market economy, parliamentary democracy, possibility of
pluralism, while some disadvantages may have been the increasing black market, decreased public
services, market failures, worsening public safety, the appearance of radicals, segmentation and the
increasing inequalities within the Hungarian society. On the individual level, the advantages may be
gaining more freedom, civil and political rights, unlimited private properties and the possibility of
higher incomes. On the contrary, the disadvantages may be the decreased existential  safety, the
dangers of structural unemployment and structural poverty, weakened social welfare system and the
lack of prosecution for earlier wrongdoings (Tabajdi 2017: 14-15.).
It is stated the Hungarian nation has not reorganized itself after communism. Hungarians
once again became a populace. The situation was much more uncertain than in the Kádár era and
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the average Hungarians were puzzled, were waiting and feared to say out loud the nation, not to be
condemned a nationalist (Nemeskürty 2003: 108.).
It  seemed  like  the  Hungarians  were  cluelessly  standing  after  the  door  of  freedom and
independence had opened by external forces. After the Soviet troops had left it seemed Hungarian
society was unable to strengthen into a self-governing state. The communists who changed their
names were voted back to power, but no governments were able to create a successful, Hungarian
welfare state (until the end of the 1990s), which is no surprise if one analyzes that the citizens had
been the servants of foreign rule since 1945. The state organizing force became extinct inside the
Hungarians and Hungarians may not be able to form their own state. After the Ottoman Empire
defeated and broke Hungary after 1526, the Hungarians aimed to reclaim their independence first in
the Rákóczi Freedom Fight with weapons, then in 1848 first with a peaceful strategy but later again
with weapons, which was defeated, then after Trianon from 1920, which was buried under Nazi
Germany  in  the  Second  World  War.  It  is  not  surprising  that  after  the  daring  1956  Hungarian
Revolution, Hungarians could not produce and name leaders that would have been accepted by the
majority,  because such leaders were appointed by the actual occupying powers to serve foreign
interests (Nemeskürty 2003: 138-141.).
The citizens in Hungary were hoping that the US, just  like in Western Europe after the
Second  World  War,  would  send  aid,  cancel  Hungary’s  debts,  but  these  did  not  occur.  Instead
privatization has started led by a state-owned company camouflaged as a public limited company.
The Hungarians believed they could get back their wealth, businesses, industries, lands, as their
private  properties  were  taken  away in  1948.  However,  they  were  only  provided  compensation
tickets they could buy shares or properties with. The privatization was undertaken in a competitive
market  environment  and  foreign  capital  flowed  in.  The  most  significant  amounts  came  from
Germany (25 percent), the US (13,5 percent), France (9 percent), Austria (5 percent), Belgium (4,5
percent), and the Netherlands (4 percent) that already constituted 61 percent. Those properties, for
example companies, industries were not returned to Hungarians, but instead were exploited, sold to
foreign hands (Nemeskürty 2003: 108-109.).
The “regime change” that was argued to have happened was a soft, peaceful transition into
the pluralist democratic system but it could have happened in a revolutionary way through which all
the former communists should have been punished, because as it was argued about the power, the
leverage  of  the  communists  could  have  been  preserved,  saved  for  the  next  system.  It  is  also
questionable  whether  the  new political  parties  who were  emerging out  from communism were
indeed genuine or took in some communist  elements.  The “Latin Americanization” of Hungary
could be seen in the coming years after 1990 until today. While it was a major issue that many
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Hungarian properties  were given to  foreign hands,  thus  many key industries  sold for  example,
inequalities  have  grown  since  the  1990s  that  may  have  created  more  hate  and  envy  in  the
Hungarians  towards  one  another.  The  Hungarian  society  may  have  been  weak  to  let  such  a
deceitful,  peaceful  regime change to  happen in Hungary  that  would  create  a  distorted,  corrupt
political system in which the most important thing of the politicians is to gain as much as possible
while  not  caring  genuinely  about  the  Hungarian  citizens.  The  Hungarians  may  have  been  too
acceptable about the change, they may have been too passive to act and not prepared to take their
freedom. The supposed regime change occurred by external forces not internally by the Hungarians
and the Hungarians may not have had a common plan for the future. 
5.2. The recent political culture
It is widely acknowledged that the political culture is not only influenced by the current
events,  personal  experiences,  but also the happenings of the past,  the turning points of history,
whether  they  were  tragic  or  uplifting  moments.  It  is  undeniable  that  the  experiences  of  the
predecessors about the politically relevant events are inherited from generation to generation and
become part of the political culture. Compared to the institutional part of the political system, the
political culture and the judgment of values change slower or are more difficult to change. From the
above mentioned events of history, one may speculate the historical changes do have an effect on
the Hungarian political culture. The Hungarian political culture, overall, exhibits both Western, or
European and Asian, or Eastern national characteristics that points to an “in-between” East and
West category (Varga 2008: 115-120.).
Some of  the  most  distinctive  characteristics  of  the  Hungarian  political  culture  after  the
regime change of 1989 are the following: 1. Passive resistance but there is a tendency towards
eruptive political expressions and the tolerance of these. 2. An attitude of distancing from politics
based on “contemplative realism” or  not  to be astonished by anything,  and thus the refusal  of
political  radicalism.  3.  Political  paternalism  and  political  infantilism,  but  demanding  real
accomplishments  from leaders.  4.  Need for  outstanding  political  figures  but  refusing  a  cult  of
personality. 5. Difficult sufferance of the rules, norms of the state and the tendency to circumvent
them, but a developed sense of law, fearing their rights during confrontation, attachment to keeping
fundamental rights. 6. Kuruc-Labanc tradition: unlimited desire towards independence contra realist
political submission and the dilemma between “the homeland or progress”. This originates in the
Rákóczi  Freedom  Fight  from  the  beginning  of  the  18th century  against  the  Habsburg  rule  in
88
Hungary, when Kuruc meant an “eternal rebel”, “eternal in opposition”, “true Hungarian”, while the
Labanc as the compromising, “friend of the Germans” or “eternal collaborator” (Paár 2018). 7. A
thousand-year-old  statehood  and  constitutional  thinking.  8.  The  weak  democratic,  but  strong
parliamentary tradition of the Hungarian political development. 9. The sense of being in-between
East and West, “Middle-Europe”. 10. The attitude of “they betrayed, they sold us”, the sense of
vulnerability but a strong need for joining, catching up and integration (Varga 2008: 115-120.).
The Hungarian political culture from a historical perspective is unique in the sense that it is
partly inclusive, while also due to the linguistic, communicational isolation it is hardly opening after
1989. From the 1970s and 1980s the Hungarian society compared to European ones has become one
of the most individualistic ones. This resulted in less solidarity nationally considering the whole
nation and also regarding local groups, even more intensely by the 21st century. On the national
level it manifests in the chauvinism of party politics, while the latter is incited due to an individual
existential  vulnerability.  There is a tendency to apply administrative,  bureaucratic methods. The
Hungarian political elites especially from the 2000s have made majority decisions of largely one-
sided, forcible, administrative and power based instead of legitimate decisions with societal support
to correct mistakes, solve dysfunctional mechanisms (Varga 2008: 115-120.).
The  sense  of  political  competence  of  the  Hungarian  society  during  the  Kádár-regime
counted that 8 percent of the society were the participants, 84 percent were the subordinates and
there was a strongly limited parochial power. After the regime change and in the 1990s it improved,
became mixed meaning the number of participants increased and became more balanced with the
subordinates. Still the political participation was low, the citizens were not that active and there was
only a “participatory culture” voting in the elections the maximum. The political paternalism and
infantilism constitute  negative characteristics as the elites treat the people as minors,  while  the
people aim to overly count on a caring state that lead to political demobilization and the lessening
of  societal,  communal  responsibility.  On  the  positive  side,  the  “contemplative  realism”,  the
strategies of waiting for the wisdom, complaining and pessimism as being politically moderate and
distancing themselves  from politics  ultimately help to  socialize the people  for  survival,  thus  it
helped the Hungarians through the worst storms of history staying alive. Overall the 1990s may also
be  labeled  as  the  continuity  of  the  inherited  negative  political  culture  enriched in  all  kinds  of
oppositions (Varga 2008: 115-120.).
In  the  2000s  the  political  participation  has  increased  in  Hungary,  though  still  in  the
referendum about the EU accession in 2003, Hungarians participated proportionally the least (until
the referendum of  Croatia)  with 45,6 percent  negative record.  Although the political  culture in
Hungary was becoming more “European”, the political activities, mobilization of people increased,
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on  the  negative  side  there  were  the  negative  campaigns,  vulgar  style,  unscrupulous  promises,
deception and so on (Varga 2008: 115-120.).
The most characteristic negative event in the 2000s in Hungary was the “speech of Őszöd”
by the above-mentioned Ferenc Gyurcsány, member of the Hungarian Socialist Party and Prime
Minister  from 2004 to 2009,  in  2006 with  its  shocking delivery and its  content,  moreover  the
aftermath,  the  political  storm that  resulted  in  street  violence  in  Hungary,  with  such a  political
expression  occurring  prior  to  this  only  in  1956.  This  speech was  supposed to  be  between  the
members of the Socialist Party, but it went viral in Hungary. In this speech Gyurcsány admitted that
they lied to the society, lied to fellow party members about the truth, about the state of the economy.
This brought a moral crisis in Hungary and the crisis of the government brought flames to the
streets of Budapest. It is also argued it partially contributed to the substantial winning of Fidesz in
the 2010 elections. It especially highlighted the cynicism and hypocrisy of Hungarian politics (Vida
2021).
After a period of hope for a more European political  culture,  the 2000s proved to have
negative  consequences  such  as  the  decreasing  sense  of  political  competence  of  the  society,
decreasing  commitment  towards  public  life  and  the  weakening  legitimacy  of  the  democratic
political system. It is argued that by the end of the 2000s the minimal consensus between Hungarian
political parties ceased to exist creating a structural societal division (Varga 2008: 115-120.).
The fragmentation of the Hungarian political culture can be traced back to the prolongation
of the “feudal” system, maintaining the “feudal” relations between large land owners and the other
part of society. Due to the capitalization from the latter half of the 19 th century, the structure of the
society had become congested until the end of the Second World War. This “congested society” was
homogenized to some extent during communism period, while the regime change of 1989 resulted
in the increasing of societal inequalities (Varga 2008: 115-120.).
 This “congested”, “stalled” society had developed since the end of the Hungarian reform
era with the defeat of the 1848-1849 Hungarian Revolution and due to the 1867 compromise as it
fixed  the  structure  of  society.  The  gentry,  the  noblemen  were  not  able  to  advocate,  aid  the
development of the civil sphere, the advocacy of civil rights, thus they could not overcome the
“feudal” system and became motionless and stationary (Bibó 1990b).
30 years after the regime change, in 2020 the Hungarian people representing all corners of
the Hungarian society were surveyed about how they assess three different periods in Hungary, the
Kádár regime, the period of 1990 to 2010 and the current Orbán regime from 2010. According to
the Hungarians, 54 percent of them thought that life was better in the Kádár era than in 2020 and
only 31 percent thought Hungarians could live better in 2020 than in the Kádár regime. The older
90
generations  especially  thought  Hungarians  lived  well  during  before  1990.  The  participants
perceived the main advantages of the Kádár regime to be order, predictability and opportunity for
material prosperity as for example 63 percent of them stated there was order and social peace in the
Kádár era. Then, many of the Hungarians were aware of the economic unsustainability of the Kádár
regime and that only pro-communists could advance their careers better that were its disadvantages
of the communism. The Hungarians regarded widespread corruption and social inequalities as the
failures of the regime change. There is a large consensus on the issue that corruption has largely
increased since the Kádár era. Lastly, a crucial fact is that while some older age groups favored the
Orbán governments and senior citizens a left-wing government, 48 percent of the Hungarians under
30 could not favor a government, leading to the conclusion there is a lack of confidence, of political
interest  and of credibility towards the Hungarian political elite after 1990 (Bíró-Nagy and Laki
2020).
During the 20th century, one Hungarian Prime Minister was murdered (István Tisza), four
executed (Bárdossy, Imrédy, Szálasi and Imre Nagy), four exiled (Mihály Károlyi, Miklós Kállay,
Ferenc Nagy, István Bethlen).  One head of  state  died in  exile  (Miklós  Horthy)  and another  in
internment camp (Zoltán Tildy), not to mention other leaders. In a European context this number is
very high that gives the impression the Hungarians do not consider their leaders to represent their
interests and the indifference towards them is high. Hungarians got used to the fact that someone
else is governing the country, even if Hungarians rebelled or complained about it. By the end of the
Soviet rule, the reflex of the Hungarians to attach themselves to larger powers and to expect them to
bring well-being to Hungary may have become stronger, even though such foreign powers had only
exploited the Hungarians (Nemeskürty 2003: 138-141.).
The  majority  of  the  Hungarian  elites  are  still  preserving  the  worldview  of  the  1980s
Hungary  as  they  form  opinions  based  on  impressions,  not  facts,  have  large  imagination  and
grandiose plans but they cannot make them a reality. There is a need for a more knowledgeable
political  elite,  a  new generation but  there is  the  problem that  the best  experts  go abroad from
Hungary leaving behind the less competent ones (Publius Hungaricus 2007).
From time to time certain Hungarian politicians appeared telling promises that they would
change the rules of the game, however, at the end they made the rules to serve them, thus increasing
the people who think that for success having relationships is prevalent (Tóth 2017: 42-43.).
The  lack  of  trust,  the  feeling  of  injustice,  the  selective  understanding  of  norms  and
paternalism provide a solid ground for politicians who do not want to find a cure to these, but rather
aim to exploit them (Tóth 2017: 43.).
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Out of the continuous disruptions of the political  direction of Hungary, only at least  the
minimal  consensus of  the political,  economic and intellectual  Hungarian elites could provide a
solution. Ernest Renan stated that the nation is a common memory from the past and a common
plan for the future. The problem of the Hungarians in the 20th century was that they could not agree
on an accepted plan for the future and Hungary was not able to move forward. From the late 19th
century there were oppositions between becoming independent or making a compromise with the
Austrians, between nationalists and liberals and between people suffering from an Orbán-phobia
and dogmatic Orbánists mutually disowning, casting off the other and what they represent, casting
off each other from the nation and calling them traitors. These acts of contempt, malice and hate
that lead to polarization have not been overcome within Hungarian society in the past century, thus
its memory lives among the Hungarians (Gyurgyák 2017: 71.).
Hungarian politics is one major reason that undermines the state to catch up with Western
Europe for a hundred years as fearful, worried and uncertain regimes ruled after one another that in
their fear of the next regime changes only concentrated to prolong their rule. For this they needed a
tremendous amount of money. First these regimes were financed or forced to be financed from
domestic sources, then they contacted foreign sponsors. The former undermined the development of
the state and the security of the property. The state, which could not advance economically, wasted
their  financial  sources  on  maintaining  the  regime,  thus  the  vulnerable  regime  at  the  end  was
dependent on the external sources. When each regime failed, another one came and repeated the
same cycle. These fearful regimes and the semi-skilled elites reproduce each other as the former
takes  advantage  of  the  latter,  and  the  latter  is  not  able  to  prevent  the  new,  next  regime  from
undergoing the same cycle. Thus, the NER (the system of the Orbán regime) may be considered as a
symptom of a far deeper problem. The fundamental problem does not lie in the Orbán regime, but
in the distorted mechanism how the Hungarian political system works. Although the failures of the
regime changes were consequences of the disease of Hungarian politics, the Hungarian elites could
be held responsible for not treating their patient (Gyurgyák 2017: 74.).
Today the people who constitute  the middle class in  Hungary,  considering their  income
situation, their standard of living is in a shaky position, do not have savings to make smaller or
bigger  reparations  on  their  houses,  are  not  able  to  put  money  aside  for  the  future  and cannot
compensate their short of income due to an illness. The layer of society who is able to speak more
languages, able to adapt constitute the minority of Hungarians (Tóth 2017: 42.).
Hungary’s history, the past has consumed the present and the future of Hungary, Hungary
could not leave behind the past, when a new autocratic regime by the Fidesz was formed many
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years after the collapse of the communism that is based on loyalty without conditions, corruption,
manipulation and a contra-selective political system (Bartha 2021).
5.3. The Orbán regime and its “illiberal democracy”
In this sub-Chapter the rule of the Fidesz since 2010 until the present day (2021) is analyzed,
but not in depth, focusing on the main policies, norms, behaviors, direction of the government that
are affecting the lives of the Hungarian citizens and the collective identity of Hungarians.
Viktor Orbán with the Fidesz party had already governed Hungary for one term between
1998 and 2002, but he won the elections again in 2010, then in 2014 and then in 2018, though from
1998 to 2010 many things had changed like the direction of the Fidesz and what kind of people the
leaders  of  the  Fidesz  turned  into  since,  as  already  mentioned  above,  Orbán  demanded  the
withdrawal  of  the  Soviets  in  1989.  Many  Hungarians  may  have  trusted  Orbán  and  the  new
government when they elected him to power in 2010, especially after the economic crisis and the
issues with the previous non-Fidesz governments such as lies, corruption, socialist illusions or the
already mentioned issue of privatization, among others, but in 2021 it seems Orbán topped other
political parties’ level of corruption, at least.
Between 1990 and 2010, a democratic system may have been working for a while, but due
to Hungary’s labile ground for democracy and its authoritarian, dictatorial past, the appearance of
democratic deficit was not striking. The Fidesz’s Hungary may be called today as an authoritarian
populist regime or in other words a competitive authoritarian regime, where elections are unjust,
twisted, but there are opposition parties taking part in them, unlike in Russia where citizens cannot
vote for an opposition party making it a dictatorship. First in 2010 the Fidesz won occupying two-
thirds of the parliamentary seats, which helped them form a constitutional majority that meant the
Fidesz could govern and even change the Hungarian constitution how they like without the say of
opposition parties (Ádám 2019).
The success of Fidesz is linked to a great extent to its redistributive policies, the creation of
a  business  clientele  and  reallocating  resources  into  richer  segments  of  society,  increasing
inequalities. The Fidesz’s policies have especially supported middle and upper-middle classes that
provide the base of supporting the regime. EU funds are often allocated to the clientele of the
regime (Ádám 2019).
Orbán’s regime may also considered to be a hybrid regime, which is the mix of having
democratic institutions and an anti-democratic exercise of power, transition between democracy and
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clean dictatorship. This re-emergence of authoritarianism is not considered to be solely a Hungarian
event,  but  a  worldwide  phenomenon.  By  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  which  supported
authoritarian regimes, and the United States becoming the only superpower in the world supporting
democratic systems, providing aid based on democratization democracies had increased worldwide
by 89 countries in 2005. However, the opponents of democracy realized it is easier, less costly to
“hack” democracies from the inside creating “illiberal democracies”, which are formally operational
multi-party systems, but the civil rights, the liberal components of democracy, the rule of law and
the checks and balances are constrained, abolished to certain degrees (Filippov 2018).
The  Fidesz  is  controlling  the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of  power  but  the
independence of courts is also weakening, moreover the Fidesz has dominated all areas of social life
from commerce to sports. Fidesz successfully overruled the checks and balances of the system and
transformed  the  state  media,  the  Constitutional  Court,  the  Electoral  Commission  and  other
organizations to be loyal to them. Orbán is often called as a real dictator, however he does not
aspires to be the “father of the nation”, but instead aims to polarize and divide the voters while
securing the support of the biggest group (Krekó and Enyedi 2018).
Orbán’s aim was to rearrange state regulations and the political arena to provide the Fidesz
with great advantages in the uneven playing field of their hybrid regime. Systemic corruption has
become the most famous characteristic of the regime. An emerging clan state is disguised in the
colors of the Fidesz that has a parasitic behavior upon the Hungarian society and the state itself. It is
argued the nationalist propaganda, the centralization of power and the discrimination, xenophobia
and the hate propaganda, among others, constitute the base of the regime. Nationalism in Hungary
has appealed for many Hungarians after feeling dissatisfied with the post-communist circumstances
as it gives them an identity and shows them where they belong in an otherwise alien, broken land
(Bozóki and Cueva 2021: 109-112.).
It is indeed true in the Orbán regime the loyal party members and the favored Hungarians
get ahead and are able to accomplish their interests on the expense of other people. To name one
example  the  Hungarian  courts  may  decide  in  a  case  in  a  manner  that  there  is  no  Hungarian
constitution the judges would have to be clinging to each time. There may be orders coming from
above how some judges should decide, and even unfairly on the expense of the other. Thus, the EU
critics about Orbán that in Hungary the rule of law is violated are indeed correct.
It is argued the Orbán regime is utilizing, co-opting the societal void left after the fall of
communism and the Fidesz is aiming to recreate the Hungarian collective identity on the base of a
unique  Hungarian  identity,  conservatism  and  religion.  This  is  done  by  emphasizing  national
symbols, national cohesion and the use of rhetoric, narrative against the migrants, the EU or certain
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businessman. It is especially creating an “us versus them” narrative in its propaganda, propagating
the end of the “traditional Hungarian culture” and displaying a lot of stereotyping and prejudice
against non-group members. Thus, nationalism and national belonging became the cement that hold
together Hungarian society and the rule of the Fidesz on the ruins of communism (Newberg 2019:
18-20.).
The Fidesz has been making an effort to change Hungarians, to install fear in them through
the  government  propaganda  since  2015  against  George  Soros  and  the  millions  of  immigrants
arriving to Europe. By 2017 the Fidesz media empire included all the regional newspapers and
some of the most popular TV channels and news websites. In 2017 a lot of money was spent on
different  types  of  propaganda against  Hungary’s  “enemies”  such as  the  migrants,  Brussels  and
George Soros. By 2015, the anti-foreigner attitude in Hungary had increased the most in Europe, as
only 10 percent of Hungarians would have permitted migrants to enter Hungary (Krekó and Enyedi
2018).
It is stated that the years of exposure of the Hungarians to the Orbán hate propaganda will
change them to be receptive, to buy the message as 87 percent of Hungarians supported the anti-
migration attitude and this  propaganda is  dangerously similar to  the Kádár pact made with the
Hungarians:
“If you mind your own business and let us conduct the affairs of the state as we see fit, you will be fine… the
others, who aren’t like you somehow, aren’t fit or worthy of the same rights or protection as you are because they
are free-riders, cherry-pickers, they don’t fit into what we think is the right way of a human being to exist.”
(Hopkins 2020).
Some of the Orbán regime’s greatest faults, ignorance have been the state of the healthcare
in  Hungary,  the  increasing  inequality,  providing  no  fundamental  rights  for  the  people  and  the
negative effect on Hungarian mentality. Even though policies can be shifted, the cumulative effects
of the Fidesz propaganda could not be changed in a short period:
“What will remain is this mindset that you are not responsible for anyone but yourself and your smaller, nuclear
family… that you don’t really have to care that there are second-class citizens, and that  the different social
groups within society should be kept apart and not care for each other. Any law can be overturned, policies
reversed, but these ideas cannot be undone overnight.” (Hopkins 2020).
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It is argued the Orbán regime has been capitalizing on the politicization of Hungary’s past,
especially  the  interwar  period  or  the  Horthy-era.  Orbán  used  particular  understandings  and
narratives, such as the metaphorical link between the 2006 anti-government protests and the 1956
Hungarian Revolution, the victim discourse that Hungarian historical events occurred by external
forces and the new constitution in 2012, as it could serve a more complete end to the Soviet legacy,
moreover the politicization of Trianon, the new Citizenship Law and the recalling of the “urbanist-
populist” opposition, which divided the Hungary society within the interwar period into two groups:
the  liberal,  socialist  and  Jewish  elites  from  Budapest  against  the  “true”  Hungarians  of  the
countryside  and  the  peasants.  Creating  a  narrative  that  Hungarians  have  been  still  suffering  a
collective trauma due to Trianon and that Horthy stands as a predecessor to Orbán (Toomey 2018:
1-3.).
Since  1998  Orbán  has  been  advocating  for  a  cultural  and  social  reunification  with  the
Hungarian diaspora in the Carpathian Basin and leaning towards more and more positively towards
Horthy. Orbán has based his messages on a national unification project that could somehow resolve
the Treaty of Trianon. The policies of the new Citizenship Law and the Day of National Cohesion
fit  into this  framework.  Since  the 2015 European migration  crisis,  Orbán has  aimed to defend
Hungary against a “second Trianon” by building a  border fence and implementing a campaign
against  the  liberal  Western  Europe and Brussels.  In  2014 after  Russia  annexed Crimea,  Orbán
publicly demanded from Ukraine to provide autonomy to the Hungarians in Ukraine, but it was
rejected and it is thought to be rather a message intended for the domestic public. Orbán also framed
Brussels as “the new Moscow” trying to colonize Hungary, while claiming to be an “antidote” to
the  former  incompetent,  “urbanist”  government  of  Ferenc  Gyurcsány  and  the  liberal  elite  of
Hungary (Toomey 2018: 7-15.).
The most significant development around the memory of Trianon has been the fact that after
the Fidesz formed a government in 2010 the Hungarian Parliament adopted a new law about the
memory of Trianon and the day of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon became the Day of National
Cohesion, which implies the togetherness of the disrupted, detached national communities. The new
XLV. Law of 2010 defined Trianon to be one of the worst tragedies of the Hungarians, which have
caused unresolved issues until today. It further states the resolution of problems have to be done
according to the principles of international law, through the cooperation of equal states based on
mutual respect. Then mentions the unified Hungarian nation is under the authority of multiple states
and that  the  national  cohesion  of  the Hungarian  communities  should be  built  beyond the  state
borders (Feischmidt 2014: 59-60.).
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According to Éva Kovács, the memory of Trianon has long not been a primary experience
but is part of the communicative memory of the Hungarians. Today’s concept of Trianon (Day of
National Cohesion) is an ideological form that makes historical debates to serve politics and creates
attitudes,  not  patriotism,  but  instead  an  increasing  xenophobia,  a  desire  for  revenge  and
ressentiment that are present more or less in all  societies.  Instead of collective trauma, Kovács
interprets Trianon as collective narcissism that the Hungarians lost their dominant position once and
for all in the Carpathian Basin. Thus the discursive, performative recalling of Trianon, even on
school memorial days is an irresponsible, narcissistic neurosis, instead of processing the past. There
is no memory besides Trianon that could fill the major place of the Hungarian memory politics. The
memory of Trianon is the expression of a long-term, controversial societal crisis and the initiative to
solve this crisis in the way of a symbolic, ritual restoration for the humiliated self-esteem, instead of
taking action in real time and in real space. Trianon is the symbol of a Hungary, which, instead of a
response to the crisis, chooses the imagination of the ethnically and historically unified nation. The
symbols of Trianon and Greater Hungary together provide the picture of an uplifting, self-confident,
recognized national past. Thus, the main statement is that a new societal crisis creates the need for
the Hungarian symbols, memories of former collective traumas (Feischmidt 2014: 54-58.). This
may be a valid evaluation of how the Orbán government transformed the memory around Trianon
but not the real memory of Trianon in the Hungarian collective consciousness.
The fact that thanks to the European Union it is easier to cross the borders, especially with
Slovakia that is part of the Schengen zone and the Dual Citizenship law of the Orbán government
are  to  be  valued,  because  these  indeed  provide  a  chance  for  Hungarian  minorities  abroad  to
establish a stronger connection with their home, Hungary.
However, Orbán really should not compare himself to earlier Hungarian politicians as today
times have changed and creating a discourse based on false promises or which have negative effects
on the  Hungarians  are  not  to  be welcomed.  Then,  the  celebration  day of  the  Day of  National
Cohesion may be counter-intuitive to be a celebration, because it reminds Hungarians on quite the
opposite that the Treaty of Trianon rather disrupted the Hungarian nation and made the Hungarian
minorities grew apart from Hungary. The day of signing the Treaty of Trianon may have to remain a
day  of  mourning  if  Hungarians  are  to  remember  this  event.  It  is  another  question  whether  to
remember  for  Trianon  or  not  to  remember,  but  as  it  may  not  have  been  processed  by  many
Hungarians,  have  not  been  accepted  and  the  right-wing  and  the  far-right  supporters  would
commemorate  it  anyway,  June  4th may better  not  be  a  celebration  day  as  it  is  an  act  of  self-
deception. If one is to create a Day of National Cohesion then perhaps that day could have been put
on another date.
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While  Stephen  Béla  Várdy  (1997)  argued  Trianon  shook  the  life-foundation  of  the
Hungarians and is still to be felt in the Hungarian collective identity as a national malady, Orsolya
Putz  (2019)  also  acknowledged  the  Treaty  of  Trianon  still  plays  a  great  role  constructing  the
national identity. Putz thinks of Trianon as a metaphor in the Hungarian collective consciousness.
Putz views Trianon and the Peace Treaty as agents, as persons who cause harm, and as means of
disintegrating an object. Trianon is also viewed as a substance in the Hungarian mind and soul,
moreover perceived as mental and emotional illness. Moreover, Sava (2020) pointed out the Trianon
Trauma is  some kind  of  causa  prima  that  may influence  the  Hungarian  collective  identity  the
greatest  and it  belittles  other  events,  then Gábor Egry (2020) acknowledged that  the effects  of
Trianon  are  still  lasting  today  and  that  there  has  been  divisions  about  understanding  Trianon
between right- and left-wing political parties.
These interpretations may all be true and highlight the different sides of Trianon as it is a
complex event, while it may also be compared to the act when the limbs of the body of a human are
amputated.
Overall, it can be stated that the Trianon Trauma has not been processed by the Hungarians,
because after new negative events occurred, the Hungarians, their collective did not have time to
process all that, after the regime change the Hungarians may not have been able to take their fate
and future into their own hands, there may be too much apathy, indifference in the people. The
people may notice what is happening but then shrug their shoulders.
5.4. The negative socio-psychological Hungarian environment
Since the 20th century changes have been undergoing within the Hungarian population and
there is a tendency of them not to know the past, aiming to abolish the past, to put their selfish
interests in the focus, to act based on ego and achieve a more advantaged position than others, to
embody  hate  and  after  a  while  these  people  even  begin  to  hate  themselves,  because  they  are
unsuccessful, they are lonely and then giving and receiving love is too late, thus after as they do not
mind, they indulge in the various methods of self-destruction, while also call for the self-destruction
of others. The crisis of the Hungarian consciousness has never been this terrible (Nemeskürty 2003:
130-131.).
It  can  be  argued  that  Stephen  I  of  Hungary  laid  down the  foundation  and  the  general
direction  the  Hungarians  should  follow a  thousand  years  ago  by  making  Hungary  a  Christian
Kingdom, however, this direction has been questioned both in the 20th and 21st centuries. The fate of
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Hungary  and its  place  in  Europe can  be  summed up in  the  following three  standpoints.  First,
Hungary is geopolitically considered to be between two major powers, Germany and Russia, among
whom either one will likely “eat” Hungary, that has determined Hungary’s foreign policy. Secondly,
that Hungary is situated in Central Europe between Europa Occidens or Western Europe and Europa
Oriens or essentially the Russian world either with its own characteristics or more distorted, chaotic
characteristics in the so-called “Middle-Europe”. Lastly, Hungary may be considered to be on the
semi-periphery of European civilization that it  follows the patterns of societal  organization and
political philosophies of the Center but in a deformed way (Gyurgyák 2017: 55-56.).
There is a common aspiration in Hungary to catch up with Western European development
since the end of the Dual  Monarchy,  so at  least  for  a  hundred years,  but  with less success as
Hungary still remains on the semi-periphery. There are many people in Hungary who view the West
either through pink fog, through illusions, or are fundamentally standing against the West, but there
are less “Western realists” (Gyurgyák 2017: 57.). 
One of  the  most  fundamental  elements  of  the  Hungarian  self-image and the  nationalist
historical traditions is Hungary as the champion of freedom and independence.  One of the key
elements of Hungarian political thinking and its biggest fiction is the thought of total sovereignty
(Gyurgyák 2017: 58.).
If the past 100-110 years of Hungarian history is analyzed considering political-ideological
systems, the conclusion is that a dozen fundamental regime changes have occurred. To summarize
these fundamental changes, the dates are the following: 1918, March 1919, August 1919, 1944,
1945,  1948,  October  1956,  November  1956,  1989  and  the  most  recently  2010  by  the  Fidesz
(Gyurgyák 2017: 52-53.).
On top of these turns, if one is to add the territorial changes of the 20 th century, the foreign
occupations, the migration of a great proportion of Hungarians, moreover the ideologies of the state
and private medias from the “imperial ambitions of Hungarianness”, to “we are alone”, “no, no,
never” slogens, from the “bastion of Christianity” or “the last fortress of Europe” to “the nation of
the East” or “the last ally of Fascism”, from “the best apprentice of Stalin” to “illiberal democracy”,
the difficulty of the task at hand seems overwhelming. These continuous interruptions, the lack of
organic  societal  development,  the  restarts  and  failures  and  the  contrasting  ideologies  have
continuously damaged the public opinion and the Hungarian society (Gyurgyák 2017: 54.).
According to Tóth’s (2010) study, it was concluded that Hungary is situated exactly on the
value map as its geographic position would predestine it to be, on the periphery of Western culture
and  near  to  the  Balkan  and  orthodox  worlds.  The  study  highlighted  four  phenomenons  that
constitute the structure of the Hungarian value system. First of all, the Hungarian society strongly
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lacks trust towards fellow citizens and the institutions. Secondly, Hungarians are in an ambiguous
relationship  with  complying  and  breaching  the  norms.  Their  ability  to  perceive  corruption  is
relatively high, but they regard it as part of life, and they regard the practices of corruption to be a
habit of norm-breaching fellow citizens, not themselves. Third, the inequalities within the economy
are perceived to  be  unfairly  high and the  ways to  succeed in  society and the  mechanisms are
considered to be unacceptable as instead of performance, success is linked to breaching the norms,
finding the loopholes, stepping on other people on the way up, thus viewing the operation of the
economy as a zero-sum game. Climbing the ladder of the societal hierarchy has been dependent
upon  the  social  capital  Hungarians  have  and  to  a  lesser  extent  on  aspirations  or  on  personal
ambitions. Finally, the Hungarian society is highly dependent upon the state: redistribution and state
solutions are preferred instead of the solutions, mechanisms of the market. Furthermore, in 2013 in
a follow-up study the perception was examined that when “their people” are in power in politics,
they tend to trust better the institutions they control and these people are more forgiving about the
corruption “their” party undertakes. This means the previously known tribal mentality has rather
strengthened by 2013 than it was in the past 15-20 years (Tóth 2017: 37-39.).
Still, looking at the European values’ map, it is visible that from North to South, from West
to East Hungary is not out-of-place on this map regarding the indicators of trust,  tolerance and
attitude towards norms (Tóth 2017: 43.).
There is one more way to approach the question of Hungarian mentality, which is to analyze
the historical cultural patterns and the long-term prevalent societal groups that provide the basis for
Hungarian mentality. Two societal  groups had been the determining ones throughout Hungarian
history, which are the mentality of the serfdom and peasantry and the mentality of the noblemen and
gentry.  The  well-known  mentality  of  the  serfdom  and  peasantry  constituted  the  respect  for
traditions, fear of reforms, jealousy, hating the rich, distrust, diligence, selfishness, self-exploitation,
stubbornness, backwardness. While the noblemen-gentry mentality was characterized by a tendency
to rule, administrative experience, a historical sense, materialism, over-consumption, individualism,
selfishness,  protectionism,  aspiration  for  guise,  respect  for  authority,  passive  resistance,
antisemitism, “rank syndrome”, etc. These two mentalities have been the dominant in Hungarian
society in contrast to aristocrat, proletarian or civilian mentalities, as the latter had not developed to
a greater extent in Hungary (Gyurgyák 2017: 66.).
Zsolt  Beöthy derived the  characteristics  of  the  Hungarian  nation  from its  antiquity  and
Asianness as many others too. He argued in his work from the late 19th century that the essence of
the Hungarian mentality can be found in the image of “the lone horseman”. He draws the picture of
a horseman appearing from ancient times near the Volga river on the steppes as he calmly stands
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and pays attention to the surroundings. He is calm, has no fear and no illusions, only regards the
things  he sees,  but  with a  clear  vision.  According to  Beöthy,  this  provides  a picture about  the
Hungarian spirit and the way of life of the earlier nomad Hungarians. He states that this thousand-
year old horseman-nomad experience was deeply embedded in Hungarians and the characteristics
of courage, barbarian pride, love of freedom, directness and willingness of resistance. Others derive
a different shade of characteristics from this Asian inheritance, such as a warrior-like, ruling people
with either a negative or positive connotation. Sándor Karácsony concluded this unique mentality
differing  than  the  European  in  the  characteristics  of  passive  resistance,  apposition  of  people,
dissension, waiting for wonders and postponing tasks. However, the link with this ancient nomad,
Asian mentality may be questionable due to the amount of time passed since then and the ethnic and
migrational changes that occurred in a thousand years (Gyurgyák 2017: 64.).
Another  perspective to  approach the characteristics of the Hungarian nation is  by Lajos
Prohászka, who condensed the characteristics of each nation, community into a symbol, into one
metaphysical image that describes them, for example the Romans as organizers, the English as
settlers,  the  Germans  as  wanderers.  These  images  do  not  describe  the  results  of  biological  or
historical developments, but embody the objective spirit, which guides that nation. He argued that
the Hungarian is a hidden, concealed soul characterized by finitism, the aspiration for finitiness,
simplicity and delimitation, while also being reluctant towards problematic, unresolved issues. The
Hungarian person does not have relatives, he or she is being abandoned, not being understood, is
unwelcomed to being seen in Europe, thus consequently he or she puts himself or herself in a box,
delimiting himself or herself. The finitist is in constant running from the facts, as he or she feels to
be beaten down, consumed by them, and even if he or she returns to these things, it is in the form of
dreaming. From the position of being in the opposition and in the dreams though, it is impossible to
rule, to form a reality without being crippled and broken, meaning not others but rather himself or
herself.  There  are  two ways  the  Hungarian  is  running from the  facts,  either  escaping  into  the
national past or into bitterness. The author concludes that it is not impossible to break out from this
image and states that the foreign, looked down upon, hiding soul who had to escape from the East
may find the way to the West (Gyurgyák 2017: 65.).
Social psychologist Béla Budai identified some characteristics of the Hungarian mentality,
such as depression, alcoholism, despair, withdrawal, a tendency of self-destruction, for which one
reason the Hungarians had to  repress much about  themselves  in  the past  hundred years.  Some
examples may be shame, hopelessness or keeping a secret about relatives who emigrated due to the
1956  Hungarian  Revolution  or  the  guilt  complex  about  the  pre-1918  behavior  towards  other
nationalities in historical Hungary. If someone is thinking about Hungarian nationality, he or she
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may be labeled as a nationalist, however, it is perceived that the suppression of the past results in a
Hungarian identity crisis (Deme 1998: 314.).
János Gyurgyák argued the first attribute that characterizes the Hungarians is that they are
individualists to a great degree, there is great selfishness in the Hungarian people, to satisfy their
own interests, while the social and community life of Hungarians is weak. Secondly, the Hungarian
society is a divided and polarized community and only the necessity and the common language
binds it  together.  Thirdly,  the Hungarian society is  hateful and selfish.  This correlates with the
polarization  as  the political  and intellectual  elites  incite  and make people uncertain,  instead  of
lending help to them. He does not see old characteristics present today such as friendly, welcoming,
hospitable, laughing people. The fourth characteristic is that the Hungarians are complaining, it is a
dissatisfied society. Dissatisfaction is not a negative attribute in itself, because it may lead to more
action, but this is not the case with the Hungarians. If one looks back at the Hungarian history of the
20th century, they notice the fate of the Hungarians was not merciful and the two events of Trianon
and 1944-1945 has to a large extent changed the Hungarian society for the worse (Bartha 2021).
If one is to understand the present characteristics of the Hungarian collective identity, the
period of socialism cannot be neglected. The ideological structure during the Soviet occupation to
maintain  peace  in  the  society  did  destroyed and suffocated  the  Western  values  and behavioral
patterns, constrained the use of creativity and innovation, honored loyalty, conformity and made the
status quo a norm, while punished any divergence from it (Tóth 2017: 40-41.).
A lack of trust towards the institutions might mean the parents, grandparents in Hungary had
negative experiences. In familial memories, historical memories there is a picture about Hungary
that reminds them Hungary did not have its own public life, public administration but it was always
dominated, dictated by occupying forces, foreigners. If Hungarians think about succeeding in life,
they  remember  what  is  was  like  to  survive  the  era  of  socialism  and  the  “first  economy”.  If
Hungarians think about breaching norms as either a virtue or a sin, they reflect the earlier reality of
their relatives (Tóth 2017: 40-41.).
Studies have shown that at the time of the regime change in 1989, the classical and official
socialist values have decreased and the importance of material values have significantly increased.
In contrast to Europe, Hungarians are more hedonists, individualists, more aspiring for security, but
are adaptive to a lesser extent, are non-conformists, while the distrust towards the institutions and
people and their dissatisfaction about the present situation are conspicuous. They also less likely to
accept inequalities, interpret the norms selectively and have a tendency to accept the paternalist
behavior of the state (Gyurgyák 2017: 67.).
102
Furthermore, discussing the Hungarian mentality, the wagon camp logic or the tribal group
identities  are  unavoidable  to  mention.  The  rigid  political  group  identities  have  characterized
Hungarian politics, it is this logic that determines intellectual thinking. The structure that forms
rigid wagon camps is based on loyalty, personal relationships and capital, not on real achievements.
This logic  infected the traditional political  left-right  dichotomy and it  was further  burdened by
devastating oppositions. After all, this logic has serious consequences on intellectual independence,
not allowing to perceive, view the issues in itself, objectively with common sense but rather looking
at the circumstances too and whom would this opinion benefit (Gyurgyák 2017: 69-70.).
The Hungarian people generally consider the demographic situation of Hungary, the low
birthrate and the aging population of the country to be either a Western, European or Christian
phenomenon,  or  “the  Hungarian  curse”.  The  myth  that  there  is  a  higher  birthrate  in  each  of
Hungary’s neighboring countries for at least a century can be considered now a national tradition.
This “curse” is thought to be partly the cause of the Hungarian historical traumas and in a longer
term is argued it may lead to the death of the nation. This stands as a stubborn myth as 68 percent of
the interviewed Hungarians believed that in the neighboring nations more children are being born
than in Hungary in 2016. However, this myth is not true, because there are only slight differences
between  these  countries,  for  example  comparing  the  birthrates  of  Hungary  with  1,44  and  of
Romania with 1,34 or of Slovakia with 1,40 from 2016 do not  provide significant  differences.
Despite this slightly harsh myth, there is a continuous trend of population decline both in Hungary
and in Central-Eastern Europe that stated if the current circumstances do not change much, by 2020
there would be 9,5 million people in Hungary (which came true), while by 2050 it would decline to
8,2 million people (Kapitány and Spéder 2017: 177-185.).
The  phenomenon  of  population  decline  can  further  be  examined  in  the  populations  of
Hungarian  minorities  beyond Hungary’s  borders.  The number  of  Hungarians  in  the  Carpathian
Basin  decreased  by  more  than  1  million  persons  in  the  past  90  years.  If  the  proportion  of
Hungarians outside Hungary’s frontiers in the Carpathian Basin is examined, it was 32,1 percent in
1910,  while  it  decreased  to  17,6  percent  in  2001.  While  the  population  of  these  Hungarian
minorities was 2,763,625 person in 1991, it was expected to decrease to 1,934,152 persons by 2021
(Bárdi 2017: 130-135.).
In 2017 the fertility rate of Hungary was documented to be 1,4-1,5, which is better than the
absolute minimum of 1,24 in 2011 but lags behind the EU average of 1,6 (Kapitány and Spéder
2017: 177-185.).
Annamária Zseni (2017), who is a psychologist, analyzed the self-identity, the soul of the
Hungarian nation with specific psychological methods. 
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There  is  a  strong  sense  of  purpose  and  the  feeling  of  being  a  special,  chosen  nation
characterizing the Hungarians. The Saker falcon as the bird of the myth of the ancient Hungarian
origins represents the spirit bird of unconditional love. The vulnerability of the Hungarians can be
found in its identity, where the love, the trust were the defining features, straight talking without any
hidden agendas, deception or betrayal. The Hungarian can be deceived because they do not know
what was deception and thus their self-defense was not developed against it. There is a high degree
of negative emotions present such as fury and the feeling of inertia. The Hungarian collective at the
present is too weak to explore the pains of the past that puts a barrier between them and positive
emotions. Detaching from the past and their identity, and their life force create further weaknesses
(Zseni and Jelenczki, 2017: 113-120.).
The  duality  also  characterizes  the  Hungarian  collective,  which  points  to  the  need  for
balance. First of all, the Hungarians think of themselves as an outstanding nation, but on the other
hand Hungarians think they are a guilty nation, do not deserve a good fate and have to be punished
for  the  sins  of  others  too.  The  collective  subconsciousness  stores  a  power-seeking,  aggressive
ancient image about the nation. The unconditional goodness has a defining role in the collective,
this is why the intense rage, assertive, self-defending aggression are not acceptable emotions, but it
is not possible to survive without these. But if Hungarians are aggressive, then remorse, expiation,
sacrifice will follow. The shame, the sin and the conflict within the nation, moreover the remorse
deriving from these make the Hungarians unable to fight. Hungarians take on the role of the victim
even without any actual sins, because through the psyche they feel themselves to be guilty without
any real sins. The Hungarians need to believe that they are strong and connect with their ancient
operating identity. Before the earlier Christian faith, the clear and simple Hungarian ancient religion
was the base of the Hungarian identity. The focus of this religion was the unconditional fidelity
towards justice, which is a defining character of the Hungarians that may separate them from other
communities. The Hungarians may not feel themselves well in the present, because they are not
able to connect to their past and they exclude themselves from their place that way (Zseni and
Jelenczki, 2017: 72-76.).
The Hungarian nation fears its own emotions, its own conscience, power, unprocessed past,
identity, its own roots and not take them into account. The nation is hopeless, weak and due to the
internal turmoil it  hits the ground again. It is not able to stand up even when there are intense
internal urges. The pain is the representation of a complex definition that involves sadness, fear,
shame, guilt, grief and suspicion. The grief cannot be relieved, it cannot reach the level of fury. The
involvement  of  the  Hungarian  nation  in  this  pain  ties  down  its  energies,  thus  the  nation  is
incapacitated and is drifting towards the death of the nation without knowing what is happening.
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The  Hungarian  nation  is  not  acting  actively,  out  of  self-will  but  it  is  like  the  behavior  of  a
surrendering suicide. The Hungarian nation needs to let go of the pain, the sacrifices it had given,
by forgetting what had happened and moving on, otherwise the Hungarians may lose their life force
(Zseni and Jelenczki, 2017: 80-85.).
Due to the unresolved issues of the past the life force of the Hungarian collective is tied
down and the past issues are present being unresolved in the present, thus the collective lives in the
past (Zseni and Jelenczki, 2017: 121-123.).
The nature of the confusion is that in the present the Hungarian collective is in a frozen state
and the aspirations to act are low, while the collective’s emotional well-being is characterized by
sadness,  distrust,  hopelessness,  fear  and threat.  Being in  the actual  present  is  lacking from the
Hungarians and it is highlighted by the facts that there is no connection between generations and
there is no connection between the past and the present. Due to the weak life force and the self-
defending mechanisms, solving the present issues and the renewal are cannot be materialized. The
younger generation are leaving the Hungarian collective while the middle generations are prevented
from taking action through indifference and escapism through self-destruction. Due to the confusion
of the Hungarian collective identity, several events, turns are not being included exactly as they had
happened  whether  these  were  painful,  shameful  events.  The  counterfeiting,  encryption  of  such
events create gaps between generations, between the past and the present. Due to the presence of the
gap, the connection with the negative happenings is lost, but also with all of the past events. The
connection with the glorious past is also cut, from where the Hungarians could build their self-
confidence,  their  life  force,  their  self-identity.  In  this  way the  Hungarian  identity  is  becoming
uncertain and the rest of the given energies are unfocused, disintegrated. The lack of order is a
serious  issue  that  points  out  nothing is  what  it  seems to  be,  creating  uncertainty.  There  is  no
structure, mirror, a reliable environment where self-reflection, self-definition could take place. The
self-identity in an uncertain environment between the extremes may increase the confusion. In this
state, where there is a lack of order, the unprocessed issues of the past are indeed dangerous that
could bury the current system under itself (Zseni and Jelenczki, 2017: 121-123.).
After analyzing the Hungarian historical events of the 20th century, recent behavioral and
political  developments,  changes  in  Hungary  and  the  consequences  these  events  had  on  the
Hungarian collective identity, it is important to highlight and conclude the major findings about the
Hungarian socio-psychological environment or in other words within the Hungarian living space,
based on the experiences. The following statements below should be viewed as the major, general
trends, tendencies to describe the collective identity, especially on the societal, interpersonal levels,
the social identity of the Hungarians, but not the unique personal characteristics of the Hungarians.
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This does not mean that each Hungarian person may own such characteristics as it is described
below, but the majority may have a few or more of these behavioral patterns:
1. General fear and fear of the unknown: The dismemberment of Hungary due to the Treaty
of  Trianon  resulted  in  a  shock,  a  weakening  of  the  Hungarian  nation  by  external  forces  and
vulnerability that may have led to a fear of similar events, actions. The meaning of external forces is
highly relevant, as Hungary was tri-partitioned by the Ottoman invasion, the 1848-1849 Hungarian
Revolution was defeated by external forces, by the Russians, the Treaty of Trianon was endorsed by
the Allied powers and implemented by Hungary’s neighbors, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution was
also crushed by the Soviets and more recently the Orbán government is propagating Hungary is
threatened by the liberal West and the unknown, foreign migrants (preparing a “second Trianon”),
which are external forces. The fear of the unknown may be partially a legitimate source of fear.
Moreover, generally the communism has greatly broken the Hungarian society and inflicted fear
and terror upon them especially during Rákosi’s rule and how they retaliated the 1956 Hungarian
Revolution.
2. The culture of distrust: During the 44 years of communism the Hungarian people were
being observed by spies and informers and there were taboos the Hungarians were not allowed to
talk about. If someone was misbehaving, rebelling or mentioning events they should not have done,
they were punished or even taken away and never be seen again. They lost their trust and self-
confidence in themselves too. This created such an atmosphere that it was even not recommended to
trust their own family members and friends of the people, not to mention the authorities. In the post-
communist system the “speech of Öszöd” highlighted the best that the politicians, the government
cannot be trusted, because they could lie many times and promises are not kept.
3. Pessimism and a negative worldview: Pessimism and a negative worldview originates in
the Trianon Trauma that  disrupted the sense of unity of  the nation,  which was unjust,  and the
attempt to remedy it had failed due to the Nazi takeover in Hungary, while the Hungarians had to
suffer a lot under the communist dictatorship. After the regime change many Hungarians were and
have been disappointed by the existing issues, problems of the system, which can be seen through
the  high  level  of  nostalgia  of  the  Hungarians  towards  the  Kádár  era.  Due to  the  traumas  that
happened in the past and the low standard of living, poverty, the hopelessness Hungarians may feel,
moreover that the Hungarians do not see, do not find a solution to the issues that drag them down
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and lose hope. The Hungarians may be pessimists and may forcibly move to abroad to find a better
life, but it does not solve their issues.
4. Victim mentality, sense of a disrupted nation: These characteristics may be especially due
to the Trianon Trauma, the fact that the Hungarian collective was dismembered, amputated into
different parts when the Treaties detached the Hungarian minorities to abroad. This may be felt by
both Hungarians from Hungary or the Hungarian minorities.
5. Self-destructive behaviors and withdrawal: many Hungarians are prone to self-destruction
such as alcoholism, smoking, substances, suicidal acts and depression lacking a vital life force. This
had been at  the  lowest  point  during the  Kádár  era,  but  to  a  lesser  extent  present  in  the  post-
communist era. The vitality, the will of the Hungarians have decreased due to the hopelessness.
6. The culture of complaints, blaming others and not taking responsibility: Complaining may
have become a norm during the Kádár era when it was allowed to complain about anything except
the system and communism. In the post-communist  period it  is  common knowledge that  many
Hungarians complain about their lives, complain about the government even more openly but often
do not  do  anything to  better  the  situation,  to  take  the  responsibility  for  their  own actions.  By
complaining, blaming others the Hungarians justify their incapability to act.
7. Empty individualism, zero-sum game mentality and egoism: Due to the moral distortions
and deviant operation of the Kádár regime, Hungarians have become more materialistic individuals
and got used to pursuing their own interests not caring about the interests of the community as
during  communism the  Hungarians  were  treated  as  a  populace  not  being  able  to  defend  their
interests or have influence over the government. As inequalities have grown in the post-communist
system, some Hungarians could break out from the average standard of living and pursue their
selfish goals, while many developed their egos and did not care about other when climbing this
hierarchic ladder. Many Hungarians have become avoidant, insensitive to other people’s issues, a
lack  of  empathy.  These  characteristics  may  also  be  derived  from  the  long-standing  serfdom-
peasantry contra noblemen-gentry historical opposition.
8.  The culture of envy,  high level of  dependency:  The culture of envy is connected to the
empty  individualism  and  the  growing  inequalities,  when  Hungarians  became  more  and  more
envious  of  what  other  people  have  that  they  do not.  For  some Hungarians  the  low degree  of
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inequalities, the equality of socialism were just and optimal, but they also became more dependent
on the state and when this dependency ceased to exist, they could not adapt and could not be more
prosperous, were unable to be creative, take on challenges and go on an unfamiliar road. Then,
many Hungarians got used to not needing to participate or have a say in politics and developed
political apathy, indifference, not only because in communism it was the norm not to share your
opinion, not to vote, but also because of the recent Hungarian political culture.
9. Lack of morality, high level of corruption, cynicism: It has been possible to act immorally,
unethically since communism when the most loyal Communist party members had the most power
and could act with a certain degree of impunity, gain, earn more than they should and behave in
ways it should not be allowed. Such an atmosphere was passed on to the post-communist era, where
many Hungarians would say morality ceased to exist and the politicians, entrepreneurs are corrupt,
cynical and immoral.
10. Lack of life force, lack of courage, apathy: The anger, frustration of the Hungarians may
not  have  come  to  the  surface  at  the  time  of  the  region  change  due  to  the  transition  and  the
Hungarian people may not have taken back their self-determination and full ownership of their
country,  because  the  events  of  the  20th century  lessened  the  Hungarians’ bravery,  life  force,
togetherness and at the fall of communism, Hungarians were not that active, but may have been
rather  passive to  let  the former communists  get  away with their  punishments  and build a new
system on the former one.
11. Aloneness,  not being understood, isolation: As the metaphor of “the lone horseman”
depicted and based on the uniqueness of the Hungarian language, which does not have any real
linguistic relatives in Central-East Europe, moreover that the Hungarians migrated to the Carpathian
Basin from the East in contrast to the Indo-European neighbors, one may say the Hungarians are
like a small isolated island on the sea and their true relatives may lie towards the East far far away.
12. Lack of order: The Hungarian nation does not see the lack of order, which is surprising.
Without order there are great action dynamics, conflicts, ideas, initiatives alternating until the level
of  chaos.  The  good  intentions  and  the  plans  remain  without  structures  and  the  energies  are
consumed without  achieving the desired changes.  Without  order  there is  no creation,  the order
provides the structure and rhythm of the actions, thus it is needed. If the Hungarians are building on
the unresolved pain of the past, then there is no stability and in such a case the anger, the pain may
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resurface  and  destroy  the  present.  The  Hungarians  are  aiming  to  cover  the  nation’s  emotional
operations with the egoistic behaviors to keep the distance from emotions (Zseni and Jelenczki,
2017: 93-98.).
The Hungarian nation as  a  consequence of  the  historical  traumas reached this  negative,
current state, but this does not mean that Hungarians do not have positive characteristics and the
above-mentioned characteristics may only reflect rigidly the collective identity based on historical,
societal facts. It is important to highlight the Hungarians may be an indeed ancient folk or nation
based on the Sumerian-Hungarian language connection, and to mention the inclusive nature of the
Hungarian tribes from early times to the announcement of religious freedom first in Transylvania
within Europe. It is important to highlight the hospitality, the goodness of the Hungarians that can
be heard from foreign visitors. It is time the Hungarians regain their self-confidence and rediscover
their true strengths, virtues.
Leo VI the Wise, who was the Emperor of Byzantine and lived between 866 and 912, stated
the  Hungarians  endure  exhaustion,  the  coldness,  the  freeze,  the  burning  heat  and  destitution,
moreover they are freedom lovers and like magnificent things. Then, a French philosopher, Charles-
Louis Montesquieu, who lived between 1689 and 1755, stated the Hungarians are famous about
their  love  of  freedom,  heroic  courage,  noble  and  generous  character  and  there  is  a  legendary
reputation about their kind hospitality (Dr. Papp, 2019: 329-332.).
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6. Towards a positive, peaceful transformation
6.1. Readdressing the historical traumas
The trans-generational  effects  usually  have  traumatic  origins.  The trauma is  the  sum of
mental and physical insults that exceed the tolerance of the individual or the community, thus they
become incapable to effectively process what had happened and restore the former state of balance.
In the case of a community, which is not able to process traumatic events, the trauma has become
locked in the soul and creates a barrier between generations. This has the consequence that families,
larger  communities or  on the level  of  the society the unresolved issues may return (Zseni  and
Jelenczki, 2017: 20-24.).
The imprint of the events that have influenced, defined the fate of the nation is preserved
throughout the ages in the subconsciousness of the nation’s soul. The next generations are guarding
the symbolic crypt where these events, humiliations, wrongdoings, disgraces are embedded in the
walls. Until these are locked in the walls, the energy of the nation is stuck, tied down. There is a
need to explore all the secrets towards a better future, everything that is hidden, each disgrace,
secret and wrongdoings. There is a need to name all the wrongdoings and all the wrongdoers. It is
also the interest of the wrongdoers and their successors to unlock all the wrongdoings and take
responsibility, because only then reconciliation may occur. Someone or a nation may also feel to be
a  wrongdoer  when they  think  they  are  the  responsible  for  the  act,  but  they  did  not  have  any
influence on the happenings (Zseni and Jelenczki, 2017: 30-33.).
The steps of processing the unresolved past are looking at the facts, acknowledging them,
naming the responsible actors, taking responsibility for the actions of the Hungarians, apologizing
for any wrongdoings and integrating the results (Zseni and Jelenczki, 2017: 91-93.).
It is crucial to once again bring up the debate whether remembering or forgetting certain
events would do more good than harm to the society. First of all, the people who do not learn from
history will ultimately be deemed to repeat it. Without making younger generations to remember,
commemorate some crucial Hungarian events, how would they be more resistant to tricky political
manipulations and tactics, or against far-right or far-left agendas? Such movements usually climb in
through the window of society with undetectable slogans such as in the name of “freedom” or
“prosperity”. If people do not learn about their history, at least a little, they may become rootless.
People who do not know where they came from may not be able to determine the direction where
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they should head forward. Still, some traumas may be necessary to be forgotten as they take up too
much space in the collective to create space for a common, healthy future. Forgetting and forgiving
help  the  people  to  leave  behind  the  old  ways,  but  may  retain  the  valuable  lessons.  Thus,  a
combination of remembering and forgetting may be the ideal way after all.
In order to relieve the Hungarian collective from its past, the Hungarian history should be
taught in the schools as objectively as possible, the governing Hungarian government should not
implement,  propagate distorted facts,  false discourses or create celebration days from traumatic
events. New Hungarian leaders would be needed, who recognize the importance of getting to know,
realizing  and  processing  the  past,  because  only  then  the  collective  identity  of  the  younger
generations will be freed from the negative effects that are weighing down the society. Such new
leaders would also need to take responsibility for the mistakes, wrongdoings of the past and realize
the experiences, lessons of those.
6.2. Positive transformation of the Hungarian living space
In the current state there is no order in Hungary, because the Orbán government is one of the
most  corrupt  governments  of  Hungary  as  the  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  according  to
Transparency International has dropped 11 points to 44 by 2019 from 2012, becoming one of the
most corrupt  states in  the European Union besides Romania and Bulgaria  (Portfolio 2020),  the
Hungarian courts are not independent, the local governments do not have enough power, there is no
rule of law in Hungary and the well-being, interests of the Hungarians are not guaranteed, while the
return of the political parties of the opposition would not be promising either. Until there is no
order, no significant changes can be implemented. Thus, all the corrupt and unethical politicians,
entrepreneurs  and  leaders  should  be  removed  from power  and  in  a  bottom-up process,  a  new
generation of leaders and experts  may take over who genuinely care about the interests  of the
people and represent the Hungarians. When the corrupt, negative leaders are pushed out from the
system, then order may be gradually restored, which means the Hungarian courts will independently
responsibly represent justice, there will be rule of law, the new Hungarian and local governments
would be made accountable, the elections would be more ethical and fair, among others.
If there are moral, responsible leaders and the order is restored, then the well-being of the
Hungarian people would also increase and their lives would become better. The negative patterns of
the  Hungarian  society  through  the  guidance  of  the  leaders  and  all  the  entrepreneurs,  local
organizations could be teared down, deconstructed and cooperation may be encouraged between the
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people. The role of the local leaders is especially important too. Bottom-up organizations would be
highly important, because the people may better trust familiar leaders, not someone foreign to the
ordinary  citizens,  who were  selected  from the  members  of  a  political  party  as  distrust  is  high
towards  such persons.  Also,  in  the  digital  age  technology has  provided humans with  so many
opportunities that it may be difficult to mobilize people for a common cause than in earlier decades,
even though information is able to spread rapidly.
As a final step “the level of Middle-Europe” should be achieved by increasing diplomatic
relations with Hungary’s neighbors in the Carpathian Basin and through the advocacy of closer
cooperation with them. Before contacting the neighboring states where Hungarian minorities live,
closer contact and cooperation should also be established between these Hungarian communities
and ask them what would serve their interests, what would they like. Then, a more serious effort
should also be taken to reconcile completely and review the common history with the neighboring
states, because there are currently damaging discourses present and how history is taught affects the
people’s behavior. Each party should recognize the other, should be more empathetic and admit
their wrongdoings to each other, so that the relations between Hungary and its neighbors such as
Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and Serbia may be eased and the different issues such as the issue of
the Hungarian minorities may be addressed, resolved. Tangible results are not guaranteed, and as
mentioned above even the European Union may lack the will to help to guarantee minority rights,
but it would be in each party’s interest to provide the Hungarian minorities with more extensive
linguistic, cultural, educational rights, at least, and to respect their ways of life, their culture.
It may be argued that globalization could serve such minority issues in the long run in East-
Central Europe, but there is a value to native, ancient communities and their cultures that should not
be  forgotten  as  probably  many  values,  cultures,  knowledge  may  have  become  extinct  due  to
internationalization  and other  factors  such as  human greed.  Even if  the power of  globalization
brings different nations together and the younger generations may be more susceptible to positively
evaluate some nations than their ancestors did, one should never know how history will unfold,
moreover the more extensive, centralized power due to globalization can either be put in good or
evil hands that need to be taken into account.
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7. Conclusions
This research analyzed the Hungarian collective identity based on the historical trajectory of
the Hungarian nation from the origins of the Hungarians through the era of the Habsburgs into the
difficult, traumatic 20th century till the present age of the 21st century and how such historical events
have affected the behaviors, attitudes, mentality of the Hungarians, their subconsciousness and the
Hungarian living space.
Regarding the methodology, the realist, objective analysis of the historical events and the
idealism, the subjective analysis of how such events have affected the Hungarian collective identity
greatly  complemented  each other  throughout  the  work.  The approach of  historical  inquiry  was
proven to be quite effective to explore the link between the Hungarian people, the people who are
part  of  the  Hungarian  socio-psychological  environment  and  the  historical  events,  while
constructionism  aided  in  setting  up  the  “diagnosis”  about  the  negative  characteristics  of  the
Hungarian living space.
Collective  identity  or  in  other  words  collective  consciousness  is  formed  through  social
interactions between humans who are creating a “cloud of collective”,  which means they share
certain beliefs, values, understandings and to a lower or higher degree they become bound to each
other, conform to each other and may be mobilized. Collective identity means a joint awareness and
recognition that humans who constitute a group have the same social identity. Such collectives are
ranging from the family units, a circle of friends to political groups and nations. As many other
collectives, the Hungarian is a national collective that have pre-modern ancient roots, a common
language, a common history and more, who occupy a certain territory and share the same culture.
The Hungarian collective has generic and specific characteristics such as a common fate and shared
symbols such as the national flag.
The Hungarian socio-psychological environment was analyzed, which does not exclusively
contain ethnic Hungarians, who only practice Hungarian cultural traditions, speak Hungarian or live
in Hungary since birth or a longer time, but also people with multiple identities such as a Spanish
person  who  have  been  living  in  Hungary  for  a  longer  time  or  a  Hungarian  person  from the
Hungarian minority area in Serbia regardless of citizenship. A Spanish person may bring his or her
own characteristics,  but  he  or  she  may  gradually  become part  of  the  collective,  especially  by
speaking Hungarian after a longer period. A Hungarian person may also be part of the Hungarian
collective, who is living in the US for a longer time, but he or she had lived for a longer time in
Hungary and still preserves such characteristics and interact with their Hungarian family online.
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The collective  identity  of  the  Hungarians  have  been affected  negatively  by  the  Trianon
Trauma and the communist era in the 20th century, moreover the recent political developments since
the regime change and the by current Orbán regime in the 21st century.
The Trianon Trauma means the signing of the Treaty of Trianon on June 4 th, 1920 for many
Hungarians that dismembered Hungary into five unequal parts, but as this research highlighted the
Trianon Trauma has to be understood as a process, and not a single event that led to the fall of the
historic Hungarian Kingdom due to internal and external reasons, while the consequences of this
trauma, this  dismemberment has far-reaching effects ranging from the irredentist  politics of the
interwar period until the celebration of the Day of National Cohesion implemented by the Orbán
regime.  The  Trianon  Trauma  is  still  defining  Hungarian  historical  memory  and  was  named  a
national malady, the substance in the Hungarian mind, among others as it is still  present in the
Hungarian collective. The legacy of Trianon has lived on in the lives of the Hungarian minority
communities as they have been facing from time to time a difficult fate in the neighboring countries
of  Slovakia,  Ukraine,  Romania  and  Serbia.  Although  Trianon  did  not  only  have  negative
consequences, it meant and means for many Hungarians, either consciously or subconsciously the
disruption of a sense of belonging, trauma, a loss and others.
Then,  the communist  period with  its  44 years  was indeed detrimental  to  the  Hungarian
society. The Soviet occupation, the mass rape, then the merciless rule of Rákosi and the spread of
terror, the enemy-seeking led to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution that was brutally crushed and the
actions retaliated. It broke down the bravery, the self-confidence of the Hungarians, and on top of
this the past, talking about Trianon was suppressed. The following Kádár regime was built on the
retaliation of the Revolution and this soft dictatorship bribed the Hungarians with the high standards
of living to become collaborators in their own suppression. Although the regime’s 33 years had
some positive attributes, in the long-term it led to an increased dependency on the state, rise of self-
destructive behaviors, culture of distrust and political apathy, among others.
The  regime  change  and  the  dismantling  of  communism,  the  new  democratic  system
highlighted the issues the communist period left behind and did not bring the promised hope for the
Hungarians  such  as  increasing  inequalities  or  the  return  of  ex-communists.  Then,  the
democratization of the 2000s did not prove to be successful and the lying, the cynical political
culture was reflected in the “speech of Öszöd”, besides other major issues such as corruption that
topped in the Orbán regime after 2010. The Orbán regime has become the most corrupt one in
Hungary with its defining rich business clientele, with its hateful propaganda and manipulation,
with  its  strong  grip  on  power  and  with  tearing  down  the  democratic  checks  and  balances  in
Hungary. It has co-opted the historical memories of Hungarians about Trianon, Horthy, the lives of
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the Hungarian minorities, moreover created enemies from the migrants, Brussels and George Soros
with its rhetoric. Ultimately, Orbán did not represent the well-being, the interests of the Hungarians
but used them to maintain the regime and further distorted the Hungarian society.
As  a  result  of  the  Hungarian  historical  trajectory,  from  the  Trianon  Trauma  until  the
manipulation, experiences of the Orbán regime, the identified general, major characteristics of the
Hungarian collective identity, from which a Hungarian person may have a few, are the following: 1.
General  fear  and fear of the unknown, 2.  The culture of distrust,  3.  Pessimism and a negative
worldview,  4.  Victim  mentality,  sense  of  a  disrupted  nation,  5.  Self-destructive  behaviors  and
withdrawal, 6. The culture of complaints, blaming others and not taking responsibility, 7. Empty
individualism,  zero-sum  game  mentality  and  egoism,  8.  The  culture  of  envy,  high  level  of
dependency, 9. Lack of morality, high level of corruption, cynicism, 10. Lack of life force, lack of
courage, apathy, 11. Aloneness, not being understood, isolation and 12. Lack of order.
Readdressing  the  historical  traumas,  issues  should  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  positive
transformation  of  the  Hungarian  socio-psychological  environment.  As  the  political  system  in
Hungary  is  corrupted  and  there  are  no  moral,  competent,  genuine  leaders  who  represent  the
Hungarians, new ethical leaders should emerge with the support of the people in the context of a
bottom-up process, while the participation of the people and the role of local governments to restore
the order is also important. Along with such aspirations and especially when there is order and the
people are genuinely represented, the crypts of the traumatic historical events should be reopened,
the  facts  explored  and  the  responsibility  taken  for  them,  moreover  the  false  discourses  being
unjustified, then healing may occur that could ultimately reconnect the nations in the Carpathian
Basin with each other to increase cooperation and reach a state of positive peace.
Due to the limited scope of my study, further research may be conducted. First of all, on the
tools, methods how the Orbán regime utilizes historical memories to their advantage,  uses media
propaganda to manipulate  the people and how they are able  to  mobilize Hungarians to  stay in
power.  Secondly,  on  the  situation  of  the  Hungarian  diaspora  more  extensively  and  how  their
collective  identities  have  been  shaped,  how  did  they  live  through  these  hard  historical  times.
Thirdly, on the broader ethnic tensions and frozen conflict that exist between Hungary and some of
its neighbors such as Romania or Slovakia due to the Hungarian minorities living there. Moreover,
as this research did not include qualitative measures to assess the Hungarian collective identity,
neither it conducted interviews that could be done in a follow-up on this topic.
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A.1: The territorial attributes of the Carpathian Basin in the age of the Árpád-dynasty in about 11th 
to 14th centuries. This was the territory of the early historical Hungary or Greater Hungary.
Source: http://fenymag.hu/a-magyar-oshonos-a-karpat-medenceben/nagy-magyarorszag-2/ 
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A.3: A version of the Red Map of Pál Teleki showing the ethnographic map of Hungary in 1910. 









A.5: Territorial revisions of Hungary between 1938-1941 with the color green showing Hungary 
after the Treaty of Trianon.
Source: https://hu.pinterest.com/pin/485333297350747124/ 
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